# Negative

## Generic Shell

#### The 1AC is part of a desire to displace the insecurities of everyday life onto an external narrative- this entrenches militarism as ideology and presents it as a necessity

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Cardiff University, UK, Liberal militarism as insecurity,¶ desire and ambivalence: Gender,¶ race and the everyday geopolitics¶ of war, Security Dialogue¶ ﻿1–¶ 12

As Salter (2006: 180) explains, though, it is not simply that states manage subjects but that the¶ price of ‘freedom’, of an everyday life removed from insecurity, is that ‘we come to manage ourselves¶ through a confessionary complex’. Key to this is that we ‘recognize ourselves as a society, as¶ part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or of a state’ (Michel Foucault, cited in Salter, 2006: 181)¶ and regard others as outside this. The desire for this way of life means, therefore, that it is not just¶ existential insecurity that facilitates war and war preparedness, but the multitude of insecurities that¶ make up everyday life, from needing to have steady employment to wanting to feel part of a social¶ and political community. Thus, while global fears are materialized and affective in everyday sites,¶ other and often more pressing matters also play a role in the reproduction of liberal militarism (Pain¶ and Smith, 2008). As Dowler (2012: 497) points out, this is why it is vital to consider how ‘militarization¶ takes root in the banal processes of daily life that are essential to the reproduction of¶ sovereignty’.¶ As Eastwood (this issue) argues, though, everyday desire for war also animates militarism; fear¶ only gets us so far. Importantly, however, as Eastwood also contends, desire is not necessarily¶ fervent: it can be more ambiguous, even unconscious. Anthropologist Gerald Sider (2008: 124–¶ 125) sheds further light on this when describing the everyday as an achievement; as those ways in¶ which people work through and against the chaos, rupture and discontinuity that shape their lives¶ to ‘try to make and to claim some kind of ordinary – some stability to today, some continuity¶ between yesterday and tomorrow, in some parts of their lives at least’. Sider (2008: 125) moreover¶ maintains that ‘what we call everyday life does not name a feature or an aspect of social existence¶ … but a very high-stakes struggle’ – a struggle that is for many people throughout the world¶ ‘largely unavoidable and often in the medium to long run unwinnable’. The desire for the ordinary¶ should not be underestimated, therefore; it takes on a profound, if often taken-for-granted, importance¶ not least ‘because it belongs to the people who have it – it is their time, their space, what¶ makes their moments and their interactions their space and place’ (Sider, 2008: 129–130, emphasis¶ in original).¶ It is not difficult to imagine why this possession of ‘normality’ would be desirable to liberal¶ populations promised that freedom is the very condition of their existence. Perceived threats to that¶ freedom might motivate fears and suspicions that foster militarism. Equally, though, in the example¶ of Syrian airstrikes, and hostility and ambivalence to resettling Syrian refugees, the desire of¶ British citizens to have everyday lives free from concern about the everyday lives of others may¶ call into question the ability of Syrians to have not only an everyday but any life at all. While such¶ effects of desire to protect one’s own everyday are not always deliberate or callous, the prioritization¶ of some lives and ways of life over others facilitates biopolitical forms of state power that¶ entail that ‘the liberal way of war is governed, in part, by the very exercise of such discrimination¶ and the application of lethal violence to it’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 49).

#### Militarist ideology results in the permanent racialized targeting and elimination of bodies to maintain a global economy of violence, a process to which the peoples of the Global North will only respond with a disembodied indifference

Harting 6. [Heike, prof at University of Montreal, Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies, globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA\_Harting\_GlobalCivilWar]

.¶ Ondaatje's novel (2000) opens with an Author's Note that locates the narrative at a time when "the antigovernment insurgents in the south and the separatist guerrillas in the north???had declared war on the government" and "legal and illegal government squads were???sent out to hunt down" both groups. In this instance, the Hobbesian rhetoric of a "war of all against all" is more than a clich??. In fact, it is symptomatic of the novel's ambiguous critique of the role of the Sri Lankan nation-state and its elaborate, modernist discourse of violence. The Note foreshadows what the narrator later repeats on several occasions, namely that Sri Lanka's war is a war fought "for the purpose of war" (ibid., 98) and for which "[t]here is no hope of affixing blame" (ibid., 17). In short, the "reason for war was war" (ibid., 43). At first glance, the narrative's emphasis on the war's self-perpetuating dynamics implies a Hobbesian understanding of violence as the natural state of human existence. At the same time, it translates the actual politics of Sri Lanka's war into the Deleuzean idiom of the "war machine." For, according to Deleuze and Guattari, armed conflict functions outside the control and accountability of the "state apparatus???prior to its laws" (1987, 352), and beyond its initial causes. Although such an interpretation of Sri Lanka's war reflects what the political scientist Jayadeva Uyangoda calls the "intractability of the Sri Lankan crisis" (1999, 158), its political and ethical stakes outweigh its gains. 6¶ To begin with, the novel's leitmotif of "perpetual war" situates Sri Lanka's conflict within a general context of global war, because, as the narrator reports, it is fought with "modern weaponry," supported by "backers on the sidelines in safe countries," and "sponsored by gun-and drug-runners" (Ondaajte 2000, 43). In this scenario, the rule of law has deteriorated into "a belief in???revenge" (ibid., 56), and the state is either absent or part of the country's all-consuming anarchy of violence. This absence suggests that the state no longer functions, in Max Weber's famous words, as "a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory" (2002, 13). It is of course possible to argue that the novel's critique of the Sri Lankan nation-state lies in its absence. It seems to me, however, that the narrative's tendency to locate the dynamics of Sri Lanka's war outside the state and within a post-national vision of a new global order generates a normative narrative of global war. On the one hand, it resonates with the popular ??? though misleading ??? notion that the "appearance of 'failed states'," as Samuel Huntington argues in his controversial study The Clash of Civilizations, intensifies "tribal, ethnic, and religious conflict" and thus "contributes to [the] image of a world in anarchy" (1996, 35). On the other, situating Sri Lanka's war outside the institutions of the state re-inscribes a Hobbesian notion of violence that helps legitimize and cultivate structural violence as a permissive way of conducting politics. Such a reading of violence, however, overlooks that in a global context violence has become "profoundly anti-Hobbesian" (Balibar 2001, xi). Balibar usefully suggests that the twentieth century history of extreme violence has made it impossible to regard violence as "a structural condition that precedes institutions." Instead, he maintains, "we have had to accept???that extreme violence is not post-historical but actually post-institutional." It "arises from institutions as much as it arises against them" (ibid., xi). Thus, in such popular post-colonial narratives of war as Anil's Ghost, the normalization of violence figures as a forgetting of the institutional entrenchment and historical use of violence as a state-sanctioned political practice.¶ If Ondaatje's novel presents Sri Lanka's war as an "inherently violent" event (Das 1998), it is also an event narrated through the symbolism and logic of archaic primitivism. For example, in the novel's central passage on the nature of human violence, the narrator observes, "The most precisely recorded moments of history lay adjacent to the extreme actions of nature or civilisation ???Tectonic slips and brutal human violence provided random time-capsules of unhistorical lives???A dog in Pompeii. A gardener in Hiroshima" (Ondaatje 2002, 55). The symbolic leveling of the arbitrariness of primordial chaos and the apparently ahistorical anarchism of violence create a rhetoric of the archaic that is characteristic, as Nancy argues, of "anything that is properly to be called war" (2000, 128). He convincingly argues that archaic symbolism "indicates that [war] escapes from being part of 'history' understood as the progress of a linear/or cumulative time" and can be rearticulated as no more than a "regrettable" remnant of an earlier age (ibid., 128). In that, Nancy's observation coincides with Hardt and Negri's that the "war on terror" employs a medievalist rhetoric of just and unjust wars that moralizes rather than legitimizes the use of global violence by putting it outside the realm of reason and critique. In Nancy's observation, however, two things are at stake. First, what initially appears to be a postmodern critique of the grand narratives of history in fact demonstrates that a non-linear account of history may lend itself to the transformation of extreme violence into exceptional events. In this way violence is normalized as a transhistorical category that fails to address the unequal political and economic relations of power, which lie at the heart of global wars.¶ Second, Nancy rightly warns us against treating war as an archaic relic that is "tendentiously effaced in the progress and project of a global humanity" (2000, 128). For not only does war return in the process of negotiating sovereignty on a global and local plane, but the representation of war in terms of archaic images also repeats a primordialist explanation of what are structurally new wars. As theorists such as Appadurai and Kaldor have argued, the primordialist hypothesis of global wars merely reinforces those mass mediated images of global violence that dramatize ethnic wars as pre-modern, tribalist forms of strife. Huntington's notion of civilization or "fault-line" wars as communal conflicts born out of the break-up of earlier political formations, demographic changes, and the collision of mutually exclusive religions and civilizations presents the most prominent and politically influential version of a primordialist and bipolar conceptualization of global war. In contrast to Huntington's approach, however, the narrative of Anil's Ghost contends that all forms of violence "have come into their comparison" (Ondaatje 2000, 203). Notwithstanding its universalizing impetus, the novel thus insists on the impossibility to think the nation and a new global order outside the technologies of violence and modernity. Indeed, in the novel's narrative it is the suffering of all war victims that "has come into their comparison" and suggests that the new wars breed a culture of violence that shapes everyone's life yet for which no one appears to be accountable. On the one hand, then, the novel's self-critical humanitarian project seeks to initiate a communal and individual process of mourning by naming, and therefore accounting for, in Anil's words, "the unhistorical dead" (ibid, 56). On the other hand, read as its critical investment in the war's politics of complicity, the novel's humanitarian endeavor is countered by the narrator's tendency to articulate violence in archaic and anarchistic terms. For, to revert to the symbolic language of "primitivism and anarchy" and "to treat [the new wars] as natural disasters," as Kaldor observes (2001, 113), designates a common way of dealing with them. Thus the rhetoric of the archaic not merely dehistoricizes violence but contributes to the making of a normative and popular imaginary through which to make global wars thinkable and comprehensible. Thus, their violent excesses appear to be rooted in primordialist constructions of the failed post-colonial nation-state rather than a phenomenon with deep-seated roots in the global histories of the present. Such a normative imaginary of global war is produced for the Global North so as to dehistoricize its own position in the various colonial processes of nation formation and global economic restructuring of the Global South. In this way, as Ondaatje's novel equally demonstrates, the Global North can detach itself from the Global South and create the kind of historical and cultural distance needed to accept ultra-objective violence as a normative state of existence.¶ Conceptualizing war as a phenomenon of criminal and anarchistic violence, however, may do more than merely conform to the popular imagination about the chaotic and untamable nature of contemporary warfare. Indeed, anarchistic notions of violence tend to compress the grand narratives and petite recits of history into a total, singular present of perpetual uncertainty, fear, and political confusion and generate what the post-colonial anthropologist David Scott sees as Sri Lanka's "dehistoricized" history. Given the important role the claiming of ancient Sinhalese and Hindu history played in the violent identity politics that drive Sri Lanka's war, Scott suggests that devaluing or dehistoricizing history as a founding category of Sri Lanka's narrative of the nation breaks the presumably "natural???link between past identities and the legitimacy of present political claims" (1999, 103). This strategy seems useful because it uncouples Sri Lanka's colonially shaped and glorified Sinhalese past from its present claims to political power. We need to note, however, that, according to Scott, dehistoricizing the past does not suggest writing from a historical vacuum. Rather, it refers to a process of denaturalizing and, thus, de-legitimizing the normative narratives of ethnicized and racialized narratives of national identity.¶ Anil's Ghost engages in this process of "dehistoricizing" by foregrounding the fictitious and fragmented, the elusive and ephemeral character of history. Indeed, as the historian Antoinette Burton suggests, the novel offers "a reflection on the continued possibility of History itself as an exclusively western epistemological form" (2003, 40). The latter clearly finds expression in what Sarath's brother, Gamini, condemns as "the last two hundred years of Western political writing" (Ondaatje 2000, 285). Steeped in the imperial project of the West, such writing is facilitated by and serves to erase the figure of the non-European cultural Other in order to produce and maintain what Jacques Derrida famously called the "white mythology" (1982, 207) of Western metaphysics. The novel usefully extends its reading of violence into a related critique of knowledge production, so that the latter becomes legible as being complicit in the production of perpetual violence and war. This critique is perhaps most articulated through the character of Palipana, Sarath's teacher and Sri Lanka's formerly renowned but now fallen anthropologist. Once an agent of Sri Lanka's anti-colonial liberation movement, Palipana represents the generation of cultural nationalist who sought history and national identity in an essentially Sinhalese culture and natural environment. Rather than employing empirical and colonial methods of knowledge production and historiography, Palipana had left the path of scientific objectivity, tinkered with translations of historical texts, and "approached runes???with the pragmatic awareness of locally inherited skills" (Ondaatje 2000, 82) until "the unprovable truth emerged" (ibid., 83). Now, years after his fall from scientific grace, Palipana lives the life of an ascetic, following the "strict principles of" a "sixth-century sect of monks" (ibid., 84). To him, history and nature have become one, for "all history was filled with sunlight, every hollow was filled with rain" (ibid., 84). Yet, Ondaatje's construction of Palipana and his account of the eye-painting ritual of a Buddha statue ??? a ritual that assumes a central place in the novel's cosmopolitan vision of artisanship as a practice of cultural and religious syncretism in the service of post-conflict community building ??? are themselves built on a number of historical texts listed in the novel's "Acknowledgment" section. As Antoinette Burton astutely observes, "the orientalism of some of the texts on Ondaatje's list is astonishing, a phenomenon which suggests the ongoing suppleness of 'history' as an instrument of political critique and ideological intervention" (2003, 50). Rather than effectively "dehistorizing" the character of Palipana, then, Ondaatje bases this character and the eye-painting ceremony on a central Sri Lankan modernist text, Ananada K. Coomaraswamy's Mediaeval Sinhalese Art (1908/1956).¶ Cont ¶ For Hardt and Negri, then, the state of exception functions as the universal condition and legitimization of global civil war, while positioning the United States as a global power, which transforms war "into the primary organizing principle of society" (2004, 12). They rightly observe that the state of exception blurs the boundaries between peace and war, violence and mediation. Yet, curiously enough, Hardt and Negri's understanding of the state of exception largely emphasizes the concept's regulatory and pragmatic politics, so that the United States emerges as a sovereign power on grounds of its ability to decide on the state of exception. By exempting itself from international law and courts of law, protecting its military from being subjected to international control, allowing preemptive strikes, and engaging in torture and illegal detention (ibid., 8), the United States instrumentalizes and maintains war as a state of exception in the name of global security and thus seeks to consolidate its hegemonic role within Empire. Although Hardt and Negri openly disagree with Agamben's reading of the state of exception as defining "power itself as a 'monopoly of violence' " (2004, 364), it seems to me that Agamben's theory of the state of exception, as put forward in Homo Sacer rather than in States of Exception, might be usefully read alongside Hardt and Negri's crucial claim that global civil war as well as resistance movements depend on the "production of subjectivity" through immaterial labour (2000, 66). What this argument overlooks is that, according to Agamben, the state of exception constitutes an abject space or "a zone of indistinction between outside and inside, exclusion and inclusion" (1998, 181), where subjectivity enters a political and legal order solely on grounds of its exclusion. Moreover, the sovereign ??? albeit a nation, sovereign power, or global network of power ??? can only transform the rule of law into the force of law by suspending the legal system from a position that is simultaneously inside and outside the law. Through these mechanisms of exclusion and contradiction, subjectivity is not so much created as it is deprived of its social and political relationships. Thus the "originary activity" of global civil war is the violent conflation of political and social relationship and thereby the "production of bare life" (ibid., 83), of life that need not be accounted for, as is the case with the civilian casualties of the US-led war against Iraq. The state of exception, however, also figures as a prominent concept in post-colonial theory, for it raises questions not only about the ways in which we configure the human but also how we understand imperial or global war. ¶ In 1940, Benjamin famously wrote, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight" (1968, 257). Benjamin's statement, as Homi Bhabha reminds us half a century later in his essay "Interrogating Identity," can be usefully advanced for a critical analysis of the dialectical ??? if not revolutionary ??? relationship between oppression, violence, and anti-colonial historiography. Indeed, "the state of emergency," as Bhabha says, "is also always a state of emergence" (1994, 41). Read in the context of today's global state of exception, namely the recurrence and intensification of ethnic civil wars across the globe and the coincidence of democratic and totalitarian forms of political rule, Bhabha's statement entails a number of risks and suggestions for a post-colonial historiography of global civil war.¶ First, Bhabha's notion of emergency/emergence reflects his critical reading of Fanon's vision of national identity and thus reconsiders the state of emergency as a possible site of "the occult instability where the people dwell" (Fanon 1963, 227) and give birth to popular movements of national liberation. In this context, the state of exception might be understood as both constitutive to the alienation that is intrinsic to liberation movements and instrumental for a radical euphoria and excessive hope that create and spectralize the post-colonial nation-state as a deferred promise of decolonization. It is through this perspective that we can critically evaluate Hardt and Negri's endorsement of what they call "democratic violence" (2004, 344). This kind of violence, they argue, belongs to the multitude. It is neither creative nor revolutionary but used on political rather than moral grounds. When organized horizontally, according to democratic principles of decision making, democratic violence serves as a means of defending "the accomplishments" of "political and social transformation" (ibid., 344). Notwithstanding the concept's romantic and utopian inflections, democratic violence also derives from Hardt and Negri's earlier argument that "the great wars of liberation are (or should be) oriented ultimately toward a 'war against war,' that is, an active effort to destroy the regime of violence that perpetuates our state of war and supports the systems of inequality and oppression." This, they conclude, is "a condition necessary for realizing the democracy of the multitude" (ibid., 67). In one quick stroke, Hardt and Negri move anti-colonial liberation wars into their post-national paradigm of Empire and divest them of their cultural and historical particularities. Moreover, translating explicitly national liberation movements into a universalizing narrative of global pacifism precludes a critique of violence within its particular historical and philosophical formation. In contrast, a post-colonial analysis of global war must tease out the intersections between the ways in which racialized violence constitutes colonial and post-colonial processes of nation formation and helps construct an absolute enemy through which to legitimize global war and to abdicate responsibility for the dehumanizing effects of global economic restructuring.¶ Second, while Bhabha's pun is symptomatic of the resisting properties that he sees as operative in the various practices of colonial ambiguity, it also, despite Benjamin's opinion, draws attention to the possibility that oppression alters the linear flow of Western history and challenges "the transparency of social reality, as a pre-given image of human knowledge" (Bhabha 1994, 41). Here, Bhabha rightfully asks to what extent do states of emergency or acts of extreme violence constitute a historical rupture and, more importantly, call into question the nature of the human subject. It is at this point that a post-colonial reading of the state of exception fruitfully coincides with Agamben's notion of exception. For in both cases, the focus of inquiry is the construction of disposable life through the logic of necropower and the collapse of social and political relationships that enable the exercise of particularly racialized forms of violence, including torture and disappearances.¶ Third, Bhabha's notion of the double movement of emergency and emergence envisions an anti-colonialist historiography in terms of a dialectical process of perpetual transformation. It is at this point, however, that the coupling of emergency or exception and emergence becomes problematic for at least two reasons. First, combining both terms prematurely translates the violence of the political event into that of metaphor and risks erasing the micro- or quotidian narratives of violence ??? such as Arasanayagam's account of war ??? that both legitimate and are perpetuated by political and social states of emergency. In order to examine the relationship between global and communal forms of violence, a critical practice of post-colonial studies, I suggest, must reassess the term "transformation" and, concurrently, the assumption that acts of extreme global violence can be advanced in the service of "making history" (Balibar 2001, 26). In other words, if, as Hannah Arendt argues, there has been a historical "reluctance to deal with violence as a separate phenomenon in its own right" (2002, 25), it is time to examine the possibility of employing post-colonial studies in the service of a non-dialectical critique of global war. This kind of critique must ask to what extent those on whose bodies extreme violence was exercised are a priori excluded from articulating any transformative theory of violence. How, in other words, does bare life ??? if at all possible ??? attain the status of subjectivity within the dehumanizing logic of exception or global civil war?¶ Fourth, like Bhabha, we need to take seriously Benjamin's insight into the intrinsic relationship between violence and the conceptualization of history. Notwithstanding Bhabha's pivotal argument that the violence of a "unitary notion of history" generates a "unitary," and therefore extremely violent, "concept of man" (1994, 42), I wish to caution, alongside Benjamin's analysis of fascism, that what enables today's global civil war is that even "its opponents treat it as a historical norm" (Benjamin 1968, 257). What is at stake, then, in dominant as well as critical narratives of global civil war is their representation as natural rather than political phenomena, and the acceptance of globalization as a political fait accompli. Both of these aspects, I believe, contribute to the proliferation of dehistoricized concepts of the global increase of racialized violence and war. It seems to me, however, that the enormous rise of violence inflicted by global civil wars requires a post-colonial historiography and critique of global war that questions notions of history based on cultural fragmentation, rupture, and totalization. Instead, such a historiography must seek out patterns of connection and connectivity. But more importantly, as I have argued in this paper, it must trace the post-colonial moment of global civil war and begin to read contemporary war through the interconnected necropolitics of global and imperial warfare. Thus, to understand the logic and practice of global war we need to develop a greater understanding precisely of those civil wars and national liberation wars that do not appear to threaten the new global order. Furthermore, a post-colonial critique of global civil war should facilitate the decoding and rescripting of both the normalizing narratives and racialized embodiment of global civil warfare.¶

#### **The alternative is critical peace research, a strategy that continuously critiques and questions sovereign conceptions of violence and peace while simultaneously committing to the ethical and practical imperative of non-violent resistance to structures of domination.**

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(Richard, ‘Towards critical peace research: Lessons from critical terrorism studies,’ chapter in *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition*, edited by Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, pp. 24-31)

Critical peace research: a proposal On the basis of the above assessment, this section briefly outlines a set of core commitments which I believe ought to characterise CPR. I conceive of ‘critical’ (peace) research in two primary senses. First, it simply means an intellectual orientation or attitude which attempts to stand apart from the existing order (while at the same time acknowledging that one can never fully escape one’s own situatedness or biases), which questions widely accepted common- sense and dominant forms of knowledge about peace and conflict, and which asks probing questions about how existing social and epistemic orders came into existence and the processes by which they are maintained. Second, and more narrowly, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to approaches which draw upon the analytical tools and insights of Frankfurt School- inspired Critical Theory, as well as related critical-normative social theories and disciplinary approaches such as critical constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, post- colonialism and others. In the first instance, critical approaches are characterised by a healthy scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas, and instead, seek to continuously question and interrogate that which is taken for granted. In particular, critical scholars are committed to interrogating how the status quo is implicated in some of the very problems that traditional theory seeks to solve, in this case, the ‘problems’ of conflict, violence, lack of reconciliation and the like. In part, this is because critical approaches recognise that knowledge and power are intimately connected– that knowledge is never neutral, but ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981). Lastly, in contrast to the social scientific adoption of a purportedly neutral standpoint on political and ethical issues, critical approaches are characterised by an openly ethical- normative commitment to human rights, social justice, progressive politics, and improving the lives of individuals and communities – or what is often called ‘emancipation’ or praxis (McDonald 2009). Ontological commitments What exactly are the things called ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘mediation’, ‘reconciliation’ and the like, that we study, and how should we conceive, understand and speak of them? An openly critical approach would suggest that all of these objects of study are not free- standing, ontologically distinct phenomena discoverable by objective social scientific study. Instead, things like ‘peace’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘cultural violence’ or ‘reconciliation’ are social formations and sets of social activities that are in large part contingent upon, and constituted by, the terms, languages and discourses used to describe and study them. A concept like ‘peace’ is actually ‘an ontologically suspicious concept’ (Elshtain quoted in Neufeld 1993: 172), and whether a particular society is described as ‘peaceful’, ‘post- conflict’, ‘reconciled’, or ‘violent’ is not a value- free fact or ‘truth’ waiting to be discovered by a scholar through the scientific method, but the consequence of the operation of a series of academic, political and social discourses, judgements and practices in different locales. In other words, there is a discursive, political, cultural and academic process by which real world actors and processes are given meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels, categories and narratives, including a set of discursively constructed measures by which ‘peacefulness’ or ‘violence’ can be ranked, or groups judged to be ‘spoilers’, for example. Such measurements are inherently ideological in that they prioritise some values over others: direct violence over structural violence, order over social justice, dialogue over resistance. Moreover, such labels, concepts, categories and meanings are prone to change and contestation; they never just ‘speak for themselves’. In terms of exactly what a ‘conflict’ consists of, for example, something that started as a ‘rebellion’ might then become a ‘terrorist campaign’ (or ‘The troubles’), before being designated a ‘civil war’ (usually, by virtue of reaching an arbitrary fatality threshold), a ‘genocide’ or a ‘counter-insurgency campaign’. This is not to say that critical approaches do not recognise actual physical violence in the ‘real world’ which is experienced by people as ‘civil war’ or ‘terrorism’, or conditions of low direct violence which is understood as ‘peace’. Rather, it is to adopt a Frankfurt School- inspired ontology which maintains a ‘minimal foundationalism’ in which the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualised as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other (Toros and Gunning 2009). Such an ontological standpoint recognizes that there are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists might call laws), and that one can distinguish between different phenomena on the basis of their delineated characteristics, while at the same time recognising that these characteristics and how they are interpreted are a product of their social and historical context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ in the positivist sense. Consequently, for critical scholars, the acceptance of the relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts results in a real sensitivity to the politics of labelling and categorising, and extreme care in the use of different terms during research and teaching. However, critical approaches go even further, recognising that peace, conflict, violence, reconciliation and the like are in themselves constituted by social and political narratives, discourses and practices. As a consequence, critical scholars are interested in the constitutive nature of norms, ideas and other discursive elements which make the social practices of conflict, violence, dialogue, peace and reconciliation possible in specific historical and spatial contexts (Alkopher 2005: 716). In other words, critical approaches suggest that violent conflict cannot be fully understood apart from the particular kinds of narratives, discourses and social practices which make it possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable (see Jabri 1996). Crucial to this process is the role played by existing normative structures which function to construct identities, interests and modes of social action (Alkopher 2005: 720). Importantly, in addition to critical civil war research (see Jackson 2014) within the conflict analysis side of the field, a critical ontology which accepts the social construction and inherent instability of the key concepts is also starting to inform approaches to the study of peace (Richmond 2007, Shinko 2008) and conflict resolution (Hansen 2008), among others. Epistemological commitments A critical epistemology accepts that creating knowledge is ultimately a social process which depends on a range of contextual and process- related factors, not least the social position of the researcher, the institutional context within which they conduct their research, and the kinds of methods they employ. Such factors impact on the kinds of knowledge produced, as well as the purposes to which it is ultimately put. Importantly, this does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that scholarly standards and procedures in research should be rejected, or that ‘anchorages’ – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth 2008). Rather, it suggests that CPR should be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its own epistemology, methodology and assumptions. It also means that there are few if any knowledge claims about conflict, violence, peace, reconciliation and the like that cannot be challenged or questioned. Related to this, a critical perspective also recognises that no individual, including academic researchers, can completely put aside their personal identity, values, perceptions, and world view and then engage in purely objective, dispassionate, value- free research. Rather, every researcher brings with them a particular culture and set of values and understandings which shapes their research in important ways. At the very least, critical scholars argue that recognising and acknowledging the personal subjectivity of the researcher is an important step (see Breen Smyth 2009), not least because such continuous reflexivity acts as an antidote to the dangerous claim that some kinds of knowledge are objective and wholly unbiased, and therefore superior to others. Crucially, such an epistemological stance does not entail a wholesale rejection of the social scientific notion of objectivity, but instead accepts that there are multiple ways of knowing about objects of social analysis, such as conflicts or peace processes, that it is in any case beyond the capacity of any single narrative to provide the best account of such processes, and that through a pluralisation of perspectives and their inevitable clashes a more justifiable knowledge can be assembled (see Campbell 1998: 279–281). A critical approach therefore suggests that ‘continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry’ (ibid.: 281).

## Links

### AI/Biotech

#### Dual use link—The 1AC’s construction of [insert enemy]’s AI/biotech as an existential threat serves to produce insecurity and creates a spiraling security dilemma

Lupovici 21

Amir, senior lecturer in the School of Political Science, Government and International Affairs and a research fellow in the Blavatnik Interdisciplinary Cyber Research Center. “The dual-use security dilemma and the social construction of insecurity.” *Contemporary Security Policy*, 42(3), 257–285. pp. 7-11

Threats are not simply given. They are constructed and shaped through social dynamics. This does not mean that the objective elements that affect insecurity are irrelevant. Rather, these elements are mediated through interpretation and carry effects through discourse that identify the threat and justify the response (e.g., Lipschutz, 1995, pp. 1–23). Actors, intentionally and unintentionally, create social structures that produce (in)security and threats. The dual-use dilemma is thus shaped by two interrelated social mechanisms. The first is the social production of the dual-use qualities of the technology. The second is the actors’ construction of the technology of their opponents as an existential threat, which is embedded in a broader social context that includes the actors’ relations, politics, identity, and history andcontinues previous securitizing moves. Through the combination of these, actors construct uncertainty over whether their opponent’s technology is meant for civil or for military/harmful (and potentially existentially threatening) purposes, and thus they allocate resources to address it. This is even if the opponent has no plans for harmful or military application of the dual-use technology. The securitizing moves an actor takes may affect the security of other actors, who in turn may take additional measures and contribute to the spiraling escalation. The concept of securitization captures the social dynamics of insecurity. Securitization is a process through which an intersubjective understanding that something is an existential threat is developed between a securitizing actor (enunciator) and audience. This intersubjective understanding allows the actor to call for exceptional measures to deal with the threat (Buzan et al., 1998; see also Buzan & Hansen, 2009, pp. 212–217; Gad & Lund Petersen, 2011). A crucial element of this process is the speech act of security, as it is the utterance itself that constitutes an issue as a security issue by labeling it as such (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 26–27). A number of facilitating conditions related to the language used, the securitizing actor, and the “conditions historically associated with the threat” affect the speech act (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 32–33; Floyd, 2010, p. 13). However, scholars have challenged the emphasis on the semantics of security, pointing to the importance of images and to external conditions affecting the securitizing move that are not related to language (e.g., Vuori, 2008; Williams, 2003). It should also be noted that while the concept of securitization was originally developed to explore the constitutive elements of “new” security issues, such as migration, epidemics, and the environment (Balzacq & Guzzini, 2015; Buzan & Hansen, 2009, p. 215), scholars have begun using this theory to study “traditional” security issues (Hayes, 2013; Lupovici, 2019; Roe, 2008; Vuori, 2008). I follow this line of studies, and especially Van Rythoven’s (2020) article.4 Van Rythoven uses the concept of securitization dilemma to explore the unintended consequences of the security dilemma dynamics. Among other things, he aims to highlight how this concept bridges traditional and constructivist theories of security, and to justify epistemologically and conceptually the combining of the security dilemma with securitization scholarship.5 Van Rythoven provides a promising point of departure to incorporate securitization theory into the study of the security dilemma. First, he defines the securitization dilemma as “a difficult choice where a securitizing move represents a powerful and attractive opportunity for political mobilization, but with the danger of perverse and unintended consequence” (2020,, p. 479). In short, the focus of the dilemma is diverted to the question of whether to securitize or not. Second, securitization theory also allows the capturing of different non-traditional kinds of threat, and not just threats to sovereignty, that initiate the security dilemma for different kinds of actors (and not just to state actors) (Van Rythoven, 2020, p. 484). I further elaborate on Van Rythoven’s assertions by acknowledging the spiral dynamics of securitizing moves. For Van Rythoven, a key aspect of the dilemma is the unexpected consequences of a securitizing move. He highlights the uncertainty that surrounds securitizing moves, as enunciators cannot know whether the audience will accept them or what the impact will be of implementing the practices stemming from these moves (Van Rythoven, 2020, pp. 486–488). While all these uncertainties are important, another key, and underdeveloped, question is how securitizing moves affect other actors. I argue that this dynamic may create a spiral of insecurity where actors respond with a securitizing move to a securitizing move initiated by another actor, thus affecting both actors’ security. Important to understanding security dilemma dynamics is the acknowledgement that securitization is a process rather than a single act (Roe, 2008, pp. 617–618, 624; Watson, 2011, p. 10). Recognizing this allows us to consider the political context in which securitizing moves are embedded, as well as the political effects of securitizing moves (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 25; Guzzini, 2011, p. 331; Hayes, 2013, pp. 16–17). A number of scholars have extended these ideas by considering the different dynamics through which the same security issue is repeatedly securitized. They explore the concept of re-securitization, when an already-securitized issue is put back on the agenda (Mavelli, 2012, p. 190; McDonald, 2011) or attains a new climax (Lupovici, 2016). Scholars have also explored the international effects of securitizing moves. Beyond domestic consequences, securitizing moves’ political effects and outcomes influence other actors, who respond to them as a result of either the rhetoric employed or the behavior triggered (Buzan et al., 1998, pp. 205–206; see also Lupovici, 2019; Wæver, 2011, p. 476). Especially important for capturing dynamics around the chain reaction of a security dilemma is a counter-securitizing move, which occurs when actors resist a securitizing move. Actors can resist a securitizing move in different ways,6 and against different elements of the targeted securitizing move (Stritzel & Chang, 2015, pp. 551–552). Although Stritzel and Chang (2015, p. 553) do not specifically connect their discussion to the security dilemma, they argue that “[a]n explicitly interactive reading of processes of securitization versus counter-securitization … can establish fruitful conversations specifically with military strategy.” Thinking of securitizing moves as part of an iterating process that affects other (international) actors captures the essence of the security dilemma (Table 1). The traditional security dilemma is fueled by the “objective” characteristics of the means acquired by the actors and focuses on whether to arm to prepare for an emerging threat, even though the act of arming may itself be threatening to the opponent. Conversely, the securitization approach to the security dilemma focuses on the actors’ spiraling constructions of insecurity. From this perspective, a security dilemma erupts when an issue is securitized and counter-securitized by rival actors. An actor’s securitizing move is constructed as an existential threat by another actor and thus it is spirally aggravated. The securitization approach of the dilemma is based on the view that, on the one hand, a securitizing move may be advantageous for the securitizing actor by mobilizing support for extraordinary measures, legitimizing their response to an opponent’s challenge or, alternatively, winning them some domestic political gains. On the other hand, the move itself may invite the opponent to make securitizing moves of its own. The result may be a spiral dynamic in which each actor conducts a securitizing move where they securitize the securitizing move taken by an opponent. The dilemma then is whether to securitize and enjoy the benefits of it while also facing the risk of negatively influencing other actors or providing tools for the opponent to perform securitizing moves of their own. When the means Actor A holds or develops (or even the rhetoric related to these processes) are constructed by Actor B as an existential threat and Actor B can justify taking extraordinary measures to address the alleged insecurity, then Actor B contributes to the dynamics of the security dilemma. In turn, Actor A may securitize Actor B’s response—that is, Actor B’s securitizing move is securitized by Actor A. More specifically, Actor A may construct a number of things as an existential threat: (1) Actor B’s construction (labeling the means acquired by Actor A as an existential threat); (2) Actor B’s justification to take extraordinary measures; or (3) Actor B’s execution of the measures legitimized through the securitizing move. Securitizing of any of these issues by Actor A can lead to attempts to justify additional means Actor A should take and can expedite attaining the means of threat to Actor B that have already been justified. The securitized issue becomes part of the opponent’s securitizing move: it provides a pretext for enunciators to perform their own securitizing move and it also gives both sides tools to further securitize the situation, and so on. This creates the dangerous spiral dynamic. Each securitizing move—and the ensuing extraordinary measures—becomes a strong justification for the opponent to re-securitize the opponent’s moves and attain a new securitization climax. I build on a securitization reading of the traditional security dilemma to present the dual-use security dilemma (see Table 2). Basically, the dilemma in the latter is whether to securitize an opponent’s dual-use technology. On the one hand, by securitizing these technologies, an actor can attain domestic support and legitimacy for policy measures, including measures addressing the (constructed) threat Conversely, the securitizing move itself, apart from any execution of these measures, may alarm an opponent or even provide it a pretext for its own securitizing moves, thus initiating a spiral dynamic of insecurity. This may especially be tragic in situations where the actor whose dual-use technology was first securitized had no plans to use the technology for military/harmful purposes. I suggest that the dual-use security dilemma is shaped by two kinds of social dynamics. First, social processes shape whether and how a technology can be seen as dual-use. Second, once a technology is seen as dual-use, enunciators are able to rely on this knowledge to further securitize it.

### Benign Warfighting

#### The 1ACs image of benign war-fighting is an age-old tactic enabling innocent domination on the periphery. By placing military benevolence on a pedestal, the aff assigns hegemonic security priestly powers culminating in genocidal sacrifice on the periphery.

Lovell 2019. [Joseph Lovell, Graduate of the Patterson School of Diplomacy, “Americans Can’t Give Up the Cult of War” https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/09/americans-cant-give-up-the-cult-of-war/]

The United States accomplished its goals in the Afghan war when a team of Navy SEALs stormed Osama bin Laden’s Pakistani compound and gave him a richly deserved bullet to the head. So why is the United States still there? America has clearly gotten its pound of flesh. **There are** **now** **more Sunni Islamist militants than ever**. Never-ending deployments place massive strains on personnel, drain resources, and divert funding needed for modernization so the United States remains competitive versus its peer adversaries.

Yet despite this, **America’s forever wars seem unlikely to end anytime soon**. And **their purpose has transformed**. Like much else in U.S. foreign policy, the **geopolitical purpose is secondary** **to the pride and ceremony** involved. Americans may bristle at the insinuation that they are engaged in ritual bloodshed. But the facts point that way. If victory was seen as a pressing national priority, then the fact that only 56 percent of Afghan territory is under friendly control more than 17 years into the war should be viewed as a national scandal and disgrace.

If the costs of war were viewed as unacceptable by the U.S. government and public, **it would be over**. Likewise, if the United States well and truly desired to be rid of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, he would have been killed a long time ago, yet he continues to cross American “red lines” and gas his citizens with more or less impunity. (The occasional Tomahawk being a perfectly acceptable price for the regime in exchange for the destruction of its enemies and the reclamation of its territory.)

But **while victory is not a priority**, **defeat is unacceptable**. As President Donald Trump once put it, “winners aren’t losers,” and America’s homegrown blood cult has reached such a frenzied height that admitting defeat is tantamount to heresy, even if stopping the wars would save the lives of actual soldiers. In other words, **while the wars are a bottomless pit** in terms of grand strategy, **they serve a domestic socio-political need**.

The **wars serve as a** grand **ritual of** American **civil religion in which sacrifice and martyrdom are props for** a vision of the **imperium**, **even at the cost of the empire’s actual strategic objectives**. The **troops are symbolic avatars for** American **values**, but as **actual human beings**, they **are expendable**. Not only does conflict provide an enemy to define America against, **but warfare itself is** seen as **a crucible in which the national character is defined and** **the soldier placed in the role of Christ**, expected **to redeem America through his** (and in the popular imagination, it is always his, not her) **suffering**.

As in reality, war tends to be unpleasant, and actual interaction with the wars and their consequences is kept to a minimum, largely restrained to using veterans and the military as set-piece props and video game-like footage of airstrikes on cable news. This reverential detachment is necessary to maintain what the theologian Jon Pahl calls “innocent domination,” which he defines as “systems of domination, hegemony, or power … that are largely absent of malice on the part of the perpetrators.” **The United States is**, in Pahl’s words, **an “empire of sacrifice**.” The magnitude of the backlash against Trump’s plans to withdraw from Syria from a normally supine Republican Party and the speed of the president’s backpedaling demonstrate how deeply ingrained this ritual is in American life.

Thus, Colin Kaepernick’s kneeling is seen as heresy despite not even being meant as an insult to the military, whereas the president attempting to dismantle veterans‘ healthcare barely registers as a minor scandal. The American public asks service members to fight in wars it does not believe in and for which no credible plans for victory have been presented, and in exchange they get to fly F-15s over the Super Bowl and consume free hot wings and martinis once a year at Applebee’s. This does not seem like an equitable bargain.

To be clear, the military is far from blameless. Indeed, pressure from military commanders has caused both Trump and former President Barack Obama to continue these campaigns against their own inclinations. **Nobody wants to be the president who lost a war.**

**The transformation of veterans** and retired **generals and admirals into a** sort of **secular priesthood is not** an **encouraging** development, particularly when the military is the last remaining federal institution with bipartisan support. **America**, like the Aztecs, **seems destined to fall deeper** and deeper **into naval-gazing bloodletting as a bizarre ritual of symbolic primacy**.

### Cyber Security

#### Cybersecurity discourse relies on objective “experts” whose true purpose is to constantly displace the structural causes of insecurity- the result is an endless set of recommendations that reaffirm the militaristic ideology of the status quo

Jacobsen 20

Jeppe Teglskov, assistant professor at the Institute for Military Technology, Royal Danish Defence College. “From neurotic citizen to hysteric security expert: a Lacanian reading of the perpetual demand for US cyber defence.” Critical Studies on Security. 3/1/2020. Pg 1-10. LJS

The goals of security policy experts – a term used collectively here to describe independent consultants and think tankers that produce policy recommendations and advise the US Administration – keep shifting. A case in point is the extensive policy discussion on cyber deterrence. Improving deterrence of cyberattacks against the US has been a recommendation put forward by task forces and commissions at regular intervals during the Obama Administration (National Research Council 2010; CSIS 2017; DSB 2013; DSB. 2017). The Administration’s attempts to accommodate these recommendations have invariably been met by new and different sets of proposals and demands, and a reluctance on the part of experts in the cyber community to stand by previous policy proposals. By way of a brief summary, elaborated further in the body of this article: Before 2010, policy experts called for more offensive cyber capabilities to ensure a cyber deterrence posture. Around the time that the Administration provided these capabilities, the cyber deterrence problem ceased to be attributed to a cyber capability problem and was now thought to result from a lack of signalling. Shortly thereafter, the Administration responded by signalling a willingness to respond strongly to cyberattacks, at which point the expert community began calling instead for resilience in both civilian and military US networks to achieve cyber deterrence. This demand for cyber resilience was put forward in such vague terms that it is impossible to determine when it is achieved.¶ The dependency on increasingly complex socio-technical systems in contemporary society has rendered reliance on experts unavoidable. And with their rise to ubiquity in policy circles, expertise has also become a frequent object of study in social sciences. In critical security studies, the sociological approaches have been particularly attuned to the study of expertise. Within this field, security scholars have focused largely on how the everyday practices of professional experts play a role in categorising what constitutes an insecurity – and ultimately, in (re)producing particular ‘regimes of truth’ (Bigo 2002; Berling and Bueger 2015). In so doing, these contributions see experts as the embodiments of specific forms of knowledge that is practised or articulated as part of a dominant rationality of government (or dispositif or field). This article introduces a strategy for studying security policy experts that does not reduce the expert to the embodiment of a knowledge regime or a tool for political interests. It suggests that paying attention to how the expert subject identifies with and performs its role as an expert vis-à-vis the government that takes policy decisions, advances our understanding of the expert’s role in reproducing insecurities.¶ The article takes its cue from the writings of those critical security scholars that show how today’s risk governance has led to increasing public awareness and general concerns in society about unpredictable and catastrophic events (Aradau and van Munster 2011; Aradau, Lobo-Guerrero, and van Munster 2008). Such concerns about uncertainty, the critical security scholars argue, have not only led to the government introducing precautionary and pre-emptive strategies for governing security but has also given rise to anxious and neurotic subjects (De Goede 2008; Walklate and Mythen 2010; Eklundh, Zevnik, and Guittet 2017). Scholarly contributions within this field have so far almost exclusively diagnosed the neurotic subject among citizens being governed. In fact, the neurotic subject is treated somewhat disconnected from or even juxtaposed to the experts that implement or propose the current security governing strategies and thus can be said to mobilise collective anxieties (Fournier 2014). Experts are, apparently, unaffected by anxieties about future uncertainties. This article extends the notion of the neurotic subject to the expert, and asks: How does a reading of the expert as a neurotic subject advance the way we study the reproduction of insecurities?¶ For answering this question, the Freudian-inspired work on the neurotic citizen by Isin (2004), which is the main inspiration for the above-mentioned turn to anxiety and neurosis in the risk literature, is a useful stepping-stone. However, the article switches the theoretical point of departure from Freud to Jacques Lacan – the latter of which enjoys increasing attention in critical security studies recently (Mandelbaum 2016; Heath-Kelly 2018; Danil 2018; Eberle 2019). To date, the Lacanian contributions within this literature have generally introduced Lacan’s notion of the divided subject – and one or a few concepts related to it – to extend the analytical power of existing critical security and IR approaches (Epstein 2011). However, Lacan offers a – largely unexplored1 – systematic strategy for locating and studying the divided subject in different social relations, his matrix of the ‘Four Discourses’ (Lacan 1998, 2007).¶ The article zooms in on one of the four discourses, Lacan’s discourse of the hysteric, introducing it as an analytical strategy for studying policy experts as neurotic subjects. Lacan defines the Four Discourses as abstract ways to structure our communication and identification. The Hysteric Discourse, one of the four discourses, is a social bond where a neurotic subject constantly protests and demands that an ‘other’, in the position of the master signifier, delivers what the subject desires (for example, absolute security) (Fink 1995, 129–37). The article focuses on US policy experts in the field of cyber defence.2 US cyber defence is as an apt case study not only because ‘cyber’ is officially considered the biggest threat to US national security, but also because cyberspace is articulated in the US as an uncertain, unpredictable and insecure domain where governments rely on assistance from outside experts to solve problems (Dunn Cavelty 2013; Hansen and Nissenbaum 2009). As the neurotic subject is likely to emerge from uncertainty and as experts hold a privileged position in the cyber policy debate, the social bond between the US cyber defence experts and the government is an ideal case for examining the expert as a neurotic subject that communicates through the Hysteric Discourse as well as what it means for the reproduction of insecurity.¶ Through the case study of the US cyber policy experts, the article contributes to the emerging body of critical security studies on experts. It introduces a Lacanian-inspired hysteric strategy for advancing the analysis of security experts. First, the article locates the drifting of desire in the public expert documents on cyber deterrence and argues that the US cyber policy experts’ ever-evolving and ultimately elusive demands are illustrative of a desire for a desire unfulfilled, which reproduces cyber insecurity as a national defence priority. And second, the article shows that the social bond between the cyber policy expert subject and the US government is sustained – despite the former taking up employment in the executive branch – by the subject pushing the object of desire in front of it to the point of ultimately returning to the position as outside experts. Together, the two readings illustrate a critical security strategy for studying the reproduction of insecurity through the experts’ neurotic identification as experts.¶ The article comes in three sections. First, it situates the study of security expertise in the critical literature on risk and uncertainty. Second, it introduces Lacan’s hysteric social bond as a strategy for studying the subject, and third, it illustrates how to apply this strategy through a case study of US cyber defence experts.¶ Security experts and expertise in critical studies on risk and uncertainty ¶ The study of experts and expertise in International Relations and security studies is not new. A focus on scientific experts preoccupied IR functionalists of the 1960s as did the concept of ‘epistemic communities’ in the early 1990s where the primary interest was to explore the causal mechanisms by which experts exert influence over security policy. More recently, critical security approaches also turned their attention to the study of experts and expertise (Berling and Bueger 2015, 3–6).¶ The main analytical task of these scholars has been to highlight the contested and contingent ground upon which expertise is constructed and exercised. Leander (2014) offers an excellent example of the contestation and controversies over the production of expert knowledge in the case of the 2013 Sarin gas attack in Syria. And scholars such as Büger and Villumsen (2007) have shown repeatedly how ‘facts’ are produced through a web of practices. The production relates, for example, to the network of peace researchers, US policy-makers, NATO officials and bureaucrats that stabilised the ‘democratic peace thesis’, or to the practice of quantification, expert monitoring groups, and special advisors, which generate a specific form of knowledge on piracy (Bueger 2015). Similarly, a group of security scholars – the so-called Paris School – approaches security as a professional struggle between experts (the managers of unease), who, through their bureaucratic, everyday practices and routines, define what counts as insecurity (Bigo 2002; Huysmans 2006; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). Whether drawing on the work of Bourdieu, Foucault or Actor-Network Theory, the existing contributions tend either to reduce security experts to the ‘scientific knowledge’ and tools for ‘political interests’ or to treat security experts as passive deployers of security techniques.¶ This tendency is particularly present in the many studies of security governance through risk. Here, the attention to technologies that represent the tools for generating ‘objective’ knowledge about risks has not only pushed the experts developing, proposing the use of, or applying the technologies to the background, but has also directed the analytical lens primarily towards the production of bionic subject-positions of those being ‘risk managed’. Amoore and de Goede (2008, 9–10) call the current usage of data-driven (surveillance) technologies to identify risky bodies and bodies at risk, the ‘techno-expert deployment of risk’. Biometric technologies are the prime example of the dominant mode of risk management, and they are used to illustrate how the technologies, rather than addressing the political subject, govern bodies with the aim of controlling the future through enforcing the (political) status-quo in the present (Bell 2006; Epstein 2008). But while experts are not the focus of these analyses, the literature on security-governance-through-risk contains an opening to ask new questions about security experts.¶ Critical risk scholars such as Aradau and van Munster (2011) argue that governing through calculation and management of the future has fostered public concern about unknowable, future catastrophes, such as terrorism and natural disasters. This increasing focus on unknowable disasters and worst-case scenarios, some scholars have suggested, renders the subject neurotic and anxious (De Goede 2008; Walklate and Mythen 2010; Fournier 2014). The neurotic subject was first discussed in the context of risk by Isin, who draws on Freudian insights to account for citizens’ acceptance of the social effects of neoliberalism. Isin (2004, 225–6) argues that the subject called upon to adjust its conduct in times of emerging risks is not ‘a rational, calculating or competent subject’ but an affective subject that needs ‘soothing, appeasing and tranquillizing’ to manage anxieties. The neurotic subject-citizen speaks and makes demands: It wants the impossible (absolute security and safety) and is presented with new solutions to manage its affects (ibid: 232). The critical security contributions that find inspiration in Isin’s work all locate anxiety and neurosis at the level of the citizens who are being risk managed and in juxtaposition to the experts and government officials that mobilise these anxieties (Fournier 2014: 315–7; De Goede 2008; Eklundh, Zevnik, and Guittet 2017).¶ Charlotte Heath-Kelly (2018) has taken an important initial step towards moving beyond the dichotomy between experts who mobilise anxiety and the anxious subject. She examines the role of anxiety among those experts and government officials who are in a position of securitising issues and who practice security towards various threat objects. With the change in focus, she has also switched the psychoanalytic starting point from Freud to Lacan. She introduces Lacan’s divided (or split) subject and related concepts such as drive, anxiety, enjoyment, and lack and applies them to the War on Terror to understand the continuous invention of new threat objects that occurs as soon as the old ones are destroyed (ibid.).¶ Building on Heath-Kelly’s argument that the subject repeatedly invents insecurities to avoid confronting an ontological lack/insecurity, the next section proposes to situate the subject in Lacan’s most formalised methodological matrix, his ‘Four Discourses’. Lacan’s Discourses do no refer to specific content (e.g. legal, political, medical, etc.) but can be understood as structuring different social bonds between the subject and the social field, i.e. different modes of communication through which the subject identifies. The following section introduces the divided subject and develops an analytical strategy for approaching the neurotic expert-subject through a particular social bond, Lacan’s discourse of the hysteric.¶ From divided subject to hysteric social bond: introducing a new reading strategy¶ Lacan was one of the 20th century thinkers who worked most extensively with the subject. The novelty of Lacan is the way in which he unites three distinct definitions of the subject: the liberal acting subject, the subject of structuralism and the subject of the unconscious. The conventional understanding of the subject is the Cartesian acting subject, often exemplified in the (to Lacan, imaginary) idea of being a whole and autonomous ‘self’ that forms the environment. The opposite conception of the subject is the subject that is subjected to the socio-symbolic structures of society. This subject is the product of – or subject position formed by – for example, a legal, medical or political discourse. Lacan introduces a third subject, which allows him to account for why the subject identifies with the socio-symbolic structures in the first place. He calls it the subject of the unconscious. This subject represents a ‘pre-subjective’ part of the individual that cannot flawlessly pass into the subject – it represents the failure to become the subject. The unconscious takes its form as a nonsymbolisable residual that keeps the subject desiring and identifying with new objects (Fink 1995, 36–48). In other words, the Lacanian subject – when emerging in the socio-symbolic order to assume an identity – cannot escape an ontological lack that is the inevitable result of being positioned in the gap/void between the other two subjects.¶ Turning to Lacan’s divided subject has analytical implications. It becomes a core task for the Lacanian analysis to identify where the subject is positioned in a social context, and how this position allows the subject to cope with or avoid confronting its own dividedness. With his Four Discourses, Lacan seeks to codify the various positions that the subject can take in different social bonds. The Four Discourses – the Master, University, Analyst and Hysteric Discourse – can be thought of as abstract ideal-types for how social relations and identifications play out (Lacan 1998: 14–25, 2007, 11–68). Lacan’s Discourses are condensed formula-based models (called mathemes), which are made up by four positions (agent, other, product, and repressed truth) and four elements (master signifier, system of signification/knowledge, divided subject, and objet petit a), whose relations make up four different social bonds (commanding, indoctrinating, transforming, and protesting) (Žižek 2004, 131–57). Introducing every matheme is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. It therefore focuses on one of the discourses, the Hysteric Discourse, and unpacks its conceptual relations and social bonds in order to develop a strategy for studying the expert as a neurotic subject.¶ The decision to study experts through the Hysteric Discourse rather than the University Discourse, in which neutral knowledge speaks, echoes the attempt – motivated in the previous section – to move from studying security experts as the embodiments of a specific risk/security governance regime (a system of knowledge) to studying experts as neurotic (divided) subjects. Lacan, like Freud, regards the hysteric as one of the two ways of being neurotic, the other being the obsessional neurotic. Before proceeding, however, it is important to emphasise that the subject, when located in a hysteric social bond, does not refer to a pathological or clinical personality type, but refers to a position occupied within a socio-symbolic system of meaning. Let me now introduce the hysteric social bond as an interpretive strategy for empirical analyses. A social relation resembles a hysteric social bond when a speaking agent deals with uncertainties and doubt by demanding that someone else does something about these feelings, and when this ‘other’ responds to the demands and protests by producing new knowledge and solutions (Fink 1995, 133). Importantly, the fundamental Lacanian assumption is that every social bond is driven by unconscious force, a repressed ‘truth’ that determines how the subject copes with its dividedness. In the Hysteric Discourse, this repressed truth is what Lacan calls objet petit a – the object cause of desire.¶ Objet petit a is one of Lacan’s most ambiguous concepts. In simple terms, it represents the empty position that a lost object can occupy, i.e. the position that allows an object to be currently unobtainable and hence desired. To the subject, a lost object occupying this position holds the promise of full enjoyment, i.e. a complete, secure identity, when reached. Hence, the lost object claims to symbolise the nonsymbolisable lack that remains when the subject attempts to assume an identity. In other words, objet petit a stands for the void or gap that causes desire by holding no positive content (Lacan 2007: 42–4, 176–9). When the objet petit a is repressed as in the hysteric social bond, the subject avoids directly confronting its desire and ultimately the ontological lack at the heart of its being. In empirical analyses, the function of objet petit a becomes visible, for example, as the drifting of desire from one (lost) object to the next with the illusory expectation that every new desired object symbolises and holds the power to overcome what is lacking in the subject/ socio-symbolic universe.¶ In the hysteric social bond, repressing or avoiding confrontation with objet petit a is a defence mechanism supported by anxiety. If the subject were to confront objet petit a, it would come to see itself in a new light, ultimately ripping it out of the comfort of communicating and identifying through the existing social bond. Thus, contrary to how this term is commonly understood, anxiety for Lacan is associated neither with the loss of an object nor with what is absent or uncertain. Rather, anxiety is an expression of presence – of not having in place a lost object (Lacan 2014; Burgess 2017, 29). It is the lack of a symbolisable lack: anxiety is the moment when the subject gets too close to objet petit a. Thus, in the hysteric social bond, anxiety emerges at the prospect of the ‘other’ delivering what the subject desires, and pushes desire along.¶ The constant drift of desire ensured by anxiety in the Hysteric Discourse is both a productive and a conservative force. It is productive because it forces the ‘other’ to constantly improve its efforts in response to the subject’s demands and criticisms, and it is conservative in that the repression of objet petit a prevents the discursive configuration from being questioned and challenged. Following this logic, the worst that can happen to the hysteric social bond is if the ‘other’ caves to the criticism and gives up its position as the master who produces new solutions. This would force the subject to take responsibility for its own choices and decisions, and ultimately, confront its own desire.¶ The hysteric social bond offers an analytical strategy for locating and interpreting how the subject communicates and identifies in particular (security political) contexts. From the above, the initial analytical step is to locate a relationship that resembles a social bond between, on the one hand, an agent that makes demand and criticises and, on the other hand, a master that responds to these demands by producing solutions. The hysteric social bond then directs the analyst’s attention to the way the object of desire manifests itself empirically, including when the social bond seems to break down. The hysteric bond is particularly relevant to the security political analysis because the constant reinvention and articulation of a desired object that promises security when attained reproduces a present sense of insecurity.¶ The next section examines how the object of desire manifests itself, first, in the expert communication through policy recommendations on cyber deterrence made during and in the aftermath of the Obama Administration, and second, in a situation where the hysteric social bond breaks down, as it can be said to do when the cyber policy experts take up positions as secretaries, ambassadors or advisors within government. In both analyses, the article zooms in on the processes through which the expert subject avoids confronting objet petit a and how this avoidance ensures ‘cyber’ as a pertinent national defence issue.¶ The expert subject’s demand for cyber defence¶ Experts supposedly offer impartially and evidence-based knowledge and lay out possible ways forward. Experts are not enmeshed in normative partisan politics. At least, US think tanks emerged in the beginning of the 20th century on this foundation (Rich 2004, 34–41). Traces of this ideal still exist, although there are clear political divisions across US think tanks today (Abelson 2018). In the ongoing policy debates on how to defend the nation in cyberspace, non-partisan task forces and commissions put forward policy recommendations based on their ‘objective’ assessment of the nature of cyberspace and the actors acting within it. One of the most iterated recommendations revolves around how to achieve credible cyber deterrence.¶ Yet, the next subsection reviews the policy recommendations related to cyber deterrence made by commissions and task forces during the Obama Administration and in doing so, challenges the idea of experts as nothing but the embodiments of a dominant knowledge regime. The first subsection reads the relationship between policy expert and government as a hysteric social bond where cyber deterrence is kept out of reach by constantly changing demands or demands that are articulated so vaguely that they are impossible for the government to meet. The second subsection analyses the US cyber policy experts’ entry into the government as a break with the hysteric social bond that risks forcing the neurotic subject to confront its own desire, but it shows that such a move is accompanied by a constant reinvention of excuses as to why the expert-turned-master is unable to provide the cyber defence it is responsible for, ultimately leading to a definition of the object of desire as that which the subject cannot currently do: criticise and make demands. In this way, the hysteric social bond between experts who reproduce insecurities through demands for policy change and a government that seeks to accommodate these demands is sustained.¶ The desire for a desire unfulfilled¶ At the end of 2008, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) brought together policy experts to develop cybersecurity recommendation for the incoming president. Under the headline ‘Military Doctrine and Deterrence’, the commission report emphasised the importance of ‘the need for a credible military presence in cyberspace to provide a deterrent against potential attackers’ (CSIS 2008, 24). The following quote from the report, however, calls in to question the commission’s own recommendation: Deterrence in cyberspace is particularly complicated because of the problems with attribution and identification. If a country does not know who is attacking, it is difficult to create appropriate and proportionate responses in ways that reduce the chance of escalation. A signal that a country is contemplating a response that goes to all potential attackers will not deter and could actually create more conflict (ibid.: 26). In short, if the attacker is not attributable and hence does not fear retaliation, then even the most potent cyber military is superfluous. To make a policy recommendation and in the same breath call into question the soundness of this policy is a hysteric communication par excellence. It avoids the anxiety that emerges when the specific object of desire (offensive military capabilities) is achieved by already introducing a new object of desire (better attribution).¶ Tellingly, the Administration’s decision to establish the US Cyber Command, the cyber branch of the US military, was immediately criticised as insufficient. CSIS director James Lewis underlined, for example, that ‘the U.S. is widely recognized to have pre-eminent offensive cyber capabilities, but it obtains little or no deterrent effect from this’ (cited in Markoff, Sanger, and Shanker 2010). In other words, the government should do a better job defending against and identifying the culprits in cyberspace.¶ Then Deputy Secretary of Defense, William J. Lynn III was ready with a plan for improving cyber defence capacities. Presenting the Department’s cyber strategy, Lynn underlined that ‘[US cyber] deterrence will necessarily be based more on denying any benefit to attackers than on imposing costs through retaliation’ (Lynn III 2010, 99–100). The newfound priority of cyber defence did not appear to reassure the expert subject. As a case in point, the National Research Council (NRC) hosted a 2010 workshop with policy experts on cyber deterrence. And shortly after, the independent Defense Science Board (DSB) created a task force on Resilient Military System and the Advanced Cyber Threat to provide recommendations on how to maintain deterrence in the cyber era. Neither the NRC workshop nor the DSB report found offensive cyber capabilities or cyber defence to be the solution to the cyber deterrence problem. Instead, the desired object had drifted along: Now, the Administration needs to clearly articulate the willingness and the capacity to respond to cyberattacks not only with cyber weapons but with all available tools – ultimately nuclear weapons (DSB 2013: 15; Rosenzweig 2010, 247).¶ Articulating the willingness to respond to cyberattacks with any means was first introduced by the Obama Administration in the 2011 International Strategy for Cyberspace and subsequently iterated in both the Department of Defense (2015) Cyber Strategy as well as in a White House cyber deterrence white paper of late 2015 (Obama 2011: 14; Department of Defense 2015: 11; Otto 2015). However, as is prototypical in a hysteric social bond, getting close to the object of desire – that is, having more steadfast articulations about the willingness to retaliate – causes anxiety that prompts a slide towards a new object of desire. In this case, manifesting in a redefinition of the meaning of cyber deterrence.¶ Two subsequent commission reports on cyber deterrence, namely the CSIS cyber recommendations to President Trump and the 2017 DSB follow-up report on cyber deterrence (CSIS 2017a; DSB. 2017), no longer focused only on large-scale cyberattacks against the US critical infrastructures as that which needed to be deterred. In fact, the government’s cyber deterrence’s efforts including the articulation of a willingness to respond with all means necessary seemed to have worked, as no serious, crippling cyberattacks against US critical infrastructures had taken place – despite the experts’ continuous criticisms of US national cyber insecurity. What the US did not prevent, however, was economic cyber espionage and minor, non-destructive disturbances of public and private networks. Thus, in the new commission reports, the anxiety over such malicious cyber activity was now included as that which needed to be deterred. Once again, anxiety pushes desire along, now in the form of a desire for better defining a proportional response to cyberattacks on private entities and economic espionage. This drift to better declaratory policy also offers an explanation as to why the government – when it finally delivered on the previous demand for better attribution – failed to satisfy the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence. In 2014, the US successfully attributed and indicted Chinese government hackers for commercial cyber espionage, but as the expert’s desire for cyber deterrence now involved a desire for a strong national security response to cyber espionage, the US government’s attributions only reinforced the demands for economic sanctions (Nakashima 2015).¶ In short, as soon as the government delivers, the expert subject’s desire shifts, from offensive military capabilities in cyberspace to better attribution, to an articulation of willingness to respond, and most recently, to the need to define proportional responses to non-military cyber activity. With the drift, the cyber threat continues as a pertinent national security challenge – to which the solution remains always just out of reach.

### Cyber Security – China

#### Articulating Chinese threats to cybersecurity papers over the internal sociopolitical contradictions present in the United States, serving to create a homogenized understanding of both countries that ultimately results in more threats and insecurity

Jacobsen 20

Jeppe Teglskov, assistant professor at the Institute for Military Technology, Royal Danish Defence College. “Lacan in the US cyber defence: Between public discourse and transgressive practice.” Review of International Studies. 2020. Pg 10-18. LJS

In short, the US cyber defence community represents China’s behaviour in cyberspace as a threat that transgresses the values and norms the United States officially follows and promotes. China is everything the United States is not. The Chinese government has an omnipresent gaze, enabled by excessive use of surveillance techniques and censorship, which challenges and violates the respect for and protection of freedom of expression and privacy that the United States promotes online. The Great Firewall represents to the US cyber defence community an attempt to secure the power of the Chinese government and the United States seeks to secure liberal values for all in cyberspace. Thus, Chinese government’s primary interest in consolidating its own centralised power by draining the economic power of others through cyber theft of intellectual property undermines the United States’ official ambition of becoming the global force for good that brings economic prosperity to billions all over the world. Lastly, the opaque Chinese government/patriotic hacker relationship is a transgression of the idea of a transparent and lawabiding state that the United States publicly promotes and defends.¶ Let me now turn to the second step in the symptomal reading; namely highlighting what tensions in the US cyber defence the Chinese fantasy displaces, how the Chinese threat object is taking on different opposing features, and where the ‘repressed’ returns.¶ First, ‘China in cyberspace’ displaces the fact that there are more uncomfortable and disavowed ‘truths’ about the cyberspace politics in the United States, ‘truths’ that are pushed to the margins of the US cyber defence discourse. Prior to the Snowden revelations, this was, for example, the fact that American privacy online is under pressure, not only from Facebook but also from the intelligence agencies’ attempt to prevent terrorism. Similarly, one can detect a process of displacement in relation to the fact that the United States’ pursuit of military superiority in cyberspace involves exploiting vulnerabilities in IT systems used by Americans as well as allies, which ultimately reproduces an environment that is technically insecure. Pushed to the margins by the Chinese fantasy is also the fact that the US cyber defence community itself is riddled with tensions, for example, over funding or who should have authority over the US cyber capabilities – that is, whether to use software exploits (cyber weapons) for intelligence (NSA) or military (US Cyber Command) purposes. Thus, ‘China in cyberspace’ is a symptom of more fundamental tensions. It plays a role as the object that prevents the US cyber defence community from confronting the fact that it is neither defending cyberspace nor is a homogenous whole. In other words, China is not only our other, it is that which enable us to keep the illusion that we are a ‘whole’ American self, and that which allows us to identify with this self. It prevents the US cyber defence community from confronting the fact that the very social field it represents is structured around an impossibility – that fulfilling a fantasy does not deliver the enjoyment it promises. ¶ Second, the displacement is supported by a condensation: the Chinese cyber threat takes on contradictory features. While more ‘traditional’ discourse analyses would see such inconsistencies as evidence of a less stable discourse,73 the symptomal reading draws the opposite conclusion. It was noted above, how the Chinese government through its Great Firewall is perceived to exert total control over its citizens and how the government enjoys total homogenisation with these subjects. Yet, it is also commonly understood among members of the US cyber defence community that the technical restrictions deployed by Chinese government authorities are easily circumvented by Chinese netizens and that the general level of cybersecurity in China is low. This is illustrated, for example, by a US Cyber Command official who explained in an interview that the NSA with ease had penetrated networks in Chinese universities, mobile phones, fibre-optic cables and servers controlled by the Chinese government, and second, by an official US policy that invests millions of dollars in technologies to promote freedom online, including tools for citizens to circumvent censorship regimes.74¶ According to the logic of condensation, the perception of the weaknesses of Chinese cybersecurity exacerbates, rather than dampens the perception of China as a threat. In an interview, a US official working with cyber defence policy worried that the insufficient Chinese cybersecurity allows other groups to route their cyberattacks through Chinese networks, while permitting China to deny responsibility for any hostile cyber activity with reference to a possible third party having penetrated its IT infrastructure. In other words, China is both a cyber superpower and cybersecurity novice – and threatening for both reasons. However, what hold these conflicting narratives together is what they have in common. In both cases, the Chinese government enjoys what the US cyber defence community cannot have: plausible deniability due to poor cybersecurity and totalitarian control with its citizens. This is the role of condensation.¶ Importantly, while China is a symptom that displaces other more fundamental ‘truths’, these ‘truths’ return. Thus, the Snowden revelations symbolise ‘a return of the repressed’. Snowden and other whistleblowers revealed how the US cyber defence community is not simply defending a unified United States from Chinese threats from cyberspace but is conducting excessive surveillance and cyber exploitation practices; as will be elaborated in the following, the US cyber defence entities undermine global network security, collect data on its own citizens, and bribe private companies to share more user data than necessary – and they lie to Congress about it. As I will argue, these transgressive practices should not be understood as being detached from the official US cyber defence discourse characterised by restraint, transparency and clarity, but as constitutive hereof. Transgression is closely connected to the fantasmatic distinction between an idealised harmonious self and the Chinese symptom. The last section elaborates this claim by extracting the kernel of enjoyment that work to sustain the US cyber defence discourse.

### Deterrence

#### Deterrence rests on the constant preparation for war- this exacerbates structural violence and leads to threat inflation

Christie et al in 2001

Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., & Winter, D. A. (Eds.). (2001). Peace, Conflict, and Violence: Peace Psychology for the 21st Century. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Like Woodrow Wilson, we define militarism in this chapter as a psychological rather than a¶ physical process: Militarism is a set of values that support military activities and enable countries¶ to mobilize for war. Militarism is as important during peace as it is during war. In fact, wars cannot be conducted unless militarism is nurtured long before wars begin. In democracies, somebody must provide a rationale for military expenditures and possible threats. The importance of¶ military readiness must be articulated and that rationale must be persuasively communicated to¶ the public. Legislative decision-makers must agree to allocate funds for the military, rather than¶ to other forms of social spending.¶ In this chapter, we argue that the preparation for war is as problematic as war itself. Because ¶ militarism is a global form of structural violence, we begin by analyzing the excessive financial¶ costs and social injustice caused by militarism. Our central concern is why people decide to pay¶ these exorbitant prices. To answer this question, we examine underlying psychological processes¶ that are not always obvious. We assert that money, masculinism, and the search for the mystical¶ drive militaristic sentiments beyond logical ends. Finally, we suggest that psychologically valid¶ mechanisms to address these motives are required before structural violence from excessive militarism can be curbed. Because militarism calls on some of the deepest and most cherished of all¶ human capacities, we believe that salvaging the best of militarism while redirecting the military’s¶ focus is a crucial task for the twenty-first century.¶ THE THIN LINE BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE¶ In modern societies, support for military matters is often covert until armed conflict erupts.¶ When soldiers fight wars, they must leave their families and join scores of other displaced persons to march, kill, and die for the sake of some political objective they often know little about.¶ Because, as we have long known, war is not instinctual, people must be socialized to kill (May,¶ 1943). The media helps the public understand the need to fight by objectifying the enemy and¶ portraying it as evil (Hesse & Mack, 1991), and often even subhuman (Reiber & Kelly, 1991).¶ Such treatment communicates dire predictions of what might happen should the enemy prevail.¶ For example, in the early stages of the Vietnam War, the public was continually warned that a¶ communist government in Vietnam would only be the first of a line of falling dominoes that¶ would eventually threaten the United States. Strong feelings of nationalistic identification get¶ aroused, creating an “us vs. them” dichotomy that is oversimplified and rigid (Tetlock, 1988).¶ Military leaders on our side are depicted as heroes, and people questioning the wisdom of mili-¶ tary action are portrayed as unpatriotic.¶ Yet sudden psychological support of military actions cannot arise in a vacuum. Along with a¶ well-rehearsed army, government leaders and the media build militaristic value systems between¶ wars so that militariesrealism can be instantly activated. In peacetime, such values are often latent.¶ Large numbers of citizens passively condone, if not support, their militaries, in order for them to¶ function effectively when called upon. In this way, the line between peace and war becomes¶ blurred. The first peace psychologist, William James, noted that “battles are only a public verification of the mastery gained during the peace interval…[The] preparation for war by nations is¶ the real war, permanent, unceasing” (James, 1910/1995, p. 19).¶ STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE OF MILITARY PREPAREDNESS¶ Preparation for war is a form of structural violence, since its social, political, and economic¶ structures cause avoidable injury or deaths (Christie, 1997; Galtung, 1969). Structural violence is¶ insidious because it has no active agent, no conscious intent, and no clear point of origin (see¶ Chapter 1). But inevitably, national decision-makers choose between military and social spending. When countries spend precious income on military matters instead of food, health care, or¶ environmental protection and restoration, injuries and deaths to civilians occur. As Eisenhower¶ put it a half century ago, “the problem in defense spending is to figure how far you should go¶ without destroying from within what you are trying to defend from without” (1956, as quoted by¶ Sivard, 1996).¶ Half of the world’s governments spend more to guard their citizens against military attack¶ than to protect them against the enemies of good health, such as contaminated water, poor nutri-¶ tion, and lack of medical care (Sivard, 1993). World military expenditures reached an all-time¶ high of $1.3 trillion in 1987. Despite significant decreases since the close of the Cold War, however, global expenditures in 1995 still amounted to more than $1.4 million per minute. The¶ United States became the world’s military superpower during World War II, when its military¶ budget sky-rocketed from under $13 billion a year to $530 billion (Sivard, 1996). The United¶ States currently eclipses the rest of the world by a huge margin, spending over five times that of¶ the second-biggest spender (Russia); more than the combined budgets of the 13 countries ranking below it (Sivard, 1996); and over 18 times the combined spending of those countries often¶ identified as its biggest threats (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba).¶ Even redirecting relatively small amounts of military expenditures could significantly impact¶ social well-being (see Mazaruna and McKay, this volume; Pilisuk, this volume). For example,¶ just 4 percent of the world’s military budget could raise global literacy to 50 percent, and redirecting 8 percent of military budgets for family planning would stabilize global population by the¶ year 2015. The cost of one nuclear-powered submarine ($2.5 billion) could immunize the world’s¶ children for one year. Clearly, excessive military expenditures constitute great structural violence.

#### Their deterrence and domestic industry arguments are a link- it is the belief in the necessary preparation for war that drives militarist ideology

Carl Mirra in 2008

Ph.D. Adelphi University; Countering Militarism through Peace Education; https://www.tc.columbia.edu/epe/epe-entries/Mirra\_ch11\_22feb08.pdf

Of special importance to peace educators is Bacevich’s (2005) observation that militarism¶ involves the use of force at the expense of alternative solutions. Following sociologist C. Wright¶ Mills’ description of the “military metaphysic,” Bacevich notes that militarism involves the¶ “tendency to see international problems as military problems and to discount the likelihood of¶ finding a solution except through military means” (2005, p. 2). Bacevich locates the rise of¶ militarism in U.S. society at the turn of the twenty-first century, owing principally to the country’s¶ inclination to equate national greatness with military prowess. The second Bush administration’s¶ doctrines of unilateral and preemptive war also accelerate militarism by prioritizing the use of¶ force. ¶ Militarism need not find expression in warfare alone. War preparedness contributes mightily to¶ militaristic sensibilities. A thriving war industry adds to a militarized world. It is estimated that the¶ major powers alone possess some 30,000 nuclear weapons and global arms spending was¶ roughly U.S. $55.8 billion annually at the turn of the twenty-first century (Menon, 2001). Peace¶ researchers have demonstrated that massive arms spending while human needs are unmet¶ constitute structural violence, since expenditures on arms come at the expense of human needs.¶ Militarism thrives on insecurity, anxiety and fear, thereby allowing resources to be diverted from¶ education, health care and related needs. The World Council of Churches has argued that¶ humanity might have avoided the disaster of nuclear war, but not the disaster of malnutrition,¶ educational neglect and lack of health care (Reardon, 1982). These problems are exacerbated by¶ military spending that diverts badly-needed resources to excessive military preparedness. This¶ phenomenon is related to the “military-industrial complex,” a term coined by U.S. President¶ Dwight Eisenhower in 1961. The president warned that the confluence of the private defense¶ industry with the government led to the “mindless pursuit” of “redundant weapons systems”¶ (Roland, 2001, p. 5). Mills’ (1956) formulation of a “power elite” that adopted a military mindset¶ expands Eisenhower’s concept to include how economic priorities propel militaristic attitudes.

### Diplomacy

#### The aff’s use of diplomacy to uphold US interests represents a classist hegemonic project- policy makers have a vested economic interest in maintaining the social and political order

De Graaff and van Apeldoorn in 2011

Naná de Graaff VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands Bastiaan van Apeldoorn VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics, Critical Sociology 37(4) 403–427

We argue that in understanding the variations in US imperialism we also need to examine those ‘specific conjunctures’ in which one hegemonic project may take the place of another without necessarily being linked to a concomitant change in accumulation strategy. However, we stress with Jessop that in order to be successful hegemonic projects need to advance the interests of a dominant class fraction, and thus to be articulated to a successful accumulation strategy – whether old or new. Success is not guaranteed, but seeking to advance these interests is what a hegemonic project is about. Let us now turn to the important ‘geopolitical’ dimension of any hegemonic project as formulated within the national context of a leading capitalist state such as the USA. As states are key in providing the preconditions for capitalist markets to develop and for capitalist accumulation to take place (Van Apeldoorn and Horn, 2007), any national or transnational capitalist class is dependent upon the application of state power both nationally and internationally (see e.g. Wood, 2003). Hegemonic projects, as expressive of underlying class interests, will therefore have to articulate not just a vision with regard to how to establish control over subordinate social groups in a domestic context (i.e. a national-popular programme), but also with respect to world order and the position of the respective state or states within it. It is thus that, as Van der Pijl (2007) maintains, class forms the crucial nexus between global capitalism and geopolitics: rather than viewing them as autonomous, they must be seen as internally related. This is not to imply that geopolitical strategy is in any way determined by objective class interests. On the contrary, these interests must be articulated politically and ideologically, and their possible translation into state policy must be seen as a contingent outcome of social and political struggles. Our claim is, however, that the content of these political and discursive practices is shaped by the social position of the actors engaging in it and by underlying social relations.4 It is thus that we must analyse how actors formulating geopolitical strategies are, to use Gramsci’s (1971) terminology, organically linked to certain social forces and to class interests. It is such ‘organic intellectuals’, located both within and beyond the state apparatus, that must be seen as constructing a hegemonic project – formulating and disseminating a particular strategy – as an articulation of long-term class interests. It is thus that we seek to show how geopolitical strategy is not so much, as Harvey would have it, formulated by a class of state managers with separate interests and motivations (2003: 27), but by intellectuals, policy advisors and (in the end by) state officials who are in fact closely linked to private capitalist interests. Although the capitalist class of the most powerful state may be highly integrated into certain patterns of transnational class formation, it is plausible that it has, at the same time, a clear sense of a distinct national interest. Precisely because of the fact that it sits at the top of the international and global hierarchy, it is acutely aware of the interest it has in maintaining the current system and of what it has to lose if the system breaks down. We therefore hypothesize that hegemonic projects formulated within the context of such a dominant state will tend to express a strong geopolitical consciousness, and include a rather elaborate strategy with respect to how to exercise control over other states and their societies. It is from this perspective that we will below analyse the rise and fall of the neoconservative project in terms of a hegemonic project that has been formulated and propagated within the national political arena of the USA and has subsequently been very successful in shaping US foreign policy after 9/11.5 We explain the rise of this project by situating its origins within the contradictions and limits of what we see as the hegemonic project of neoliberal globalization that unfolded in the 1990s, while arguing that the effect of these structural dynamics were crucially mediated by the concrete agency of a political vanguard tied to dominant social forces within the USA. The neoconservative project, we argue, offered an answer to a crucial question facing the US ruling class: how to prolong US global hegemony at a moment when the ‘answer’ of the neoliberal project no longer seemed that compelling any more.

#### Diplomacy is a tool to infuse foreign policy with distinct class interest- exceptionalism, leverage, and the maintenance of capitalism

ANDREI A. GROMYKO in 1983

Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957–1985) and as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (1985–1988). Gromyko was responsible for many top decisions on Soviet foreign policy until he retired in 1988, Modern Diplomacy of Capitalist Powers, vii-viii

This book deals with the current problems of bourgeois diplomacy. Every state defines the objectives and tasks of its diplomacy, which is the sum total of all the measures, as well as the forms, ways, and means used by this state to implement its general policy in international affairs. Priority is attached to foreign policy; however, foreign policy and diplomacy are inseparably linked and interlocked in an integral whole. It follows from this fact that the foreign policy and diplomacy of a state, which has a definite social system, stem from the very nature of this system, or the ideology of the class or classes in power, and are called upon to secure their interests. In short, diplomacy, just like foreign policy, has a distinctive class character. Seeking to shape the destinies of nations, the exploiter classes have always regarded the planning and implementation of foreign policy and diplomatic activity as their exclusive privilege. Today, as in the past, they take whatever steps are necessary to bar the common people from participation in this process in whatever form, let alone directly, through their representatives. Bourgeois diplomacy continues its loyal service to the capitalist system, and to the monopoly bourgeoisie, which views diplomacy as an important instrument for preserving and consolidating its positions on the international scene, for the struggle against world socialism, the revolutionary and national liberation movements. In fulfilling its purpose bourgeois diplomacy makes wide use of the experience and facilities available in the rich arsenal of customs and traditions, norms and methods that took shape and accumulated through centuries of international intercourse, and activity in the foreign policy field. As Lenin pointed out in his time, in all areas of politics, foreign policy in particular, the proletariat which has come to power must know the methods of its opponent and use them at least with equal skill.1 Needless to say, deception, blackmail, and dictation, which have become the stock-in-trade of bourgeois diplomacy, are inapplicable in the practices of socialist diplomacy for reasons of principle and morality. Knowledge and consideration of these methods as diplomatic weapons of the bourgeoisie are quite indispensable for a timely exposure and analysis of imperialist plans and for frustrating them effectively. Falsehood and deception inherent in the diplomacy of capitalist powers are strikingly manifest in the glaring discrepancy between the foreign-policy principles and objectives they announce officially and those, they actually pursue in real life. The ruling sections of these countries proclaiming noble foreign-policy principles and objectives often use them as a cover-up to substitute their own selfish interests for the general state and national interests, to camouflage their true intentions and actions in international affairs, concealing thereby the essence of their diplomacy alien to their peoples.

#### The aff’s diplomatic engagement is an attempt to shore up US power through consent- it still relies on imperial power to achieve compliance

De Graaff and van Apeldoorn in 2011

Naná de Graaff VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands Bastiaan van Apeldoorn VU University - Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Varieties of US Post-Cold War Imperialism: Anatomy of a Failed Hegemonic Project and the Future of US Geopolitics, Critical Sociology 37(4) 403–427

It is true of course that Obama also at the same time, and in contrast to his predecessor, emphasizes the important role of international institutions and regimes (lauding in particular the United Nations) and since taking office has stepped up, next to the deliberate public relations efforts to restore America’s image abroad, the kind of diplomatic engagement – including with so-called rogue states – that was already going on in a more muted way at the end of the Bush reign. Although this engagement in the meantime has turned out to be less effective than hoped for and is being criticized from both the left and the right, and for instance vis-a-vis Iran a more hard-line stance seems now again in the offing, not just in style and tone but also in terms of actual foreign policy-making during Obama’s first year ‘the multilateral gloves’ (Stokes, 2005) have to some extent been put back on. This seems to fit well with a ‘liberal internationalist’ outlook such as was also expressed by previous democratic administrations (see e.g. Chanley, 1999). Yet this should not be taken as simply a return to previous policies. First, the renewed emphasis on institutions and diplomacy is combined with a continued emphasis on the need to enhance and apply military power, and more so than during the last Democratic presidency. A clear testimony of this is Obama’s Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in which he stated that ‘it was not just simply international institutions … that brought stability to a post-World War II world … The United States of America has helped to underwrite global security for more than six decades with the blood of our citizens and the strengths of our arms’ (Obama, 2009b). In the same speech, praised by the leading neoconservative Robert Kagan (2009) as signalling a ‘significant shift’ towards ‘a tougher, less forgiving, more quintessentially American approach’, Obama moreover reiterated that ‘I – like any head of state – reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation.’ (Obama, 2009b) Second, inasmuch as Obama does represent a relative shift back from coercion to consent, this should be seen in light of the failures of the coercive strategies of neoconservative imperialism. As the latter has undermined consent for US power so much as to become rather counter-productive, playing the ‘goodwill’ card may not only come naturally to Obama, but could also be seen as a strategy to seek to restore what is left of US global hegemony. The renewed search for consent that we have observed in Obama’s first year, however, is one that is born out of the fact that the USA has only a few cards left. This is crucially different from the neoliberal project of the Clinton years, which were the heyday for the power of both the USA and the neoliberal ideology. In short, inasmuch as multilateralism is making something of a comeback, it is out of weakness rather than strength. Finally, as indicated, the biggest challenge for Obama arguably lies on the economic front, where Obama not only has to adapt to the new multipolar reality and the loss of US structural power, but also will have to cope with the economic and ideological failure of the neoliberal accumulation strategy that has been pursued over the past decades; a failure which can be seen as at the heart of the current economic crisis. Returning to our network analysis above, the fact that largely the same people, linked to the same capital interests, which promoted the neoliberal accumulation strategy in the 1990s in the first place (e.g. Larry Summers, Paul Volcker) are now in charge of solving the crisis, in this respect may not bode well. Although Obama has recognized, and indeed made into a key priority of his overall foreign policy, the need to tackle the financial crisis also at a global level, in particular through the G-20 as the new primary platform for global economic governance, the three summits held thus far have produced little in the way of concrete steps towards a global reregulation of finance that could really form the basis for an alternative global growth model.

### Heg

#### Hegemony is upheld through a militaristic ideology – restricts opposition by entrenching itself as key to the economy and national security

Bernazolli and Flint ’09 (Richelle M. – University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; Colin- University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; “Power, Place, and Militarism: Toward a Comparative Geographic Analysis of Militarization”)

The Gramscian notion of hegemony, which sought to explain societal acquiescence to a capitalist system that created and maintained vast economic inequalities, held that the poor and working-class sectors of society adopt the dominant cultural group’s ‘values, norms, perceptions, beliefs, sentiments, and prejudices’ (Lears 1985, 569). Consider for a moment the role of the military in society, with its own particular values, norms, perceptions, beliefs, and practices. In order to gain and maintain support, or at least acquiescence, for a large, standing armed force and the different activities it takes on, with associated opportunity costs, those who do not necessarily have a stake in the well-being of this system must be somehow convinced that its health and viability is of critical importance to their own well-being. Society as a whole must be acculturated to adopt a particular worldview and set of cultural beliefs that will generate a certain level of acquiescence to whatever it is the military is doing at any time and in any place. In adopting a Gramscian view of hegemony, we do not wish to imply that there is necessarily a ruling military class analogous to the ruling economic class of which Gramsci spoke. Rather, we posit that hegemony – the ability to set agendas and define values and norms – has advanced militaristic goals as well as economic or class goals. Indeed, the various sets of goals are intertwined and often compliment each other. The point here is that Gramsci’s broad notion of power is of use in analyses that go beyond class in a capitalist society. For example, Flint (2006) notes that the Gramscian notion of power demonstrates how ‘geopolitical practices and ideas are disseminated and portrayed to wide audiences in order to justify them and make them appear “normal” while belittling alternative views’ (Flint 2006, 28). Cresswell (1996), in his theorizations of placediscussed above, employs Gramsci’s ideas in order to explain the role of place in constructing dominant ideologies. And Taylor (1999) adapts the Gramscian idea of hegemony from the scale of a particular society to the globe in order to explore the mechanisms by which the last three world hegemons (the Netherlands, Great Britain, and the United States) have each been able to construct and impose their own versions of ‘modernity’ on the rest of the world. Emphasizing that dominant worldviews do not take hold in a simple, top-down manner, Sharp (2000, 31) points out that **hegemony**, far from being constructed solely through political ideologies on the part of the elites of society, **is produced and maintained** ‘more immediately **through detailed scripting of** some of the most ordinary and mundane **aspects of everyday life**.’ It is this very banality that makes militarism more than merely an elite ideology, or a set of beliefs with which state institutions indoctrinate the less powerful sectors of society. This does not rule out the possibility of resistance to the dominant ideology. Just as Gramsci had to explain open revolts such as workers’ strikes and factory takeovers, the application of cultural hegemony to militarism necessitates an explanation of activities such as war protests. In actuality, maintaining hegemony does not require constant commitment from subordinates to the existing system; rather, **the dominant group** carefully **defines the acceptable range of resistance** to these processes. As Lears (1985, 569) points out, most of the time, the vast majority of people find it difficult, perhaps impossible, ‘to translate the outlook implicit in their experience into a conception of the world that will directly challenge the hegemonic culture.’ This explains why we may see protests to a particular event, such as the Iraq War, but not challenges to the overall role of the military in society (although it is the very nature of the military’s role in society that allows such wars to happen). Gramsci’s theories of common-sense power and cultural hegemony rest on his distinction between political society and civil society, a view echoed by Agnew (1987) and Kirby (1993) in their theorization of place. Political society consists of the juridical or coercive institutions, most notably the police and the military. Providing the necessary ‘direct domination’ or command, political society assures the discipline of those members of society who do not consent to the imposed order willingly. Civil society, on the other hand, consists of institutions such as schools, the media, churches, trade unions, and political parties. In contrast to political society, civil society corresponds with the actual function of ‘hegemony’; the diffusion of cultural values and norms that construct the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the masses to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant group (Bellamy and Schecter 1993, 118–119). The cultural hegemony of militarism, as with class-based hegemony, can be understood as the convergence of political and civil society in ‘perpetuating the existing order’ (Boggs 1976, 17). **One way in which the military sector achieves ascendancy within the state is to become an essential component of the economy**. Compared to the cultural or ideological side of militarization, the economic mechanisms of militarization are more tangible and readily quantified. Therefore, although defense spending is often shrouded in secrecy, researchers have been able to utilize secondary data in order to focus empirically on these economic processes, making them well documented in geography. For instance, Markusen et al. (1991, 5) provide ‘a preliminary sketch of a theory of location for the defense industries,’ which the authors note have altered the US economy in fundamental ways, contributing to the rapid development of certain regions and cities vis-à-vis others throughout the Cold War. The edited volume the Pentagon and the Cities (Kirby 1992) was compiled with an eye toward the end of the Cold War and what this geopolitical transition might mean for the many communities across the United States that had come to rely on defense spending for their economic survival. In addition, at this time, Crump (1993) looked at how the spatial distribution of Department of Defense services procurement lead to new patterns of regional development and economic inequalities (see Woodward 2004 for a comprehensive review of military economic geography).

#### Reframing US policies as necessary and defensive perpetuates hegemony by presupposing the necessity of militarism for a secure world

Cypher ’16 (James M. - Research Scholar at the Global Institute for Sustainable Prosperity and a Research Professor in the Doctoral Program in Development Studies (UAED), “Hegemony, military power projection and US structural economic interests in the periphery,” Third World Quarterly)

Neoliberalism is a complex, quickly metamorphosing doctrine with many objectives, including especially a largely successful campaign to de-politicise the vast ‘underlying population’.34 As a consequence of this effort, it has only been in the context of the run-up to intervention in Iraq in 2003 that the **intellectual hegemony of US militarism has been questioned** within the country since the last aftershocks of the Vietnam war era. Notably useful in this short moment of re-politicisation have been the contributions of Blum, which offered a popular summary of US interventions, and Kolko, who presented a sophisticated critique of the pretentions of US power projection.35 Nevertheless, as the ‘perpetual war’ era of the 21st century was consolidated in Afghanistan and Iraq, such disavowals were gradually subordinated through a new crystallisation of US ‘**conventional wisdom’**, which **ceased to view ongoing military campaigns as** events **beyond the ‘ordinary’**. This unnoticed transmogrification was achieved through the **constant ‘reframing’** **of the geopolitical policies** of the US as merely ‘necessary, protective, defensive’ measures as the ‘Pentagon propaganda machine’ worked assiduously with the mass media to de-legitimate opposition to these interventions and promote a numbing, universal ‘patriotic’ discourse.36 Second, Falk emphasised the attention the power elite has given to the avoidance of US war casualties, using technologies that effectively shift the fatalities of war-fighting onto (largely) foreign non-combatants. After Vietnam great care was given to the maintenance of consent through popular disengagement from the realities of intervention. Then President Carter began the reconstruction of US military intervention capabilities with the Rapid Deployment Force. Such new capabilities allowed for lightning US intervention in Panama in 1989. In 2003 ‘Shock and Awe’ – achieved through the rapid advance of overwhelming force – were thought to be the military tactics that would bring Iraq under US dominance before the American populace had an opportunity to react to events. In this instance, as Falk emphasised, Iraqi national resistance quickly formed and a prolonged battle ensued. ‘Fast intervention’, conducted with an array of high-tech weaponry, is designed to assure relatively few US military personnel killed in action. Thus, there is a constant substitution of capital for manpower in the field of battle for many reasons, one being that US corpses quickly pierce the carefully constructed **fog of intellectual hegemony** deployed **to ensure** US citizen **consent in the application of military force** in distant Southern nations. Interventions, then, have been facilitated through new processes and procedures carefully constructed to create a sufficient degree of autonomy **to permit the US state to ‘project power’** and intervene without broad societal resistance. Nonetheless, prolonged engagements resulting from creative forms of asymmetric national resistance regularly erode and degrade US social consent, requiring its constant reconstruction. This erosion of consent can be forestalled to a considerable degree thanks to a culturally well-entrenched allegiance to US militarism. Militarism entails both individual and societal deference to all things military – including the military definition of reality, as Mills argued: ‘military power has become an ascendant end in itself…heightening the prestige and increasing the power of the military…tends to become a basis of national policy’.37 However, US militarism has always, ultimately, been a civilian-dominated construct, although since 1945 the civil–military relationship has frequently been ‘fractious, combative and problematic’.38 **Militarism is the societal belief that the use of force in international relations** – as a preferred option – **can achieve national objectives.** Furthermore, it is the **dominance of military affairs in the construction of** national priorities and **policies**. Militarism, in the US guise, does not mean that high-ranking military cadres precipitate episodes of ‘power projection’. Rather, most frequently, this role is filled by civilians – often in the face of opposition or scepticism from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Militarists believe in the ‘logic of violence’, although there is no logic to violence except its assurance of ‘blowback’. Militarism has its deepest roots in the south states of America, where ‘valour’ and unquestioning ‘patriotism’ have long been held up as the highest of societal values. Today US military bases are spread throughout the southern states, reflecting the abiding influence of generations of jingoistic Senators and Congressional Representatives. US militarism is embraced by an influential portion of the civilian population, regardless of geography, particularly through the institutional power of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW, with 1.4 million members), the American Legion (2.4 million veteran members) and retired officer associations. Of equal importance, with the end of national military service (in 1973), a multi-generational ‘caste’ of military families formed, with the south states constituting its strongest representation.39 Thus, the ideological hegemony needed to enable near-constant military interventions since the end of the Cold War is not structurally fragile. Neither is it unassailable. Regardless of the calamitous conditions arising from US interventions – including massive civilian casualties and displacement – a vociferous portion of the populace embodies unmitigated support for US military ‘power projection’. Another portion of the population – always risking the accusation of treasonous practices – embraces a counter-hegemonic position either as pacifists and/or because of their critique of the structural political economy of US military interventions. At any moment in time a vast proportion of the apolitical US populace has no strong commitment to either the permanent militarist faction or to those who hold an a priori position of opposition. Under conditions of prolonged military engagement this structurally uncommitted and easily deceived portion of the populace slowly and quietly withdraws its consent for interminable exercises in power projection. This is normally characterised as ‘war fatigue’ the ‘Vietnam Syndrome’ or some other sweeping term adopted by mass media entities that interpret, and communicate, the results of (frequently manipulated) public opinions polls. Manufactured consent, then, can be challenged at crucial conjunctures. Nonetheless, deeper structural and inertial forces tend – time and again – **to reassert the intellectually hegemonic construct of US militarism.**

#### Cultural hegemony reentrenches militarism by labeling a war-culture as key to local identities

Bernazolli and Flint ’09 (Richelle M. – University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; Colin- University of Illinois at Urbana-Campaign; “Power, Place, and Militarism: Toward a Comparative Geographic Analysis of Militarization”)

Contemporary theories of place provide a framework within which geographers can bridge society-wide processes, such as state-building, with local actions, decisions, and experiences. In this view, places are widely conceptualized as networks of social relations, rather than simply the local-scale settings, or containers, in which social relations occur (Agnew 1996; Massey 1994). This overview of place literature will look at the key aspects of place that we will subsequently connect to processes of militarization: place as a recursive and contingent process of social construction; the role of the production and maintenance of ideology; and the contestation of dominant ideologies and identities as a component of the social construction of place. The recursiveness of place, which is central to contemporary usage of the concept, stresses that as places are socially constructed, they concurrently foment particular behaviors and attitudes, which in turn, reproduce the places. These processes vary between localities, so that the general phenomena observable at the level of ‘mass society’ are experienced uniquely from place to place (Agnew 1987). Thus, the unique and the general, the structure and the agent, are related in a network of interdependent localities (Agnew 1987). Historical contingency likewise ‘emphasizes institutional and individual practices as well as the structured features with which those practices are interwoven’ (Pred 1984, 280) and further contributes the notion that places are constructed over time. While social relations (and the places they constitute) are dynamic and even sometimes fleeting, new interactions and behaviors that appear in their place are not built on a ‘clean slate’, but instead on the remains of previous ones, inevitably shapedby what came before (Pred 1984; Massey 1994). Finally, the construction of place may often be the result of elite actions in pursuit of particular goals, as Johnston (1991) posits, but it is important to recognize that subaltern members of society also play a role – either by complying with elite agendas, or by resisting them (Pile and Keith 1997; Thrift 2000). Place, as a process, is a ‘powerful force in the ongoing hegemonic and counterhegemonic struggles,’ meaning that place reproduces the beliefs that have produced it, and this occurs in such a way that the beliefs eventually appear self-evident and commonsense (Cresswell 1996, 13; Kirby 1993). This idea provides the crucial link between place and ideology. As noted earlier, while places may manifest as areas of resistance to the state, they also play a crucial role in reproducing the geography of the state’s hegemony (Agnew 1987). In a militarized society, this ‘geography of hegemony’ would unfold in a number of ways, particularly in terms of the cultural manifestations of militarism: the adoption and visible signs of military culture and values and ensuing support for militaristic policies. Such activities give rise to a local sense of identity, or sense of place, which often – but not always – serve to perpetuate dominant ideologies and identities (Agnew 1987; Pred 1984; Williams 1977). Places may also be constructed with the aim of resisting elite identities, ideologies, and objectives (Cresswell 1996; Kirby 1993; Pile and Keith 1997). In such cases, rather than serving as the local tools of overarching structures, the social relations and attitudes comprising localities may formulate in opposition to the policies of the state (Kirby 1993). Recent empirical work on the practices of memorialization and commemoration demonstrates how places may consist of competing forces: those which seek to perpetuate dominant ideologies and identities and those which seek to contest them (Alderman and Dwyer 2004; Graham and Shirlow 2002; Johnson 2003; Schein 2006). Ideologies, both dominant and marginalized, are inscribed into the cultural landscape, making this facet of place both a reflection of the human activities and ideals that have gone into constructing it, and at the same time, constitutive of them (Mitchell 2000; Schein 1997). Questions of power, then, are critical to gaining an understanding of how place based activities produce particular landscapes (Dowler et al. 2005). The complexity of place, with its multiple facets and meanings, is important to recognize. However, Agnew’s three aspects of place may be seen as core ‘variables’ around which a research framework may be organized. Agnew (1987, 1996) identified location, which is a place’s role or function in the wider economy; locale, which represents the primary institutions organizing social relations and identity in a place; and sense of place, which refers to the sense of identity tied to a locality. A fourth dimension, connectivity, or linkages to other places and other scales, should also be considered within a place-based research framework (Massey 1994). Agnew’s aspects of place will be revisited later in this article, as we propose possible comparative research designs for the study of militarization. As discussed above, several theories of place have set the foundation for discussing the construction of places within the political processes of state formation and maintenance. One set of processes involved is militarization. But what, exactly, is militarization accomplishing? These processes, constituted in large part by the activities of people in everyday settings, work to make militarism a taken-for-granted, or ‘natural’ facet of many societies. Hence, a useful concept for conceptualizing militarism is that of cultural hegemony, which up to now has been used in research focusing on class relations within capitalist societies. Cultural hegemony, as the following section will discuss, is a term developed by Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci ca. 1930 in order to explain why the working class had internalized or adopted the capitalist values of the bourgeoisie – in effect, reproducing a system that perpetuated their meager existence. However, this term, in concert with Gramsci’s theories of power, can be readily adapted from an explanation of the adoption of capitalist values to an explanation of the adoption of militaristic values.

### Humanitarianism

#### Humanitarianism reifies a monolithic humanity where privileged agencies articulate human insecurity – ambiguous conceptual boundaries allow for manipulation and violence

**Watson in 2011**

Department of Political Science, University of Victoria, Canada; The 'human' as referent object?: Humanitarianism as securitization, Security Dialogue, Vol. 42(1)

Yet, security is not the only discourse that may be used to legitimize the implementation of emergency measures. Turning to recent historical events, one is struck by the power of humanitarianism in legitimizing a wide range of rather extraordinary measures. The humanitarian discourse that shaped the response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami resulted in unparalleled funding from both public and private sources: over US$13.5 billion was donated to disaster relief and recovery, and donors included an unprecedented total of 99 governments (Flint and Goyder, 2006; Telford and Cosgrave, 2007). Additionally, elites have used humanitarianism in varying degrees to justify military interventions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Mozambique, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Zaire, Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Iraq and Afghanistan (De Waal and Omaar, 1994; Wheeler, 2004; Roth, 2004). Perhaps the pinnacle of justification for military intervention for the purposes of human protection emerged from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s (2001) report The Responsibility To Protect1 . The ICISS report explicitly outlines the foundations of the right to military intervention and garnered relatively widespread international support, including acceptance by the UN General Assembly (MacFarlane et al., 2004). The widespread endorsement of this report, combined with the continued use of humanitarianism to promote massive relief operations and military interventions, amply demonstrates that humanitarianism, like security, is a powerful discourse that legitimizes marshalling a vast amount of resources in the implementation of emergency measures. Humanitarianism as a justification for the use of military force is opposed by critics from all over the political and academic spectrum: from realists concerned with the use of force for reasons other than national security (traditionally understood) to critical theorists concerned with the imperialism of humanitarianism and its legitimization of violence (Slim, 2001; Ayoob, 2002; Bricmont, 2006; for overviews, see Welsh, 2004; McFarlane et al., 2004; Macrae, 1998). Yet, not all critics are completely dismissive of humanitarianism and the types of intervention it justifies. Those who still advocate for humanitarian action aim to create a concept of humanitarianism that either excludes the state and the use of force (ICRC, 2004; Rieff, 2002) or sets out clear parameters for ensuring that states employ force in a humane way and toward humanitarian outcomes (Weiss, 2001; Anderson, 1998; De Waal and Omaar, 1994). Consequently, scholars and practitioners alike have spilled much ink attempting to tie down the meaning of humanitarianism, in order to prevent its abuse at the hands of state and non-state actors. Despite these efforts, humanitarianism lacks rigid conceptual boundaries and is extendable, which facilitates ambiguous and manipulated uses (Chimni, 2000: 244). US and British elites’ justification of the invasion of Iraq in terms of humanitarianism is evidence enough of this problem. Yet, Chimni’s observation is eerily reminiscent of the critiques of the concept of security – that security is an essentially contested concept (Buzan, 1991) and that it is ambiguous and easily manipulated by elites (Wæver, 1995). Wæver (1995: 54–5) writes that security’s conceptual fluidity and discursive power encourages power-holders to use the instrument of security to gain control over an issue and use it for specific, self-serving purposes. He could just as easily have been referring to humanitarianism. In this article, I contend that the power of humanitarianism to legitimize extraordinary measures and the problem of its ambiguity and manipulability are best understood by approaching it as a form of securitization, similar in kind to societal and state security. Securitizing discourses (state, societal, humanitarian, etc.) identify a referent object that is threatened and endorse emergency measures to alleviate the threat. Approaching humanitarianism as a distinct sector of security with its own logic of threat and vulnerabilities addresses three critical gaps in securitization theory: its exclusion of non-state or societal referent objects of security (Buzan et al., 1998: 36; Hansen and Nissenbaum, 2009: 1160), its reliance on domestic and democratic forms of governance (Wilkinson, 2007; Vuori, 2008), and its problematic distinction between normal and emergency measures (Buzan et al., 1998: 25–7; Stritzel, 2007: 367; Rasmussen, 2001). Such an approach also contributes to our understanding of humanitarianism as a structured field in which certain actors hold a privileged position in the enunciation of human insecurity, in which a reified and monolithic form of humanity is declared, and that supports existing international norms pertaining to the provision of security for humans.

### Hybrid Warfare/Disinformation

#### Hybrid warfare and disinformation rhetoric serve as empty signifiers to displace any understanding of the structural contradictions generated by militarism

Ünver and Kurnaz 22

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Since then, strategic communicative actions that are intended to influence, mislead and confuse foreign populations have assumed a central position in global debates about politics and foreign policy. Given the impact of such actions on elections, polarization and crisis management, it was natural for the rhetoric about these actions to assume such a central position (Bradshaw, Howard, 2018). However, over time, popular buzzwords like ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, and ‘information operations’ have proliferated in global political mainstream discourse and assumed an accusatory nature worldwide as more leaders, diplomats, and politicians have begun using them to discredit and delegitimize their political opponents. This dynamic was later conceptualized as ‘discursive deflection’ (Ross, Rivers, 2018; Smith, 2019) and became acutely visible in the foreign policy domain, as more countries have begun securitizing the concepts ‘fake news’, ‘disinformation’, and ‘information warfare’ to similarly discredit, and delegitimize rival countries (Baum, Potter, 2019). Broadly speaking, ‘discursive-deflection’ is the strategy of discrediting competitors and rivals by portraying oneself as the sole source of truth. While the domestic political use of these terms is well-studied, we are still somewhat in the dark with regard to why countries choose to securitize these terms and what happens in their interactions with other countries when they do so.¶ The foreign policy use of such terms predates the 2016 US elections and proliferated after the Russian military involvement in Crimea and Donbas (Khaldarova, Pantti, 2016). The primary reason for this contextual proliferation was the Russian decision to deny the initial stages of its involvement in Ukraine and its broader strategy of distracting and dividing Western attention over Russian military operations (Mejias, Vokuev, 2017). There is still a debate over whether it was really Russian information operations that had derailed NATO response in Ukraine, or if disinformation discourses are employed in order to shift the blame over to Russia at a time when NATO was already divided over its commitment to Ukraine (Lysenko, Brooks, 2018). While there is robust evidence of Russian information operations in Ukraine and its role in spreading disinformation in NATO countries, sustained NATO apathy towards rising Russian military influence in the Black Sea after 2014 and Syria after 2015 support the latter claim.¶ Critics of Western disinformation discourses for example, argue that such discourses have turned into ‘floating (or empty) signifiers’, that have no specific or agreed-upon meaning (Farkas, Schou, 2018). In that vein, blaming others for engaging in disinformation often distracts attention away from a mistake or failed policy enacted by the blamer (Monsees, 2020). In this case, critics argue that Western discourses on disinformation are intended to distract attention away from NATO or EU divisions, or more domestic level polarization dynamics, by creating a unique empty signifier (disinformation) that is employed as a rallying rhetoric that bolsters the significance of external threats (Mas-Manchón et al., 2021). This way, disinformation and its associated terms like misinformation, fake news and information war get securitized, receiving disproportionate levels of attention in the policy domain. In this context, disinformation and its associated terms are used to exaggerate an existing threat and create a rallying discourse that would channel the attention of the divided Western nations away from their internal disagreements, and towards an inflated external threat. Some scholars go even further, arguing that disinformation is being securitized in the West (especially in NATO) to the extent the ‘war on terror’ was securitized through the 2000s (Lanoszka, 2019). In this line, disinformation is alleged to have become a new strategic glue that would help Western nations pool in their increasingly diverging interests and resources into a common cause (Baumann, 2020).¶ Securitization of disinformation in domestic politics is relatively well-studied (Freelon, Wells, 2020; Neo, 2021). Although these terms have entered into mainstream debate after the 2016 US elections, former President Donald Trump too, had securitized fake news to delegitimize his opponents by constructing rival disinformation as a national security problem, indirectly attributable to China (Polletta, Callahan, 2019). Following the tornado of accusations in the US, political actors in Britain, France, Italy, South Africa, Kenya and others have begun blaming each other for engaging in organized disinformation (Maweu, 2019; Saurwein, Spencer-Smith, 2020). Even in Sweden, there is empirical evidence that suggests accusing journalists of spreading fake news results in self-censorship of such outlets (Bennett, Livingston, 2018). There are further cases of evidence supporting the claim that elite-level discourses on disinformation have a direct effect on how the wider society perceives information and facts in general, creating a measurable effect on public trust towards such facts and information (Van Duyn, Collier, 2019). In Singapore for example, delegitimizing rival parties and news outlets through disinformation discourse is considered ‘acceptable’, as part of the state’s duty to discipline the opposition and its political actors (Tan, 2020). Similar trends emerging in democracies and authoritarian countries alike, such as in Austria, Australia, Poland, Russia, and South Africa, demonstrate the universality of instrumentalizing disinformation discourse as a political delegitimization tactic (Kurowska, Reshetnikov, 2018; Tandoc et al., 2018).¶ While a robust scholarship is emerging on the domestic political uses of disinformation discourse, there has so far been no longitudinal, large-N study that explored how such constructions emerge in international politics. Furthermore, there has so far been no exploration of how such discourses evolve over time and under what contexts in foreign affairs. We know that disinformation and fake news are important issues in world politics and that they are frequently used to bring an issue to public attention, but we are more in the dark over the contextual and temporal nuances that drive how these concepts are discursively constructed in foreign policy discourse.¶ This study aims to provide an early addition to the emerging literature on foreign policy uses of disinformation discourses by focusing on how the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has used them in its documents and social media posts. It does so by studying 238,452 tweets from offcial NATO and affliated accounts, and more than 2,000 NATO texts, news, statements, and publications using computational methods since January 2014 and presents an unsupervised structural topic model (stm) analysis to explore the main thematic and discursive contexts of these texts. Ultimately, we hope to trigger a wider debate on the securitization of disinformation and fake news in foreign policy, and the greater explanatory value of computational methods in studying large-N text data in studying such securitization strategies.¶ 2 Securitizing Disinformation¶ Over the last few years, defining what misleading content is and how to measure the legitimacy of its dissemination has been at the forefront of journalistic, political and scientific debate (Tandoc et al., 2018). Even before its proliferation in 2016, disinformation was a widely-used term in the mainstream discourse, co-existing with other terms such as infoglut, or information overload (Andrejevic, 2013). Although at first disinformation and misinformation were terms used interchangeably, today, disinformation refers to the deliberate dissemination of false information with the intention to mislead and confuse its audiences. Misinformation, on the other hand, strictly defines unintended diffusion of false information by mistake, without malintent. There are also bridge terms such as ‘malinformation’ that is factually accurate but is deployed to harm and damage an individual or an entity, or the concept of ‘problematic information’ as defined by Caroline Jack (Jack, 2017; Morgan, 2018). Although it is not directly mentioned, all of these concepts refer to the digital space, where information manipulation is disseminated faster and wider on social media and digital communication technologies compared to more media forms of media.¶ As terms ‘disinformation/misinformation’, ‘fake news’, ‘information operation’, and ‘hybrid war’ are often used interchangeably in political discourse, there are no clear-cut differences in the strategic topic of each word choice (Guess, Lyons, 2020). Politicians and leaders can often use these terms as a bag of buzzwords, without a clear operational definition of what each of them precisely means. Each of these buzzwords generate roughly the same effect on the consumers of such messages, which is the delegitimization of their target (Tucker et al., 2018). Especially problematic is the fact that once the discourse on disinformation is weaponized to delegitimize rivals, there is very little such rivals can do to defend themselves. Given the significant political charge of these terms, individuals or institutions that are alleged to be engaging in disinformation-related activities often have to enter into a fruitless spar of words to challenge such allegations, which usually leads to further controversy. This renders the accuser - or the side that securitizes disinformation - more advantageous compared to the accused, generating a dynamic similar to the ‘attacker’s advantage’ in cyber security where the defender is continuously blindsided (Tong et al., 2020).¶ Therefore, the securitization of disinformation - that is, discursively constructing disinformation as a security concern - is becoming almost as controversial as disinformation itself, and can often be deployed to muddle the waters of a healthy debate. Its problem lies within its success; namely how successfully disinformation gets securitized and rallies policy resources around itself. This fits into Buzan et. al. criteria for a ‘successful speech-act’, which takes places in a medium most appropriate for its dissemination and have a clear, mobilizable referent object (i.e. ‘those that spread disinformation’) (Buzan et al., 1998). By securitizing disinformation in the medium that is most conducive for its dissemination (social media and Internet), speakers get a chance to use the speed and volume advantage of digital communication technologies against their opponents. Also, such discursive constructions must be sedimented (1) rhetorically: have a clear argumentative function, (2) discursively: contain clear power and hegemonic relations within, (3) culturally: refer to a well-known case or instance, and (4) institutionally: in a way that mobilizes policy resources (Williams, 2003).¶ Yet for the Copenhagen school, not all speech acts constitute securitization. Securitization is a very particular discursive construct that designates a specific existential threat that requires the mobilization of uncommon resources and measures that go beyond the norms of institutional and political responses (Knudsen, 2001). In many cases, securitization happens to trigger and facilitate these institutional changes by ‘shocking’ power brokers and bureaucracies into action either through internal bureaucratic peer pressure, or through public opinion pressure (audience costs). As such, disinformation has been lifted ‘above politics’ in Western rhetoric as a peculiar threat that requires a sidelining of daily political squabbles, mobilizing unique resources and addressing it in unity that would otherwise cannot materialize (Buzan, Wæver, 2009). Ultimately the discursive constructions of disinformation do constitute acute cases of securitization as they generate amity-enmity relations among countries that adopt this discursive strategy, versus those that do not (Buzan, Wæver, 2009).

#### Hybrid warfare discourse displaces security anxieties by framing Russia as an evil Other that must be contained- it results in limited understanding of the root causes of war and turns the case

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To sum up, NATO’s discourse on disinformation presents a discursive continuity and is broadly in line with its securitization preferences prior to the popularization of the terms ‘fake news’ or ‘information operations’. By leveraging a buzzword that has mainstream popularity, NATO’s discursive efforts refocus the alliance’s strategic agenda back on Russia, and semantically clusters these securitization moves on existing competition areas with Moscow. Since securitization is the process by which regular events, actors and phenomena are elevated into a policy frame that requires special measures, NATO’s disinformation discourse directly fits into the theoretical spectrum. NATO’s 2018 Brussels Summit Declaration and the 2019 London Declaration both prioritized disinformation as a major, strategic-level alliance threat and combating information warfare have been integrated into NATO military exercises since 2017. NATO has been running wargames that focus on coordinated, Russian-origin disinformation campaigns against NATO battlegroups in Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland and has been investing in the establishment of new digital countermeasure labs (NATO, 2020). In other words, as a successful securitization effort, disinformation has been receiving ample attention, resources and cohesion-building initiatives within the NATO framework. As part of this strategy, NATO’s securitization efforts have a clear securitizing agent (alliance), existential threat (Russian-origin information warfare), a referent object (alliance cohesion, electoral integrity) and an audience (international public opinion), along with new doctrinal changes and investment schemees.¶ 5 Discussion and Conclusion¶ Our analysis has shown that NATO has developed two disinformation-related communication strategies for two outlets: a more up-to-date and faster-developing threat discourse for its Twitter presence, and a more traditional, slow-moving threat presence visible in its offcial documents. This is particularly interesting and acutely visible in more 20th century military topics like command and control cohesion, missile defense, air defense architecture, naval defense, satellites and military intelligence-related topics that are more frequently mentioned in offcial documents, and much less referenced on Twitter. However, the overwhelming majority of disinformation, misinformation, hybrid war, information warfare and fake news-related communication topics are securitized on Twitter. This shows the emergence of two NATO discourses: one for its offcial documents, and one for its social media presence and messaging.¶ The advent of digital communication technologies and social media has been significant for the evolution of securitization. Since securitization entails production and dissemination of insecurity frames through discursive networks, a more dynamic, interconnected information ecosystem is more conducive for collective meaning-making. On social media, the formation of insecurity processes are more rapid and interactive, and are able to influence and alter traditional, boring securitizing acts of elites. To that end, media outlets like Twitter provide a more interactive and fast-paced securitizing environment where elites and non-elites can set the security agenda and mobilize masses. The most clear expression of this novel medium, as demonstrated in our results, is that NATO’s Twitter securitization efforts change much faster, and spread more widely than traditional outlets like offcial speeches, texts and reports.¶ This could be interpreted in two ways: first, that NATO may prefer securitizing disinformation exclusively on Twitter, since such threats are generally more visible and debated on social media platforms. The second interpretation is that NATO’s offcial statements and documents could largely be focusing on macrolevel doctrinal issues that pose a direct military security threat to its members, rather than disinformation, which is a nuisance, but poses no direct military threat. Since disinformation is being discussed in contemporary policy debates within the context of electoral integrity and social polarization, their actual military relevance may be less relevant to be taken into account in formal NATO documents. In either case, our study of the NATO lexicon demonstrated that disinformation and related terms are constructed as uniquely ‘Russian’ nuisances. This isn’t surprising since most of these terms - at least their digital interpretations - have entered the NATO lexicon after the Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine and Crimea. However, since then, Russia remained the only country against which NATO has constructed its disinformation narratives, indicating that Russia is NATO’s sole disinformation concern. Although very recently China has emerged as a runner-up country within the context of COVID-related disinformation concerns, Russia is largely the main threat in NATO’s lexicon. This could be counterproductive to long-term NATO efforts to combat disinformation, given the global prevalence of fake news and information meddling. While Russian disinformation efforts are observably valid, cornering a universal problem like disinformation into the limited space of NATO’s interactions with a single country may lead to conceptual contraction. This in turn, may prevent NATO from mobilizing full alliance resources against disinformation, defined as a global and universal problem.¶ Overall, our analysis has shown that NATO still defines its security identity against Russia, and there isn’t a significant shift in NATO’s securitization dynamics since the Cold War, evidenced by our comparative analysis of older and newer NATO texts. Although Chinese disinformation attempts have also begun to enter into NATO threat language, NATO’s primary discursive security identity continues to develop against and around Russia. This is most evident in our longitudinal analysis or pre- and post-2014 documents that prioritize Russia as a threat alike, implying that it is not really disinformation or fake news agenda that is rendering Russia a threat for NATO. This suggests the hypothesis that even if technologies change, NATO-Russia rivalry will remain securitized the same way. In other words, contemporary disinformation and fake news agenda is a continuation of the same NATO-Russia rivalry – at least in discursive form – through newer mediums.

### Liberal International Order

#### The liberal international order is based on a classist and Eurocentric ideology that legitimates western ways of life will masking the extreme racial and economic inequality exacerbated by its policies

INDERJEET PARMAR in 2018

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It is widely agreed that the US-led liberal international order (LIO) is at the¶ very least in transition, if not in crisis.1 This article raises a number of significant¶ questions with the aim of clarifying the current conjuncture in the US-led LIO,¶ with particular attention to the academic ‘theory’ (liberal internationalism) that¶ underpins the system. Above all, it asks: is liberal internationalism a legitimating¶ ideology more than it is a description or theoretical explanation of the existing¶ system? I explore this question by considering several specific sub-questions, the¶ cumulative effect of which is to provide pathways to address the main issue: How¶ did we get here? Who built the order? What were the foundational principles in¶ theory and practice? How has the international order’s leadership managed change¶ within it since 1945?¶ I address these questions by considering detailed examples of actual practice¶ by US and allied elite leadership groups at key moments: first, in conceptualizing¶ and building the order, both during and immediately after the Second World War,¶ by exploring the creation of the South Korean state; and second, in looking at¶ the management of change and challenges—in particular, the (re-)emergence of¶ China as a Great Power. Both cases are claimed by leading liberal internationalists¶ as primary examples of the successes of the LIO: hence, examining these cases in¶ some detail allows us to compare liberal internationalist rationales—and the stated¶ aims of policy-makers—with historical and contemporary evidence. The overall finding is that liberal internationalist thinking/theory is, in effect¶ (albeit unconsciously on the part of its proponents), a legitimating ideology rather¶ than an effective explanatory frame for understanding the way in which the LIO¶ actually works. That conclusion is reached, in part, by suggesting the applicability¶ of a rather different perspective on the operations of the LIO and US power:¶ specifically, a synthesized Gramscian–Kautskyian framework, explained below.¶ The key point is that the LIO is a class-based, elitist hegemony—strongly¶ imbued with explicit and implicit racial and colonial/imperial assumptions—in¶ both US domestic and foreign relations. At home, this analysis helps to explain in¶ part the phenomenon of the ‘left behind’ white working/middle class, including¶ the affluent but economically anxious voters whose salience on the right has transformed¶ US politics since the Reagan revolution of the 1980s.2 Responding to the¶ (minorities’) rights revolution of the 1960s, and the loss of economic opportunity¶ and decline in living standards due to technological change and the global redistribution¶ of industry,3 white working- and middle-class voters drifted towards the¶ Republicans as the party of low taxes and fiscal conservatism.4 This delivered¶ little¶ in material terms, however; and, as inequality increased with market freedom and¶ real wages stagnated, workers in the ‘rust belt’ and other areas grew increasingly¶ dissatisfied with the status quo of establishment politics, their frustration exacerbated¶ by anxieties about ethno-racial diversity and American identity as the United¶ States moves towards a society in which whites are a minority.5 The result was¶ the election as president in 2016 of Donald Trump on an overtly anti-conservative¶ and barely concealed white identity platform at home and a programme of protectionism¶ and non-interventionism—America First—abroad.6¶ Yet political dissatisfaction or disaffection was not confined to the political¶ right.7 ‘Occupy Wall Street’ and other movements and groups vented their anger¶ at the inequalities of power, wealth and income, particularly in the wake of the¶ Iraq War and the 2008 financial crisis.8¶ In external policy, the analysis helps to explain the difficulty, perhaps the¶ impossibility,¶ of the US readily embracing a more diverse international order, as¶ well as the character of that very embrace.9 Accepting nations of the global South¶ on an equal footing may become a strategic necessity, but the process remains problematic given the racialized discourses of western power over the past several¶ centuries, fortified in the United States by the experience of the slave trade, slavery,¶ the ‘Jim Crow’ era, Orientalist views of Asians, and other factors.10 Class power¶ helps to explain the strategic embrace of foreign elites as the sources of change and¶ the agents of American influence, however diluted it may have been due to target¶ states’ national interest considerations. Those at the apex of America’s hierarchies¶ sought to forge alliances with and incorporate their foreign elite counterparts—¶ with their full cooperation—in South Korea and China.11 Hence, the liberal internationalist¶ ‘successes’ in the cases of South Korea and China must be qualified by¶ considering the repercussions of developing market-oriented societies marked by¶ economic inequality, rising social unrest and varying degrees of political repression.¶ In ‘successful’ China and South Korea, as in India and other emerging¶ powers, there remain major challenges underpinned by profound inequalities in¶ power, wealth and income, associated with a politics that is frequently class-based¶ but also heavily racialized and xenophobic.12

#### The aff’s presentation of the international liberal order as a benign good elides its role as a legitimating ideology for racial and class hierarchies within and between nations-it views western values as essential in intervening to tame racially inferior cultures

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Liberal internationalism is an ambiguous, multifaceted approach to understanding,¶ explaining, justifying and practising international politics. One aspect of it is as¶ a positive theory taught in academic International Relations (IR), derived from¶ liberalism as applied to international affairs, explaining how the foreign policies of¶ leading states, especially the United States and Britain, work. It is also a normative¶ world-view, used by some of its proponents to indicate what the world ought to¶ look like and how it might, and frequently does, work. Liberal internationalism,¶ therefore, is also a set of policies, institutions and established practices.13¶ As an IR theory, the key pillars of liberalism, as embodied in liberal societies,¶ are limited government, individual freedom, private property, pluralism and¶ tolerance, progress, institutions and cooperation for peace, and interdependence.¶ As a theory of US foreign policy, which is the object of analysis here, it encompasses¶ democratic values, economic interdependence, international institutions as¶ a framework for cooperation in addressing global crises and problems, and the¶ broad promotion of general welfare. Emerging historically from the era of rising¶ anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, with the United States and Britain in the¶ lead, the US-led order laid claims to being opposed to colonial rule, and in favour¶ of national and human rights, within a system of international power undergirded¶ by rules binding hegemon and others alike. It was promoted not as a continuation¶ of empire by other means, but as a new system based on universalistic principles¶ applicable to all regardless of race, colour or history.¶ For my immediate purposes, it is unnecessary to disentangle the positive from the¶ normative, the theoretical from the practical, because this framework of thought¶ emerges both from deep principles and also as a set of solutions to international¶ problems, especially world wars. Hence, liberal internationalism is frequently¶ referred to as Wilsonianism, after the internationalist programme promulgated¶ by US President Woodrow Wilson after the First World War that included the¶ formation of the League of Nations, the forerunner of the longer-lasting post-1945¶ United Nations system.¶ I argue here that, as a theory, it operates as ideological legitimation even when¶ its proponents offer reform; it justifies the status quo. In that regard it differs little¶ overall from other theories like Marxism, for example, or realism. But because it¶ is the principal system of ideas and practices, and ideals, that are used to explain,¶ implement and defend the present international status quo, I would suggest that¶ it elides too much to be fully validated beyond the circle of its proponents. Of¶ course, it explains aspects of the world’s functioning; but its interpretation tends¶ to be benign: crises and challenges are explained as resolvable within the system’s¶ governing principles through socialization, integration and assimilation.¶ I use the term liberal internationalism, then, as an amalgam to suggest that,¶ while it is all of the above, upon reflection it serves within academia and in IR as a¶ positive theory of how things actually are—that is, as the opposite of an ideology.¶ It purports to be able to explain the world, at the same time as its adherents are¶ normative supporters of the theory. I show that it is actually ideological, because¶ it elides key factors of how the liberal world order actually works, and that other¶ theories suggest better ways of explaining the world.¶ In the next section of the article, I analyse liberal internationalist ideas and¶ claims in more depth and more critically, with a view to identifying key elements¶ of a more viable framework to explain the LIO—a critical theory influenced by¶ the work of Antonio Gramsci and to some extent synthesized with the work of¶ Karl Kautsky. The principal aim of this article is to identify the weaknesses of¶ liberal internationalism in practice with the purpose of opening space for subsequent¶ theorizing. In sum, what appears to be missing from liberal internationalism¶ is any recognition of domestic power inequalities—such as those based on¶ class and race—its broad attachment to (democratic) elitism, and its hierarchical¶ approach to other powers, especially in the global South.¶ While Wilsonian liberal internationalism is widely recognized as privileging a¶ belief in the free movement of people, capital, goods and services, less attention has¶ been given to its origins in a time when ‘international relations’ was overtly understood¶ as ‘race relations’, and its consequent implication in managing overtly racialized¶ imperial power after the First World War.14 The Wilson administration’s role¶ in racially segregating the US federal government had its foreign policy counterpart¶ in a belief in an eventual, but far distant, self-government of the colonies¶ and opposition to a Japanese proposal for a racial equality clause in the charter of¶ the fledgling League of Nations.15 The development of liberal internationalism,¶ then, was symbiotically bound to Wilson’s conviction that US intervention in¶ world affairs was essential, and to what were effectively parastatal organizations¶ created both by the federal executive and by private foundations—the Carnegie¶ Endowment for International Peace, among others. Wilsonian ‘theory’ was¶ practical, idealistic and ideological from the very beginning. It is also the case¶ that, long after overt racial discourses became politically damaging, subliminal¶ racial thinking remained—and (unconsciously) remains—a significant element of¶ liberal internationalism, affecting its analyses of the politics of domestic and global¶ demographic power shifts.16¶ Nevertheless, liberal internationalists are cosmopolitans—opposed to narrow¶ nationalism and trade protectionism, within a US-led international system. But its¶ core ideas—rule of law, superiority of the western idea (however lightly worn),¶ a rules-based institutional order open to all, in principle—are deeply embedded¶ in US political-intellectual elite think-tanks, university public policy schools,¶ corporate media and the leaderships of both main political parties,17 the core of¶ the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment.18 Importantly, however, there¶ are influential voices in the emerging powers and regions that support the liberal¶ international order by calling for internal reform to take account of the changing¶ distribution of global power away from the West and towards the ‘rest’.19

### MIC

#### Your presumption should be that all aff evidence is a pile of lies- their authors have specific political and economic incentives to overstate threats and hype the value of the MIC

Edmund F. Byrne in 2017

Indiana University-Purdue University,¶ Indianapolis, IN, USA; Military Industrial Complex (MIC); Springer International Publishing AG 2017¶ D.C. Poff, A.C. Michalos (eds.), Encyclopedia of Business and Professional Ethics,¶ DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-23514-1\_209-1

“The military-industrial complex” (MIC) refers to¶ a self-sustaining politico-economic system that¶ perpetuates profitability in military supplies¶ industries, de facto in multiple countries but primarily in the USA. It is made up of competing¶ and/or collaborating entities – the maintenance of¶ which is on the whole financially advantageous to¶ all concerned. These include professional soldiers¶ et al., managers and owners of industries that¶ supply military equipment, government officials¶ whose careers and interests are tied to military¶ expenditure, and legislators whose districts benefit from defense procurement (Rosen 1973,¶ pp. 1–2). The complex business objectives sought¶ by these and other related personnel are fostered¶ in part by exalting technical possibilities but also¶ by spreading fear as to dangers that are imminent¶ and can be countered only by maintaining the¶ highest feasible level of military preparedness¶ (Hallowell 2016). In pursuit of these objectives,¶ MIC participants’ budgetary requests amount to¶ meticulously orchestrated industry advertising¶ portrayed as strategic force requirements. Given¶ this state of affairs, the preeminent business ethical questions with regard to an MIC involve ends¶ as well as means, i.e., not only death and destruction but systemically inherent pork and waste.¶ C. Wright Mills (1956) formulated the concept of¶ an MIC, and President Dwight Eisenhower¶ famously warned about it in his 1961 Farewell¶ Address. The entity itself had come into being¶ during WWII as competing countries built up¶ their military hardware in concert with the buildup of military manpower. When that war came to a¶ cataclysmic end, the losers’ industries were¶ severely pacified; but the winners, especially in¶ the USA, intensified their production of¶ warmaking equipment and, no less assiduously,¶ their search for enemies against whom that equipment could be used (short of nuclear holocaust).¶ And whenever so used if not used up the user¶ government needed to fund so-called defense¶ industry corporations to replace shortfalls of old¶ equipment; and, increasingly, this process of¶ replacing the old came to be supplemented with¶ projects to introduce new means of mayhem¶ aimed at meeting speculative future challenges.¶ If this industry consisted as do others of freestanding companies that respond to changes in the¶ market by changing their mix of products to¶ remain relevant, its list of products would have¶ changed considerably over the past seventy-some¶ years. And in fact, budgetary reductions were at¶ times deemed circumstantially possible and desirable, e.g., at the end of a war, notably that in¶ Vietnam, or more so following the demise of the¶ USSR. MIC companies are not free-standing,¶ however, but depend on government funding the¶ size of which is based on a need to confront¶ dangers that seemingly can only increase. Thus¶ challenged the industry seldom discontinues old¶ products, not even if the military itself asserts no¶ need for them; and new products are rarely left¶ unfunded merely because experts claim they will¶ never be effective. In an artificial budgetary climate like this, in which careful estimates of¶ demonstrable need are seldom relied on, budgetary bottom lines are more likely to be derived¶ from actual confrontations such as the September¶ 11, 2001, attacks. For these lend weight to estimates of risks posed by terrorists whose defeat¶ will require a massive infusion of funds into companies whose products and services will be¶ needed if the nation is to be adequately¶ “defended.”¶ The MIC’s monetary distribution system¶ involves interdependencies so complex that¶ downsizing, never mind abolishing, it is generally¶ deemed virtually unthinkable. Lobbyists for the¶ contractors give their preferences weight by distributing vast sums of money to parties issuing¶ contracts through the US Department of Defense¶ (DoD) (OpenSecrets.org 2015). In addition, the¶ actual manufacture of parts for weapons systems¶ is distributed among plants deliberately located in¶ most if not every Congressional district.¶ A Congressional representative’s campaign contributions, hence voter support, ultimately depend¶ on his or her level of support for the budget from¶ which local defense manufacturers receive their¶ contracts. Governmental public and nonpublic¶ MIC employees similarly risk losing their jobs if¶ they are not supportive of this system in every¶ way (Hartung 2011, Chap. 1; Reich 2010). Apart¶ from these domestic arrangements, many of the companies dealing with DoD are multinational in¶ scope, and thus so is the US MIC. Non-US¶ weapons procurers deal directly not with contractors but with Foreign Military Sales (FMS), a¶ program in DoD, that uses the Defense Security¶ Cooperation Agency as its intermediary.

#### The MIC is a result of economic crises generated by capitalism. Their authors are corrupt with specific incentives to continue this system- the result is that the “efficiencies” the aff proclaims come from stripping away money from other needs

Thomas K. Duncan and Christopher J. Coyne in 2013

Department of Economics, George Mason University; The Origins of the Permanent War Economy¶ ; https://www.ccoyne.com/Origins\_of\_the\_Permanent\_War\_Economy\_-\_final.pdf

The military-industrial complex that Eisenhower (1961) warned of has become a vast network of¶ expanded political power, enlarged profits, and increased state authority. Indeed, national¶ security, in terms of dollars, mentality, and interests, has bled into nearly every aspect of¶ American life (Turse 2008), creeping into nearly every federal department (Mueller and Stewart¶ 2011), into domestic and international humanitarian efforts (Coyne 2008, 2013), and even into¶ domestic policing (Hall and Coyne 2013). The result has been a lasting impact on the evolution¶ and structure of private industry (Duncan and Coyne forthcoming). Defense funding goes not¶ only to giants like Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman, but also filters through¶ subcontractors and supportive non-military firms and organizations to influence “professional¶ and business services, financial, information and administrative services, retail trade, leisure and¶ hospitality services, education and health services, construction, and other manufacturing”¶ (Fuller 2011, 1). How did this permanent war economy emerge?¶ This paper answers this important question. Our analysis emphasizes the combined¶ efforts of three key interest groups (unions, industry, military) that arose in the context of the¶ dual crises of the Great Depression and World War II. In any good crisis, there are multiple¶ parties ready to take advantage of the state of emergency (Higgs 1987, 2004, 2005a, 2006, 2012).¶ During the depression and the war that followed, a partnership between industry, the military,¶ and politicians emerged. The Great Depression and World War II resulted in increased spending¶ by government, and a variety of interests groups took advantage of the opportunity to advance¶ their interests: unions with jobs, industry with profits, military branches with budgets, and¶ politicians with votes and lobbying stemming from the support of these interests. These crises, ¶ combined with the State’s monopoly over the military, created the opportunity for these interests¶ to influence the trajectory of economic activity in a lasting, and self-serving, manner.¶ This paper contributes to two interrelated strands of literature. Firstly, we contribute to¶ the literature on the origins of the permanent war economy (Oakes 1944; Vance 1951a, 1951b,¶ 1951c, 1951d, 1951e, 1951f; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Vatter 1985). This literature emphasizes¶ how the origin of the permanent war economy was a solution to the unemployment problem that¶ plagued capitalism. Our explanation, in contrast, emphasizes the central role of government’s¶ monopoly on the military and the desire of powerful special interests to secure the rents of that¶ monopoly in the context of the crises of the Great Depression and World War II.¶ Secondly, we extend the literature on the distortionary effects of the permanent war¶ economy (Russet 1971; Melman 1970, 1971, 1985; Rothbard 1989; Higgs 2006; Duncan and¶ Coyne forthcoming) by linking its origin and perpetuation to special interests. Those who argue¶ for the necessity of a constant state of military readiness tend to overlook, or at least¶ underestimate, the negative effects of military spending in terms of rent-seeking behaviors by¶ private interests. While the permanent war economy generates a mutual benefit for government¶ and private interests, it also generates a significant negative externality by diverting resources¶ from other, private uses.

#### The aff is corrupt through its core- it relies on a cadre of “experts” that financially gain from inflating the importance of the MIC- even a ‘state planned’ war economy ensures corruption

Thomas K. Duncan and Christopher J. Coyne in 2013

Department of Economics, George Mason University; The Origins of the Permanent War Economy¶ ; https://www.ccoyne.com/Origins\_of\_the\_Permanent\_War\_Economy\_-\_final.pdf

By war’s end, all three interest groups—the military, organized labor, and war-related private¶ industry—had experienced the monetary and political gains offered by the dual crises of¶ depression and war. The iron triangle was complete, with the vested interests of “[b]ig business,¶ including its powerful friends and representatives…, and the newly but vastly empowered¶ military establishment together,” which “formed a potent political faction” (Higgs 2006, 73). As¶ “[u]nions could not afford endlessly to neglect their immediate self-interest,” organized labor¶ also remained “a junior partner in the postwar complex” (Koistinen 1973, 477). Despite popular¶ sentiment for a respite from the war effort, demobilization was short-lived, as American military¶ planners were already looking at the Soviet Union as the source of the next crisis with which to¶ exert their influence (Biddle 2007, 141). With only a short pause to gather its strength, the¶ military-industrial complex found itself attempting to influence policy against a potential threat¶ that would last for over four decades (see, for instance, Lazarowitz 2005). And, in the post-9/11 ¶ world, the military-industrial complex has again shifted focus to the transnational “War on¶ Terror” which has further extended and sustained the permanent war economy. Indeed, as¶ Mueller (2006) shows, an entire “terrorism industry” consisting of consultants, counter-terrorism¶ experts, and pundits has emerged in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.¶ In addition to providing insight into the origins of the permanent war economy, our¶ analysis has broader implications regarding the relationship between capitalism and foreign¶ military imperialism.19 Some critics of capitalism view foreign intervention as a logical¶ outgrowth of this type of economic system (see Oakes 1944; Vance 1951a, 1951b, 1951c, 1951d,¶ 1951e, 1951f; Baran and Sweezy 1966; Vatter 1985; Hossein-Zadeh 2006). From this¶ perspective foreign exploits provide a means for politically-connected capitalists to earn¶ significant profits. These critics are right, at least to a degree. What these critics are really¶ highlighting is a flaw in capitalism whereby investors and entrepreneurs are indifferent, at the¶ margin, between additional rents earned by seducing government and additional profits earned¶ by creating new and cheaper products which benefit the general public (see Buchanan 1980).¶ In the context of foreign military interventions, this implies that, given the chance, self interested capitalists will gladly engage in a mutually beneficial exchange with the state monopoly provider of military services. Private companies offer campaign contributions and¶ political support, and politicians and state bureaucrats offer rents in return. Although both parties¶ are privately made better off, there is a significant negative externality of allowing this exchange¶ because the permanent war economy diverts productive resources away from other uses that¶ improve general standards of living (see Duncan and Coyne, forthcoming). ¶ How is this dilemma to be resolved? One solution is to adopt a completely planned¶ economic system for military and defense production which removes capitalists from the process ¶ altogether. The flaw with this alternative, however, is that it assumes that government, absent¶ crony capitalists, will have less of an incentive to build and use weapons for imperialistic¶ purposes. The field of public choice, which demands the symmetry of assumptions between¶ private and public actors, calls this assumption into question. Further, historical evidence also¶ provides countless instances of government abuse of its monopoly on military force.

### NATO

#### Integration with NATO serves to legitimate and enforce capitalist social relations globally- it elides the exploitation of other countries through economic and physical violence as a necessary mechanism for maintaining capitalism at home

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The upshot is a broad consensus around certain core ideas: that the post-1945¶ rules-based world order, whatever its weaknesses, serves the world well by¶ spreading prosperity and maintaining peace; and that, although it cannot continue¶ unreformed, the US-led system draws on deep resources—economic, military,¶ systemic and ‘soft’—that bestow upon it continuing strengths to contain, engage,¶ manage and socialize emerging powers. Charles Kupchan lists a range of problems¶ requiring US leadership, even if only within a suitably reformed international¶ system reflecting ‘the real distribution of power’.20¶ John Ikenberry of Princeton University, the leading proponent of this school¶ of thought, makes significant claims as well as several unquestioned assumptions,¶ undeveloped allusions to core powers’ violent and other connections with the¶ periphery, and a number of significant silences. He claims, for example, that the¶ United States is a fully functioning democracy, yet fails to acknowledge evidence¶ of the power of racialized, class-based elites. For critical theorists, such as Robert¶ Cox, Stephen Gill and Craig Murphy,21 the international relations of elites across¶ states and societies operate to reproduce extant patterns of power and manage or¶ engineer change to the benefit of elites in a generally zero-sum game in which¶ broad masses and lower classes lose out. This is clearly a far cry from liberal internationalist¶ claims associated with the benefits of globalization, notwithstanding proposed ameliorative remedies against the harshest effects. Likewise, claims about¶ the centrality of the rule of law occlude consideration of significant violations¶ in practice. The question of imperial power is hardly addressed, and there is a¶ general Eurocentric neglect of the significance of global areas beyond the core to¶ the ‘welfare’ and cohesion of the core itself. There is a clear link between Ikenberry’s¶ overt theory of American democracy and its liberal-hegemonic world role.¶ The United States, and the western order it built, is characterized as a pluralistic¶ liberal market democracy that is broadly inclusive and tolerant of ethnic diversity.¶ The US-built security community exhibits its leading state’s internal character as¶ a plural one and, very significantly, one in which the United States is bound by¶ rules.22 Yet liberal internationalists’ underlying assumptions effectively deny the¶ findings of numerous well-researched studies challenging American democracy’s¶ principal claims.23¶ As far as Ikenberry and Deudney (and many others) are concerned, the ‘western¶ idea’ is a significant part of the strength of the US-led order.24 The West, a¶ spectacularly successful ‘civilizational heritage’, was underpinned by America’s¶ New Deal liberalism, and extended globally via Bretton Woods, the Marshall¶ Plan and NATO. In effect, this vision and programme aimed to defuse domestic¶ class conflict and the threat of war through ‘activist government, political democracy,¶ and international alliance’. That system is in principle capable of assimilating¶ emerging powers, given the universalism of its values and its tolerance of ethnic¶ differences, although others joining this privileged grouping are expected to¶ conform to its rules and accept US leadership. Western order is exclusive also¶ because special rules apply within its zone of peace. Beyond it, conversely, other¶ rules apply—cruder, neo-imperial and violent, although the implications of this¶ contrast are left unaddressed.25 By drawing a line around the West, Ikenberry¶ cuts off the rest of the world while addressing questions about the sources of¶ world order which, empirically, lie in a symbiotic relationship between core and¶ periphery. Yet, even within the ‘greater’ West, Japan and South Korea were not¶ accorded the same treatment as western Europe.26 The LIO really was conceived¶ and developed as a system of the West and the rest, in a zero-sum game. As Donald¶ Tusk, President of the European Council, noted on Twitter in May 2017, the¶ whole point of ‘Euro-Atlanticism’ was to ‘prevent post-West world order’.27 Yet the claim persists that this is no empire, despite America’s privileged place¶ at the top of the ‘hierarchical political order’, because its hegemony is built on¶ ‘consent’ and bounded by law. Power, which was necessary at the creation, faded¶ away as consensual hegemony developed. This interpretation, of course, elides¶ America’s overwhelming military superiority, including in and over Europe.¶ Beyond Europe, however, Ikenberry concedes that American hegemony remained¶ hierarchical, ‘with much fainter liberal characteristics’,28 again closing off an avenue¶ of analytical and empirical analysis that might threaten the intellectual edifice of¶ the LIO.¶ The (unconsciously) racialized world-view of Ikenberry’s Eurocentrism¶ is subtly buttressed by Walter Russell Mead’s exploration of the significance¶ of superior Anglo-Saxons who win wars, build world structures, and govern¶ efficiently owing to ethno-cultural, not biological, characteristics.29 Mead’s interpretation¶ of Anglo-Saxonism makes it appear benign, assimilative and universal—¶ a scaffolding to support Ikenberry’s more overtly institutional analysis.¶ Assimilating minorities, however, is not embracing diversity—learning from¶ other cultures and creating something new; it is maintaining conformity to¶ the cultures of the powerful, dominant group.30 Looking to the future, as new¶ global powers emerge, Mead advises America to both embrace and contain them,¶ retaining military superiority should ‘rising’ powers become ‘opponents’.31 Mead¶ complements the prescriptions of other liberal-realist internationalists, all seeking¶ to incorporate, assimilate and mobilize emerging powers to absorb difference and¶ produce conformity.The liberal view is challenged by scholars who argue that the New Deal¶ order effectively represented a political compromise, made in order to attain¶ class peace and greater productivity, that mainly benefited major corporations¶ while incorporating¶ organized labour and thereby drawing its teeth. The¶ postwar settlement was a narrow one—excluding racial minorities, unskilled and¶ unorganized¶ labour, and women—and relied on war and a heavily militarized¶ economy that arose with the war in Korea and led directly to that in Vietnam.32¶ Liberal internationalists’ accounts elide the class, gendered and racial bases of the¶ order, both at home and abroad. Ikenberry paints an appealing picture of a liberal¶ order that delivered¶ material benefits and security to all, while also raising some¶ doubts about the operation of the system, especially with regard to the inequality¶ of rewards generated by globalization and its potential political consequences.¶ Those consequences are regarded by Ikenberry as posing the greatest threats to¶ the stability of the liberal order, laying bare a central mechanism and dynamic¶ of the system itself: market-driven class inequality, exacerbated in a society in¶ which racialized class politics is salient.33 Yet Ikenberry never mentions class, race or gender—an omission central to critical theories of the making of the¶ LIO.34¶ The other key omission is the role played in building the order by violence and¶ outright war—not just the Second World War but also the Korean War, the ‘hot’¶ war at the birth of the order that propelled the formation of NATO, the rearmament¶ of Germany, the security alliance with Japan and indeed the US military–¶ industrial complex.35 Accordingly, a key focus of consideration here is wartime¶ planning for a new world order and the manner of its foundation as a direct result¶ of military violence that violated the UN Charter, international law, the lessons¶ of the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions.¶ Wars ‘out there’ secured the core ‘over here’.36¶ And, of course, what is referred to as benign ‘liberal internationalism’ is what¶ Mark Mazower refers to as ‘imperial internationalism’—trying to maintain a¶ global hierarchy established by centuries of colonial and semi-colonial rule over¶ what is now called the global South.37¶ Finally, the construction of the postwar western order was constitutive of¶ a political, social, economic and ideological ‘vital center’, as Schlesinger terms¶ it38—opposed to both right-wing nationalists and left-wing anti-imperialists.¶ This entailed the acceptance by core forces of the ‘New Deal order’ that the price¶ of class harmony, stability and mobility at home was the export and continuation¶ of inequality,39 and therefore military violence, on the periphery; and that¶ the removal of vast quantities of raw materials required a global military basing¶ strategy, both to protect allied trade and to deny it to adversaries.40 Ikenberry¶ accurately notes that the internal character of the leading state in the liberal order¶ has an impact on the international system it built; but I diverge from his presentation¶ of this impact as the externalization of a democratic regime. He elides¶ the racial, class and gendered character of American historical, economic and¶ political development—including that of Wilsonianism itself.41 His conclusion,¶ however, is accurate, even if he fails to recognize its significance in the building¶ and maintenance of the liberal order: ‘Access to resources and markets, socioeconomic¶ stability, political pluralism, and American security interests—all were¶ inextricably linked.’42¶ The framework that may best fit the actual underlying engine of liberal orderbuilding¶ and maintenance, however, must also incorporate understanding of the¶ ‘soft’ processes of socialization or incorporation. Violence is a powerful tool, but always and everywhere it is connected with the processes of non-violent elite¶ socialization and alliance-building. It is one of the great strengths of Ikenberry’s¶ analysis of international order that elite socialization is considered so significant.¶ 43 Yet a critical view of elite socialization in the building and perpetuation¶ of hegemony views it not as a reflection of a democratic and benign foreign¶ policy, but as incorporation into hegemonic agendas or ‘domestication’.44 In the¶ Gramscian perspective, capitalist Great Powers, including the United States, are¶ deeply unequal at home and imperialistic abroad, ultimately pursuing the interests¶ of their ruling classes and elites, whether embedded in private, public or state–¶ private realms.45 Their hegemony is a combination of persuasion and coercion¶ involving a ‘state–society complex’.46 Admittedly, liberalism gives an account of¶ elite socialization processes that overlaps with Gramscian approaches. However,¶ liberal approaches see it as relatively benign, politically neutral or representative¶ of democracy/popular sovereignty.

#### NATO is an institution created to prop up an imperial world order that guarantees the continuation of western capitalism- it generates stability necessary to ensure the flow of goods and resources toward capitalist centers of power

INDERJEET PARMAR in 2018

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My critical approach connects Gramscian thinking with a largely forgotten early¶ twentieth-century socialist theoretician of ‘ultra-imperialism’—Karl Kautsky.¶ According to Kautsky, in contrast to Lenin’s claim of the inevitability of interimperial¶ wars of hegemony, ultra-imperialism—the tendency of national ruling¶ classes to form international class-based alliances to jointly exploit the world’s¶ resources47—leads to cooperation rather than conflict between capitalist states.¶ Kautsky notes that inter-capitalist corporate/state cooperation could take¶ numerous forms—such as cartel-like agreements or even the formation of a¶ ‘league of states’.48 Of course, there is a strong tradition of critical thinking by¶ neo-Gramscians—including Cox and Gill, but also other Marxists such as Kees¶ van der Pijl49—that extends to the building of transnational alliances. That¶ work, however, largely focuses on alliances of the Cold War era between the¶ United States and western Europe as junior partner. In this article, I consider¶ two Asian states—South Korea and China—whose political–cultural incorporation¶ would clearly differ from the Euro-American example. On the other hand,¶ all incorporation processes come up against strictly national interests and specific¶ cultural differences, including in the British case: hence the controversies over¶ naval armaments in the 1920s and the terms of the alliance after 1945, the refusal¶ by Prime Minister Harold Wilson to support the United States with troops in¶ Vietnam and, later, frictions over the Falklands War.50 The attempt to incorporate¶ any power, great or small, is always going to be extremely difficult.¶ Kautsky is forgotten largely because his claim—which essentially suggested¶ there would be no major war between capitalist Great Powers—was spectacularly¶ disproved by the outbreak of the First World War.51 However, clearly there are¶ numerous alliances and international agreements that uphold Kautsky’s approach.¶ The EU is a case in point—a supranational alliance, bringing together several¶ great and smaller powers with a colonial past, which has effectively prevented¶ war between them and generated enduring cooperation over decades. Stokes¶ argues that American power, exercised via the LIO with its panoply of multilateral¶ organizations, perfectly exemplifies ultra-imperialism given its system-maintenance¶ role serving a range of other states—much to President Donald¶ Trump’s pluto-populist chagrin.52¶ Kautsky’s ultra-imperialism was hardly a utopia free of rivalries and wars,¶ however, given the levels of exploitation and subordination endemic in capitalist¶ international relations.53 Yet even critics argue that Kautsky’s idea has applicability¶ to the post-1945 era of the LIO, underpinned by US hegemony and an¶ influential web of institutions that embed western powers—NATO, the IMF,¶ the World Bank and the G7, among others. Indeed, it could be argued that since¶ 1989 ultra-imperialism spans virtually the world,54 although I would argue that¶ in the case of China the process began in the late 1970s. Of course, Kautsky is¶ clear that the pattern of international capitalist alliances is subject to change along¶ with the uneven development of power and economic strength. Therefore, we¶ would expect tensions to emerge within the system of relationships, despite the¶ basis of shared interests, placing great strain on institutions amid muscle-flexing¶ on the part of certain states that feel unduly constrained by the international¶ system. Hence the current tensions between the Trump administration and China,¶ Germany, the EU and NATO, for example. Whether this represents the breakdown¶ of the post-1945 order or its recalibration remains to be seen.¶ Kautsky is therefore useful for our understanding of the LIO in two ways:¶ first, in suggesting that, notwithstanding the emergence of unavoidable tensions,¶ war is not inevitable between Great Powers, but for reasons rather different from¶ those suggested by liberal internationalism’s egalitarian and benign ideas about¶ interdependence; and second, in pointing out that Great Powers, aiming to jointly¶ promote their power against others at home and abroad, build alliances with their¶ elite foreign counterparts where they already hold power or, by extension, where¶ such a nascent elite might be fostered. Such is the case in the instances of South ¶ Korea and China discussed below. In neither case is there any suggestion that¶ one state controls another—the point is that their ruling elites hold shared interests,¶ even if that means their enrichment at the expense of the broad mass of¶ their own people. This analysis challenges Leninist,55 realist and liberal conceptions¶ of the international order: the system is imperial but not necessarily doomed¶ to perpetual war, and is not benignly liberal. This is international ‘high’ (class)¶ politics—cooperation for shared narrow self-interest but resting on unstable social¶ and political foundations.¶ Ikenberry’s benign interpretation of the US-led order is read back into the activities¶ between 1939 and 1945 of elite planners of the postwar order. Developing the¶ ‘Grand Area’ concept, planners in the State Department and the Council on Foreign¶ Relations (CFR) identified the world zones the United States ‘required’ in order to¶ avoid having to radically reform its economy—zones that together encompassed¶ practically the whole world.56 The key point elided is that it was to cohere that¶ imperial ‘Grand Area’ that so much of the institutional architecture of western¶ power was built—the IMF and World Bank, the UN, the Marshall Plan, GATT¶ and NATO.57 The interrelations between the Grand Area’s regions were never¶ envisaged as being in any sense equal—raw materials would flow towards western¶ reconstruction and social peace, and finished industrial goods in the other direction.¶ The postwar settlement at home that coalesced, as Hogan argues,58 around¶ high-technology capital-intensive industries, international finance and organized¶ skilled labour, was located within an international settlement that secured broad¶ corporate interests under the auspices of an interventionist state. And, in that¶ respect, America’s military capacity to police flows of goods across the world was¶ at the very least a part of the reason why the United States acquired ‘forward¶ bases in Asia and Europe’.59 As policy-makers such as Henry Stimson and John J.¶ McCloy noted, American and western well-being relied on ‘“open markets, access¶ to raw materials, and the rehabilitation of much—if not all—of Eurasia along¶ liberal capitalist lines”’.60¶ CFR and State Department wartime planning was therefore driven above all by¶ a vision of global–imperial leadership exercised by US elites, strongly supported¶ by Britain’s ruling elites, via an international order of organizations and relationships.¶ 61 The aim was, acting in concert with Britain’s elites, to resurrect European¶ Great Powers by means including the restoration of shattered colonial trading and¶ economic and financial linkages. The Marshall Plan viewed European reconstruction¶ in just that global context.62 The UN was envisaged as a key international¶ agency for American imperial internationalism, at least in its earliest days63—and, as¶ its role in the making of South Korea shows, it remains the official basis of America’s¶ role in that country today. And, as I will show below, the building of a hegemonic¶ multilateral order indicates the significance of a Gramsci–Kautsky synthesis.

#### The US liberal order uses alliance institutions to manage the hierarchical class and race relations that entrench the power of elites at the expense of equality

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The foundational values, interests and institutions of the (Anglo-)US liberal¶ international¶ order, with due respect for important but not fundamental recalibrations¶ and corrections along the way, are the sources of its current crises or at¶ least challenges. The mentalities and power structures of the LIO’s leaders are¶ constructed by hierarchical, imperial and racial–civilizational ways of thinking,¶ albeit in most cases subliminally embedded to the point of being unconscious¶ deep structures themselves.117 The American white Anglo-Saxon Protestant¶ (Wasp) establishment built and maintained the liberal order in a ‘competitively¶ cooperative’ alliance with their British counterparts,118 whose own imperial and¶ racial mentalities were hardly in conflict with those of their American cousins.119¶ Whatever changes occurred or were forced on US elites over time, those underlying¶ and mainly subliminal values have remained significant in decision-making,¶ including when nurturing new states and powers such as South Korea and China.¶ As a result, liberal internationalism as a ‘theory’ or approach to world order,¶ eliding and skirting matters of hierarchy, race and class just as it does in its outline¶ understandings of American democracy, misses a critical part of the picture—of¶ the dynamics of international power as well as the dynamics of domestic power.¶ Because of that elision, that failure to see, I suggest it is a legitimating ideology of¶ the American ruling elite. I have argued above that the LIO is better understood as a¶ system of hierarchy and inequality, and as what Persaud calls a ‘racio-civilizational’¶ phenomenon. What does that mean? It means that this system and its leaders cannot¶ yet comprehend an order that encompasses on the basis of something approaching¶ equality the broad mass of people—citizens—at home, let alone the non-western¶ peoples of the global South, or even their elites. The tweet from Donald Tusk¶ quoted above is revealing and instructive because it was addressed to President¶ Trump in simple and stark terms, worth repeating here: ‘Euro-Atlanticism means¶ the free world cooperating to prevent post-West world order’—so, please ‘do not¶ touch’. International alliances of elites, including those of the emerging powers¶ such as China, are in large part attempts to manage and channel change to prevent¶ radical power shifts, to sustain a world order that serves elites and masses, in West¶ and East, in starkly unequal ways. A Gramscian–Kautskyian synthesis combines¶ consideration of domestic and international class-based imperial hegemonies and¶ offers a good explanation of the existing order. However, it also offers a way out, in¶ theory, and provides ways to assess the likelihood of avenues towards egalitarianism¶ being taken by ruling elites. The prognosis is not positive at present, although the¶ bases of ways forward appear to be coming into view as political strife and electoral¶ shocks challenge the status quo.120

#### NATO is integral to the social construction of a Western identity that secures liberal values through the use of external threats to our way of life- it creates a passive community that accepts liberal capitalism

Alexandra Gheciu in 2019

Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of¶ Ottawa; NATO, liberal¶ internationalism, and¶ the politics of imagining¶ the Western security¶ community; International Journal¶ 2019, Vol. 74(1) 32–46

In recent years, there has been renewed interest among International Relations (IR)¶ scholars in the ability of the Western security community to protect itself from a¶ variety of threats and challenges. In this context, longstanding debates concerning¶ the role played by the organization that is widely regarded as the institutional¶ expression of that community—NATO—have recently taken on new dimensions.¶ Scholars and policymakers often disagree in their interpretations of the relative¶ strength of NATO, but many agree that the alliance needs to play a central role in¶ protecting the West from a mix of conventional and non-conventional dangers,¶ ranging from an increasingly assertive Russia to transnational terrorism. One of¶ the key assumptions underpinning many analyses is that NATO constitutes the¶ institutional expression of a pre-existing Western security community united¶ around liberal-democratic norms and values. However, a close reading of the alliance’s¶ history shows that, far from simply representing a pre-given community,¶ NATO has always been involved in constructing ‘‘the West.’’ At the heart of that¶ process of social construction lie practices of collective (re)imagining of the¶ Western world in specific ways, as well as the representation—and management¶ of—internal tensions as feuds within a community united by shared liberal values.¶ Today, the task of managing internal differences has been rendered particularly¶ difficult by the rise of radical conservative political forces in several allied states.¶ This has translated into a clash between liberal and illiberal interpretations of the¶ Western security community, which has the potential to seriously complicate interallied¶ relations in the foreseeable future. As this paper shows, contrary to conventional¶ wisdom, middle powers have always played important roles in the constitution¶ of the Western security community. More recently, they have also played significant¶ roles in contesting liberal interpretations of the security community, and articulating¶ an alternative, radical conservative vision of the West. Recent developments in allied¶ countries such as Turkey and Poland are a potent reminder that not all middle¶ powers are alike; on the contrary, based on their socially constructed, historically¶ specific definitions of identity, they can perform a diversity of international roles—in¶ support of, or, conversely, as obstacles to liberal internationalism.¶ One of the most influential narratives of international security put forward by¶ liberal IR scholars and practitioners centres on the Euro-Atlantic security community,¶ consisting of a group of countries united around a set of key liberal norms and¶ institutions that generate ‘‘dependable expectations’’ of peaceful resolution of conflicts¶ that might arise among them.1 From that perspective, NATO is an institution that was created in the context of the Cold War to protect the pre-existing security¶ community from the threats posed by the West’s dangerous other: the communist¶ bloc. Yet, as a series of constructivist scholars have persuasively argued, there is¶ nothing natural about the Western security community.2 In Emanuel Adler’s¶ words, ‘‘security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical¶ knowledge of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.’’3 Furthermore, the absence of¶ violence should not lead us to conclude that the construction of security communities¶ in general and the Western community in particular were power-free processes.¶ On the contrary, as Adler and Barnett explain, central to the establishment¶ of a security community is the dialectic between power—primarily symbolic¶ power—and knowledge.4 Thus, in the physically non-violent context of security¶ communities, power is primarily ‘‘the authority to determine the shared meanings¶ that embody the identities, interests and practices of states, as well as the conditions¶ that confer, defer or deny access to goods and benefits.’’5 Applying this logic to the¶ specific case of NATO, we can see the alliance not as the institutional expression of¶ a pre-given community, but, rather, as an organization that has been deeply¶ involved in power-filled practices of construction and reproduction of that¶ community.6¶ Historical evidence indicates that the founders of NATO—policymaking elites¶ from the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, France, and the Benelux¶ states—did not take the Western security community for granted. Instead, they¶ engaged in a systematic set of practices aimed at constructing a sense of community¶ around a shared set of liberal-democratic norms in the Euro-Atlantic area, and¶ placed the newly created North Atlantic Treaty Organization at the heart of those¶ practices. In the intergovernmental debates leading up to the establishment of¶ NATO, the threat of military confrontation with the Soviet Union was regarded¶ as less worrisome than the danger of communist subversion within the weakened¶ societies of Western European states.7 In that context, as Louis St. Laurent—then¶ Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs—argued, the best way to prevent¶ a third world war was by confronting ‘‘the forces of communist expansion with an overwhelming preponderance of moral, economic and military force on the side of¶ freedom.’’8¶ At the level of top Western political elites, the fear of communism inspired a¶ collective (re)definition of political identity in the Euro-Atlantic area. The ‘‘spectre¶ of Communism’’ provided the defining other against which decision-makers on¶ both sides of the Atlantic were able to subordinate their differences to a collective¶ definition of a Western community. That community was seen as based on the¶ common heritage of political and cultural ideas of member states; its defining mark¶ was the set of shared values of individual liberal freedoms, the rule of law, and¶ democracy.9 This view is clearly reflected in the preamble to the Washington Treaty¶ (NATO’s foundational treaty), which stipulates that the alliance is based on principles¶ of democracy, individual liberty, and law.

### Problem-Solution

#### Arms control is integrally linked to the military industrial complex through its promotion of sovereign rule in its ability to manage force. Reject the aff’s problem solving methodology that justifies technomanagerial logic and the acceptability of war.

Krause 11 (Keith Krause (2011) Leashing the Dogs of War: Arms Control from Sovereignty to Governmentality\*, Contemporary Security Policy, 32:1, 20-39, DOI: 10.1080/13523260.2011.556823, <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.556823>) NL

\*This is probably my best card in terms of 1nc links as it has a lot of warrants, including the framing the aff embraces.

So what remains is a set of formal arms control agreements, mostly bilateral, but also a few that were multilateral, designed to manage the potentially most dangerous and destabilizing aspects of inter-state conflict dynamics. They channeled the confrontation between the superpowers into a technical and problem-solving logic that would facilitate decision making about what kinds of weapons to produce and deploy, and under what circumstances to use them. In addition, after some of the conceptual confusions of early nuclear strategy (such as Massive Retaliation), arms control became part of the logic by which decisions over appropriate (rational) strategies could be designed. In the 1960s and 1970s, in context of the East-West conflict and nuclear proliferation, maintaining the conditions of stable deterrence and reducing the risk of war was perhaps a politically and normatively laudable goal. But arms control was thus also linked to deterrence theory and practice, and to the entire functioning of the so-called military-industrial complex, and not something distinct and in opposition to it. This vision would not necessarily be accepted by those – such as researchers at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and other think-tanks – who saw themselves as growing out of the peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements, but I ARMS CONTROL FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO GOVERNMENTALITY 25 think the policy acceptability of SIPRI’s work (for example) came precisely from its progressive acceptance of the underlying rules of the game.19 What were these rules of the game? There are four elements of the Cold War practice of arms control that warrant a deeper exploration in order to illustrate the normalizing and sovereign logic of arms control. The first element was the attempt by proponents of arms control to distinguish it from advocacy of disarmament in any form. Disarmament was associated with the failed attempts to negotiate reductions in armaments during the interwar period. In the 1950s and 1960s, it was associated with the peace and anti-nuclear movements, and was seen as the preserve of impractical idealist efforts – at best politically naı¨ve; at worst politically suspect. As Jeffrey Larsen notes, ‘in the early 1960s international security specialists began using the term arms control in place of the term disarmament, which they believed lacked precision and smacked of utopianism. The seminal books on arms control published in that era all referred to this semantic problem’.20 So arms control was presented by its practitioners as directed towards controlling or regulating the numbers, types, deployment or use of certain types or quantities of arms, and disarmament was defined as involving the reduction or the elimination of particular weapons and weapons systems, and/or foreswearing of acquisition of new weapons.21 Although occasionally agreements were signed that did eliminate weapons systems or particular classes of weapons, most notably the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty that eliminated an entire class of nuclear weapons, when seen as part of the broader spectrum of nuclear capabilities, such restrictions were tilted more towards the control side of the equation.22 Overall, arms control reinforced, not undermined, sovereign state power. The second, related, element was the technocratic or problem-solving orientation of arms control practices. Its political acceptability came from its claim to operate within the same policy frame as other forms of military-strategic thinking, including of course deterrence theory and strategy, alliance-building, and the entire militaryindustrial logic that shaped Western (and arguably Eastern) security policy. More importantly, however, it provided legitimacy to a counter-intuitive set of policy prescriptions (such as leaving your own civilian population vulnerable to nuclear attack, or revealing the equivalent of state secrets as part of confidence-building measures). And finally, the technocratic approach also was, in its strongest version, opposed to the irrational and uncontrollable prescriptions of what, as early as President Eisenhower, was called the military-industrial complex. High level proponents of arms control (Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, for example, as well perhaps as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger), regarded the defence establishment as unable to set limits on its threat assessment and concomitant arms acquisitions. They wished to subject security policy to rational managerial techniques, including such ideas as diminishing marginal returns to investments in new weapons, cost-benefit analysis for weapons systems, and trade offs between competing goals (the guns-versus-butter debate).23 As Henry Kissinger is once purported to have said, ‘What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally, at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?’ thus expressing his frustration with the inability of the nuclear defense establishment to provide a rationale for its weapons acquisition plans.24 Even more 26 CONTEMPORARY SECURITY POLICY hawkish arms controllers subscribed to the rational calculus, with, for example, Paul Nitze arguing, with respect to ballistic missile defense (Star Wars), that it had to be cost effective on the margin in order to make strategic sense.25 Arms control was thus more rational – and promised to achieve the same national security goals (including war-fighting dominance) at lower cost. But the actual achievements of arms control negotiations, treaties and agreements are difficult to assess, even if we use some counter-factual analysis. As noted above, arms control failed to stem the technological arms race, failed to reduce spending on weapons, and perhaps played only a marginal role in preventing a violent superpower confrontation. In all of its forms, arms control was not a transformative paradigm – but a technomanagerial project. The transformation of inter-state relations via either nuclear disarmament or nuclear holocaust was to be avoided at all costs, and the management of the superpower arms race was a sort of via media between these two Manichean visions. Parenthetically, some prominent advocates, such as Robert McNamara, or President Barack Obama, who have argued prominently for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons, claim implicitly or explicitly that there is a seamless conceptual thread that goes from arms control to nuclear disarmament, and that all that distinguishes one from the other is the relative time horizon or degree of pragmatism of the advocates.26 But this is both conceptually and practically unlikely – if arms control is a set of techno-managerial practices fully integrated into the Cold War logic of national security strategy, then it is unable to make the leap to disarmament – which involves an entirely different idea about the place of violence in social and political life. Recent debates around the ratification of the New START treaty in late 2010 illustrated how it hardly represented a step towards deeper nuclear reductions. The third core element of the arms control paradigm was that the Weberian state’s monopoly over the use of lethal force could not only be used to impose order domestically and to create social peace but that it could also be projected outwards to create a form of international order that reduced the risk of violence. Just as the domestic form of the Weberian monopoly renders the population vulnerable to the predatory state (so much so that scholars such as Rudolph Rummel could argue that democide – state-sanctioned killing of citizens – was a greater risk than war);27 the international form also involved rendering entire populations totally vulnerable to nuclear holocaust. In the name of national security the very survival of the entire population could be put at risk, through policies such as Mutual Assured Destruction or treaties such as the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. It is difficult to find a better example of techno-managerial logic, instrumental rationality and the assertion of sovereign power at work. Although perhaps an extreme example, this faith in the ability of states to exercise restraint over the use of force, also underlay the entire edifice of nuclear deterrence policy and strategy. The final element was that the arms control paradigm, like the much older balance of power system, was not a mechanism for maintaining order that eliminated war or the use of force from the international system. It assumed that the main risk to be prevented was that of large-scale inter-state war between great powers or the superpowers, and that a trade-off between this risk, and the risk of (or fact of) small and large wars, especially in the postcolonial world, was an acceptable one. The use of ARMS CONTROL FROM SOVEREIGNTY TO GOVERNMENTALITY 27 violence was either to be part of the logic of so-called limited (nuclear) war or to be confined to the periphery, to such places as Indochina, Angola, and Afghanistan (although this was hardly peripheral to the Soviet Union). This was analogous to the operation of the 19th century balance of power system, which sanctioned the partitions of Poland, the Crimean War, and so forth in the name of maintaining systemic stability. Similarly, the logic of limited nuclear war, as presented by scholars such as Henry Kissinger, rested upon the assumption that the use of force could be carefully calibrated and controlled.28 The neo-colonialist and political implications of pushing the problem of war to the periphery are of course clear, and one could argue that the arms control paradigm sketched above, especially the treaties that stabilized the nuclear confrontation between East and West (SALT I and II), made certain kinds of proxy wars more possible or acceptable by creating escalatory fire-breaks that facilitated the relatively risk-free provision of military assistance to client states and movements. These fire breaks were easier to create in the global South, where American and Russian troops managed to avoid confronting each other directly, but less easy to create in Europe. The history of attempts to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions (the 1975 name for what in the late 1980s became the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), and of debates over the necessity for intermediate range and tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, and the problem of extended deterrence (or the nuclear umbrella) all point towards a set of tensions or contradictions within the logic of arms control. It is not the place of this article to demonstrate in detail how these four understandings or elements of the arms control paradigm were instantiated in particular Cold War arms control practices (treaties and negotiations). It is reasonably clear, however, that such things as the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), which enshrined the nuclear supremacy of the permanent five members of the UN Security Council, or the logic of the nuclear strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), or the NATO doctrine of first use of nuclear weapons, or the lack of any meaningful restraint on technological innovation for nuclear weapons and delivery systems, rested upon a deep faith in the ability of the Weberian state to regulate and control the use of violence. Some scholars and analysts went so far as to argue that the possession of nuclear weapons imposed – as a sort of structural constraint – a strong form of rationality on state behaviour.29 Arms control efforts were simply one part of this larger logic, and in any event were not designed to threaten or undermine it. They were, in short, a clear expression of a Foucauldian form of sovereign rule that reinforced the system of rule of the contemporary state system.

### Russia Threat

#### The Russian threat paradigm is grounded in racial and ideological dogma that works to maintain the imperial nature of western power – their descriptions aren’t neutral, but a byproduct of underlying militaristic epistemology

Brown 10 [Prof @ University of Aberdeen James, “A Stereotype, Wrapped in a Cliché, Inside a Caricature: Russian Foreign Policy and Orientalism,” POLITICS: 2010 VOL 30(3), 149–159]

As a natural consequence of the lack of real knowledge about the area, the ‘“East” has always signified danger and threat’ (ibid., p. 26). It represents an ‘otherwise silent and dangerous space beyond familiar boundaries’ (ibid., p. 57) that the West must confront forcefully. Moreover this sense of fear is not restricted to the past: Today, bookstores in the US are filled with shabby screeds bearing screaming headlines about Islam and terror, Islam exposed, the Arab threat and the Muslim menace, all of them written by political polemicists pretending to knowledge imparted to them and others by experts who have supposedly penetrated to the heart of these strange Oriental peoples over there (ibid., p. xv). This portrayal of the East as an enigmatic and dangerous counterpoint is a fundamental component of Orientalist literature. However, as well as exaggerating the East’s distinctiveness, the Orientalist canon is committed to proclaiming its inferiority. The second core characteristic of Orientalist literature is its portrayal of the region as a degenerate divergence from Western norms. Specifically, the people are presented as backward or, as Chaim Weizmann put it to Arthur Balfour, ‘the fellah is at least four centuries behind the times’ (quoted in ibid., p. 306). What is more, unlike superior Europeans, [they] Orientals are prone to irrationality, inefficiency, inability to learn from mistakes and a chronic incapacity for self-government (ibid., pp. 36–40, 107, 228, 241). In dealing with them, one must appreciate that ‘power is the only language they understand’ (ibid., p. xv). Furthermore, not content with highlighting this supposed inferiority, Orientalism is committed to rectifying it. The East must therefore be kept ‘in statu pupillari’ (ibid., p. 37) while the West imposes its more advanced socio-political model upon it. The knowledge produced by Orientalism is therefore ‘never raw, unmediated, or simply objective’ (ibid., p. 273) but complicit in a political project with imperialist instincts. For this reason, Said brands Orientalism a trahison des clercs (ibid., p. xxi), suggesting that, even though their participation may be unconscious, ‘the Orientalist could be regarded as the special agent of Western power’ (ibid., p. 223). Having said this, recognition of Orientalism’s close connections to power is not to imply that its analysis is compelling. The third prominent feature of Orientalist discourse is its ‘paper-thin intellectual apparatus’ (ibid., p. 322). Said explains that over time Western writing about the Orient has acquired a narrow set of convictions which now serve as the foundation of all subsequent thinking. Analyses of the region proceed from the basis of this received knowledge and are consequently repetitive and unimaginative. Their purpose is no longer to engage with their subject directly or achieve fresh insight, but to reiterate and reconfirm ‘unshakeable abstract maxims about the “civilization”’ (ibid., p. 52). Every fact is taken to be a reaffirmation of established principles and all phenomena are explained via reduction to the same tired models. This problem is exacerbated by the tendency for Area Studies to be closed off from other disciplines (ibid., p. 70). Some of the specific traits of this orthodoxy are as follows: First is ‘demeaning generalization’ (ibid., p. xiii), whereby ‘innumerable histories and a dizzying variety of peoples, languages, experiences and cultures, all these are swept aside or ignored’ (ibid., p. xiv). Second is eternality: the Orient is deemed never to change and there is therefore no need to alter one’s intellectual models. Momentous shifts are downplayed and previously unseen phenomena are confi- dently labelled atavism (ibid., pp. 58, 104, 240). Third, Orientalism uses crude one-dimensional models upon which scholars would not countenance relying if their object of study was the West. Prominent examples include a fixation with geographical determinism (ibid., pp. 162, 216) and obsession with the ‘Oriental personality’ (ibid., p. 31). Fourth, Orientalists have a great talent for combining ‘imperial vagueness and precise detail’ (ibid., p. 50). Therefore, while indulging in the most shameless of generalisations, Orientalists simultaneously bombard the reader with ‘sheer, overpowering, monumental description’ (ibid., p. 162). Fifth, despite pretensions to expertise, numerous Orientalists are remarkably underqualified to speak about the East and cannot even claim knowledge of the relevant languages (ibid., pp. 178, 193). In developing the argument outlined above, Said refers almost exclusively to representations of the Arab world. However, as an intellectual model, Orientalism lends itself to application well beyond its original field of study as a means of drawing attention to any area of scholarship in which the literature has become stuck in a monotonous cycle of reaffirmation. With this in mind, this article employs Orientalism to critique Western discourse on Russian foreign policy. Orientalism and Russian foreign policy Orientalism and Russia are not unacquainted. In fact, Russia (or the Soviet Union) features more than ten times in Orientalism. There is also a substantial secondary literature that explores Orientalism in the Russian context (e.g. Bolton, 2009; David-Fox, Holquist and Martin, 2006; Khalid, 2000). However, for both Said and the vast majority of subsequent scholars, Russia is significant, not as an object of Orientalist modes of thought, but as an origin. In particular, the literature highlights Russia’s long imperial history, its tendency to define its core culture in contradis-tinction to those of the Caucasus and Central Asia, and its imposition of a standardised way of life upon the peoples of its empire. However, just because a culture is itself an instigator of Orientalism does not mean that it is not also a recipient. This fact has been recognised by Iver Neumann. In Uses of the Other, Neumann describes the historical construction of Russia as Europe’s Other. In particular, he draws attention to representations of the country as a ‘barbarian at the gate’ (Neumann, 1999, p. 77), acknowledges the popular stereotype of ‘an alleged Russian Volksgeist (“national character”) of sloth, drunkenness, and laziness’ (ibid., p. 104) and highlights the perception of Russia as ‘a gigantic specimen to which the most advanced legal and administrative ideas could be applied with a completeness impossible in western Europe’ (Anderson, quoted in ibid., p. 78). In making this case, Neumann cites Said and clearly demonstrates the appropriateness of his model to this context. However, Russia is not the exclusive focus of his book and, even when dealing with the subject, Neumann’s concern is with long-standing cultural representations of the country and not contemporary portrayals of its position in international politics. Elsewhere, some scholars have explored specific deficiencies in the Western political discourse about Russia (Gleason, 1951; Lieven, 2000; Malia, 1999; Mikoyan, 2006; Solzhenitsyn, 1980); most recently, studies have highlighted anti-Russian sentiment among US policymakers (Tsygankov, 2009) and lack of balance in Western media coverage of the 2008 Russo–Georgian war (English and Svyatets, 2010). And yet, as valuable as these contributions are, they tend to frame their arguments in terms of Russophobia and do not recognise the interdisciplinary relevance of Orientalism. This article fills the gap in this literature by demonstrating how Said’s model can be employed to make sense of the clichés, distortions and exaggerations that taint this discourse. The use of this alternative framework is a valuable addition, not only because it highlights some heretofore un-noted deficiencies, but also because it does so by drawing upon a more substantive and deep-rooted theory than the nebulous Russophobia. As such, rather than simply describing the weaknesses, the Orientalist model is able to employ its sophisticated understanding of the process of Othering to offer a clear and credible account of their emergence. Moreover, Said’s depiction of how the discourse about a region can come to be dominated by a partisan and self-perpetuating orthodoxy provides a valuable explanation for the pervasiveness and durability of the unfortunate representation of Russian foreign policy that is detailed here. Each of these considerations provides significant scope for further research, thus encouraging the opening up of this subject area to much-needed intellectual rejuvenation. At this point I should make clear that it is not my intention to suggest that all Western accounts of Russian foreign policy are Orientalist; there are many fine studies that do not fit the model. However, as the following paragraphs reveal, there is a sizeable mass of literature that unmistakably displays the characteristic symptoms of Orientalism. With regard to the first trait – the exaggeration of difference – there is a striking propensity to portray Russian foreign policy as markedly different from that of Western states. Although probably of older origin, this perception was powerfully reinforced by the stark dividing lines of the Cold War and by Moscow’s use of ideological rhetoric to justify its international strategy. Despite the collapse of communism, this image of Russia as an Other, which pursues a qualitatively different mode of behaviour, remains prominent in Western scholarship. It might be noted that all branches of Area Studies are prone to stress countries’ dissimilarities, while downplaying their commonalities, since this represents much of the field’s unique selling point. However, be this as it may, there is certainly a tendency for Russia’s mode of engagement in international affairs to be presented as unusual. To be specific, scholars regularly present Russian foreign policy as puzzling, unpredictable and divergent from the Western norm. Indeed, the country’s behaviour is considered to be so exceptional and difficult to define that standard analytical models are not thought to apply (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008; Kubicek, 1999, pp. 547–548; Legvold, 2007a, pp. 10–11). Bobo Lo, one of the best-known Western experts on the subject, clearly highlights this conception, beginning his popular textbook with the observation that Russia’s external activities reflect ‘the perversity of human nature’ and, ‘far from exhibiting an underlying if specific pragmatism ... have been liberally streaked with irrationality’ (Lo, 2002, p. 1). Moreover, in accordance with the Orientalist model, this image of inscrutable foreignness is persistently reaffirmed through shared language use. Most notable in this regard is the literature’s compulsive repetition of Churchill’s claim that Russia’s actions are a ‘riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma’ (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008, p. 118; Donaldson and Nogee, 2009, p. 65; Joyce, 1984, p. 134; Lo, 2002, p. 1; March, 2006, p. 88; Rubinstein, 1989, p. 12). Another popular means of expressing the same idea is the medical metaphor, whereby Russia is presented as ‘genetically different’ (Wesson, 1974, p. 3), exhibiting allergic reactions (Lo, 2008, p. 258) and afflicted by various ailments, including Borderline Personality Disorder (Arias-King, King de Arias and Arias de la Canal, 2008). Meanwhile, others contribute to this sense of exoticism, deviance and distance via clichés about bears (Garnett, 1997, p. 61; Menon, 1995), chess (Goldman, 2008, pp. 92, 154–155) and nesting dolls (Legvold, 2009, pp. 42–43). Furthermore, as Said predicts, as well as being presented as somehow more extraordinary and incomprehensible than the behaviour of any other large, complex state, Russian foreign policy is portrayed as significantly more dangerous. Despite its ‘syndrome of backwardness’ (Snyder, 1994, p. 181), Russia continues to represent a serious potential threat to international stability (Kubicek, 1999, pp. 567–568; Pipes, 1997; Snyder, 1994, p. 197) and is thus a popular subject for Western polemic (Baker and Glasser, 2005; Lucas, 2008). Turning to the second tenet of Orientalism – the assumption of Western superiority – there is also clear evidence that Russia’s mode of engagement in international politics is routinely presented as inferior to that of Western countries. In a manner that contributes to the image of Russian deviationism (though contradicts the illusion of mysterious unpredictability), a substantial values gap is proposed to exist between Russian and Western strategic cultures (Forsberg, 2004, pp. 261–263; Mankoff, 2010, p. 134; March, 2006, p. 93). In essence, while the West is considered to have largely transcended Hobbesian modes of thought, Russian foreign policy remains ‘nakedly realist’ (March, 2006, p. 92), fixated with security, sovereignty and the pursuit of national interest. This is an entirely legitimate observation, yet what is dubious is the disparaging suggestion that this approach is un-European (ibid., p. 93), anachronistic (Lo, 2008, p. 176) or even so backward as to be rooted in a different historical era (Vihavainen, 2009, pp. 53–54). What is more, not only is Russia’s strategy deemed outdated, but its attempts to implement it are also seen as substandard since its policymaking is habitually cast as chaotic, error prone and even feckless (Garnett, 1998, pp. 67–70; Legvold, 2007a, pp. 7–10; Lo, 2008, p. 141; Simes, 2007, p. 36). Again, there may be some truth to this, especially with regard to the early 1990s, yet so embedded has this image become that even successful (from the Russian perspective) undertakings – such as the use of energy as a means of economic and political leverage, and military intervention in Georgia – are instinctively portrayed as fundamental failures (Baev, 2008, pp. 128–129; Sestanovich, 2008, pp. 25–26; Vendil Pallin and Westerlund, 2009). Furthermore, as the Orientalist model suggests, as well as being convinced of the waywardness of Russia’s approach, Western scholars are committed to rectifying it. The issue of how its pupil was ‘lost’ in the 1990s continues to be debated (Columbus, 2001; Eyal, 2009; Simes, 2007), thus assuming that Russia was ever someone’s to lose, and academics presumptuously dictate how the country can be returned to the ‘right’ path (Council on Foreign Relations, 2006). While nominally independent, such scholarship clearly shares and serves the interests of Western power. Finally, traces of Orientalism are detectable in the intellectual models employed in the study of this subject. Although the number of publications in this area is large, accounts of Russian foreign policy, when not essentially heavyweight descriptions (e.g. Donaldson and Nogee, 2009; Kennedy-Pipe, 1998; Rangsimaporn, 2009), are remarkably repetitive and unimaginative. Testimony to this fact is provided by the surprising number of similarities to be found in the analyses, if not the ultimate expectations, of liberal (e.g. Legvold, 2007b) and conservative (e.g. Pipes, 1996) commentators. Rather than undertaking innovative research into how findings from other disciplines can be applied to this context or drawing new cross-national comparisons, scholars habitually reiterate a core set of convictions which, on the basis of use rather than truth, has become the standard narrative. Employing simplifications and unsubstantiated claims that would not be tolerated with regard to Western states, this basic approach does little to enhance our understanding of Russian foreign policy. At core, the orthodox discourse takes the view that there is a specifically Russian mindset or pattern of behaviour to which the country inevitably reverts. While Western states are assumed to respond rationally to incentives and constraints, Russian policy is guided by some primordial instinct that has been indelibly imprinted upon its national character by the weight of geography and history. This predisposition naturally inclines the country towards expansionism, militarism and autocracy (Brzezinski, 1984; Galeotti, 1995, pp. 3–24; Lo, 2003, pp. 72–83; Pipes, 1996; Snyder, 1994, p. 179). Moreover, so enduring is this assumed inclination that it is deemed to apply across the fault lines of Russian and Soviet history. In consequence, there is an uncommon tendency to explain Russia’s current foreign policy by drawing upon historical precedent (Bunce, 1993; Joyce, 1984; Lederer, 1962; Legvold, 2007b and 2009; Lo, 2008, pp. 17–37; Vihavainen, 2009). For example, Russia is said still to possess a collective ‘Mongol complex’ as the result of the subjugation of Russian lands from the 13th to 15th centuries (Lo, 2008, pp. 18–19; Vihavainen, 2009). This phenomenon apparently helps account for today’s ambivalent national identity and troubled relations with both East and West. In explaining why no respected scholar would account for modern British policies in such a way, Timo Vihavainen states bluntly that ‘England had changed, while Russia had not’ (2009, pp. 18–19). Encouraged by this view that Russia is trapped in the past, all manner of modern phenomena are labelled atavism and dubious parallels are drawn between modern and historical figures, such as between Vladimir Putin and Peter the Great, Stolypin and Stalin (Lo, 2003, pp. 6, 133–134; McDonald, 2007, pp. 182–183; Murawiec, 2000). Of course, there is nothing wrong with historical comparison per se; it is a widely used and valuable analytical technique. However it should be employed when genuinely merited and not simply as a matter of convention.

### Russia Predictions – think tanks

#### Their use of think tanks as a way of predicting Russian behavior guarantees error replication

Crosston 15(Matthew, Professor of Political Science at Bellevue University, “NEMESIS: Keeping Russia an Enemy through Cold War Pathologies”, Forthcoming in Сравнительная Политика, No. 3 (19), 2015, МГИМО (Московский Государственный Институт Международного Отношения), Moscow, Russian Federation, pgs. 3-8, [SG])

There are numerous think tanks, both in the United States and Russia, which are deeply concerned about the state of Russian-American relations. Places like the Moscow Carnegie Centre or the Brookings Institute in Washington DC are regular go-to places for the media when seeking expert opinion and analysis. However, these centers have had a decided slant in allocating blame for the poor bilateral relations to the Russians, with the explanations ranging from the fairly simple to the rather mystically esoteric. “If America did not exist, Russia would have to invent it. In a sense it already has: first as a dream, then as a nightmare. No other country looms so large in the Russian psyche. To Kremlin ideologists, the very concept of Russia’s sovereignty depends on being free of America’s influence. Anti-Americanism has long been a staple of Vladimir Putin, but it has undergone an important shift. Gone are the days when the Kremlin craved recognition and lashed out at the West for not recognizing Russia as one of its own. Now it neither pretends nor aspires to be like the West. Instead, it wants to exorcise all traces of American influence.”2 It is not difficult to find this Freudian popcorn political psychology today when it comes to ‘analyzing’ Russian positions. It portrays the United States as the victim of a global oedipal complex when it comes to Russia: first Putin desperately craves daddy’s attention only to then defiantly and recklessly reject him, petulantly trying to run away from home. It is important to remark how most countries around the world would actually find it dangerously myopic and unhealthy to base its own foreign policy on earning the ‘approval’ of another country. With ease the far more standard approach to foreign policy formulation is to determine a country’s own national interests within its local security dilemma and craft an independent and fierce strategy that can best achieve its optimal goals. That normal process, ironically, is often described in America as a ‘shift’ away from craving attention to exorcising American demons. In reality there is no shift: Russia has always been about Russia, as it expects America to be about America, France to be about France, Nigeria to be about Nigeria, so forth and so on. What Russia usually finds so irksome is that when it does what everyone else does in terms of exercising global power, it is judged as psychologically unstable or deficient. What the American media outlets and think tank personalities fail to recognize is how much of this judgment is coming not from explicitly observable behavior or direct quotes from Russian actors but is placed upon Russia by the so called experts themselves as they push a decidedly one-sided interpretation. Russia is not supposed to aspire to be a copy of the West nor should it be allowing particular American influence over its policies. This is not said as anti-Americanism but rather as simple logic: America would never strive to copy another country and it most certainly would not allow another country to force-influence its foreign policy. So why should Russia? It is this very simple and straightforward question that seems to never be asked by what are otherwise august media institutions and impressive political think tanks in the West. Sometimes this tendency can reach near farcical levels. When Alexei Pushkov, chairman of the Russian parliament’s foreign-relations committee, received so much media attention here when he spoke about ridding Russia of dependence on America and even fining cinemas that showed too many foreign films, Western experts needed to recognize the absurd for absurdity. But they did not. Failure to do so is perplexing given Western analysis always laments the strengthening of Putin’s own presidential power system and decries how little power sits within the legislative or judiciary branches of Russian government. Thus, it is nonsensical to highlight parliamentarians as having real impact. But this happens often in America with no sense of diplomatic irony. There also tends to be a failure to focus Russian analysis through the looking glass of reciprocity. What this means is that current American thinking emphasizes how untrustworthy Moscow decision-makers are while completely ignoring the same Russian criticism lobbed back at Washington. President Putin openly and publicly discusses his lack of trust in American power and in the specific policy decisions emanating from the White House. It is this skepticism that supposedly forces his own lack of desire to engage the United States. There are simply too few voices at present in the West trying to analyze this mindset as a legitimate position. As far as can be determined, the only reason this is not analyzed more seriously is because the competing alternative – that Putin is untrustworthy and Moscow is the cause of all communication breakdown – is simply accepted as a de facto axiom. In short, if the United States does not trust Russia, it is because of how Russia behaves on the global stage and its untrustworthy history. If Russia does not trust the United States, that is simply Russian posturing and a case of political transference, wanting to blame its own selfmade problems on someone else so that it can avoid any accountability. The problem is how readily this is unquestioningly accepted and how few so-called Russian experts are willing to step forward and shine a light on such intellectual superficiality. Perhaps one of the worst examples of this is the over-reliance on ‘insider knowledge’ without actually vetting the source’s objectivity. The recent exit of Alexander Sytnik as a senior fellow from the Russian Institute for Strategic Research is a prime example. Upon his exit early in 2015, Reshetnikov unleashed a torrent of information that, while interesting, really does not amount to more than just gossip and hearsay. Worse, American media and political analysts adopted it almost wholly as fact rather than as a possibly compromised source motivated to talk badly about Russia: “The Russian analyst’s scathing remarks about the country’s leadership and about the community of government experts confirm that the concept of Russian supremacy has a strong hold on the Russian leadership. These supremacist views are not limited to the post-Soviet space, where ‘only ethnic Russians are capable of creating statehood.’ The West is also seen as decadent and somewhat spiritually inferior to the Russians. The spread of such views in Russia, especially among the country’s leaders, precludes easy and quick solutions to the Ukrainian crisis, but rather suggests a relatively lengthy period of tensions between Russia and the West, even if Russian strongman Vladimir Putin were, for some reason, to step down.”3 (Italics mine) The tendency is to use personal opinion as confirmation of fact when it should be recognized as biased material. The only confirmation is the affirming of preconceived ideas and a particular agenda that undermines any new attitudinal environment between Russia and the United States. As a consequence, it is easy to find ‘research’ proclaiming Russian goals that have never been publicly disclosed or addressing Putin objectives that have never been formally issued. This is not to say that Russia is incapable of having ulterior motives or secret agendas. Truly every country to one degree or another has them. The criticism here is the propensity in the Russian analytical sphere to assume such agendas and then cherry picking information to affirm the assumption. In pure methodological terms, selection bias is rife within the community that analyzes Russia, leaving those analyses decidedly weak. This bias is only more pronounced when you leave academically-oriented think tanks/news monitors behind and observe within the corridors of American power. Traditionally, the focus has been on a decidedly anti-Russian fervor coming from the Republican Party. However, this analysis would argue that except for a very brief and ultimately dashed Obama ‘reset,’ Russian-American relations within Washington DC has always been dominated in both parties by a remarkably typical Republican mindset. That mindset sets a fairly stark characterization: Russia is an aggressive and untrustworthy dictatorship that is an innate contradiction to American values. As such it will inevitably always be a threat to U.S. interests and global security. 4 By all indicators, Russia is a threat not just to itself and its immediate neighbors but to the entire world, masking its own domestic failings and instabilities with an aggressive foreign policy that will never acquiesce to a more peaceful and cooperative global community.5 Indeed, in an American political world that likes to specialize in ambiguous statements and plausible deniability, it is rather remarkable how freely the American Congress seems to deride Russia: John Boehner: “It is increasingly evident that Russia is intent on expanding its boundaries and power through hostile acts.” Ted Poe: “The Russian bear is coming out of its cave because it got its feelings hurt because of the fall of the Soviet Union, and now it is trying to regain its territories.” Chris Smith: accused a “repressive Russian regime” of “coddling dictators” around the globe from Central Asia to Syria to Cuba and Venezuela. Trent Franks: After the conclusion of an arms deal between Russia and Venezuela, President Putin was called a “thugocrat” engaged in “dangerous alliances.”6 Keep in mind all of the above statements were uttered before the 2014 crisis in Ukraine even broke out. So before the U.S. Congress received what is has subsequently considered undeniable and irrefutable proof of Russian aggression in Ukraine, it was already quite prepared to view Russia solely as a corrupt kleptocracy willfully abusing human rights, powered by an irrational and paranoid hatred of the United States as the sole driver of its foreign policy.

### State Centric

#### The aff is stuck in a militarist frame - we must look at the historical role of imperialism. Their centering of states and quantified arms exports obfuscates the role of imperial exceptionalism that restricts arms to reaffirm the moral imagery of the West as an arbiter of human rights

Anna Stavrianakis in 2015

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I’ve written in the past about the international politics of NGO and campaign group strategy – whether reformist, insider approaches are more effective than transformist, outsider ones – in the context of debates about global civil society. Yet what continues to trouble me, intellectually and politically, is a raft of questions about the operation of the arms trade itself. Namely: where, or with whom, does political responsibility lie for the negative effects of the arms trade in a world of formally national states that are home to internationalising arms companies and operate in a multilateral system based on sovereignty? What social forces drive the arms trade, how does their power operate, what is the character of the problems they generate, and how should scholars and activists best respond? Competing understandings of the operation of the arms trade can be seen in the varied activist responses to it: is the problem one of lack of regulation, the need for improved multilateral action, improved normative standards and international law, as per the Arms Trade Treaty? Or is the problem the relationship between the state and arms capital, and government promotion of the trade, as per the anti-DSEI protests? In the case of DSEI, how are we to understand the operation of internationalising arms capital that has an intimate yet fractious relationship with national states? And in the case of the Arms Trade Treaty, how should we make sense of efforts to create a level playing field of respect for human rights and humanitarian law in the context of a vastly asymmetric and hierarchical world military order?¶ Thinking theoretically, I have come to see that a large part of the difficulty in answering these questions lies in the grip that methodological nationalism continues to hold on IR as a discipline.¶ Contemporary scholarship on the arms trade and arms transfer control tends to operate within the realist-liberal-constructivist triangle that dominates the mainstream of the wider discipline. Realist accounts of balancing or threat perception sit alongside liberal accounts of multilateral regimes for arms transfer control and constructivist accounts of the symbolic politics of arms acquisition or human security approaches to normative change and protection of human rights and humanitarian law. Despite their many differences, these approaches all think in terms of relations between states (seen as autonomous from both the arms industry and unscrupulous private brokers as a social force), and between the domestic and the international. This is particularly so because of the privileged claim that the arms trade has on national defence and state sovereignty. Both in scholarship and policy circles, the arms trade is a key bastion of methodologically nationalist claims. The international appears as the sum of its constituent parts, of nation states. What falls out, though, is the North-South dimension, which is probably the most significant dimension of the arms trade as a practice. The South features either in the often blanket and sometimes stereotyped, but usually under-theorised guise of the repressive, authoritarian regime, the conflict-affected zone of disorder, or fragile state. Even in cosmopolitan approaches that probably do most to transcend methodological nationalism, in which the international features in the form of international humanitarian law and universal human rights, the South primarily features as a site of intervention, and we are left with few intellectual or political resources for understanding either the dynamics of the role of the arms trade in repression or conflict, let alone southern resistance to seemingly obvious public goods such as the Arms Trade Treaty. ¶ The arms trade has long been an international, and primarily North-South, phenomenon. The North-South dimension is fairly easy to see: two-thirds to three-quarters of contemporary international arms transfers are to developing countries. In the postwar era, the world’s major arms suppliers have been the USA, West European states and Russia, and the most significant importers have been found in the Middle East and Asia. Yet this remains stuck on the terrain of methodological nationalism: we are still talking about states, even though gesturing towards the hierarchy and asymmetry captured in the notion of tiers. And most data generated on arms transfers is organised in terms of national states as exporters and importers. Whilst the terms “North” and “South” generally map on to other binaries such as “developed” and “underdeveloped”, the arms trade often throws up examples that complicate things and remind us that these are primarily political rather than geographical categories. Israel, for example, is a niche high-tech producer and supplier, integrated into western production networks, engaged in a colonial war with part of its population, and located in a region generally understood as southern. China is now a top five arms exporter and is nurturing asymmetric relations with African states but still sees itself a developing country. The growth of Chinese arms exports should be seen as a return rather than a rise from nowhere – it was a major arms supplier when it supplied weapons to both sides in the Iran-Iraq war; and gunpowder was invented in China as early as the 9th century, troubling Eurocentric accounts of western military superiority. And whilst most accounts of North-South politics focus on the liberal West’s engagement with the South, don’t forget that the USSR, and now Russia and former Soviet states also engage in various forms of core-periphery relations with arms clients.¶ So we need to capture core-periphery relations without assuming a world of national states. Rather than seeing the arms trade as the outward-facing activity of pre-given national units, then (as happens in the predominant supply-demand and import-export models), we should rather think in terms of the circulation of weapons as part of practices that constitute those units as they prepare to fight, and do the fighting. That means prioritising the significance of the transnational exchange of military techniques between the European and non-European world, and of colonialism in shaping the development, production and transfer of weapons (through practices such as the dumping of obsolete weapons in the periphery). Arms regulation is similarly marked by its imperial past, with some remarkable resonances in the tropes and patterns of control. Drawing on the work historians of empire and sociologists of the postcolonial, as well as IR scholarship on imperial warfare, an imperial perspective can help transcend methodological nationalism. What does this involve, and how can it help us unravel the significance of the arms trade for contemporary international politics?¶ First, an imperial perspective emphasises the ongoing resonance of the historical legacy of formal empire. The modern international arms trade is usually deemed to have started with the Industrial Revolution. But this is a Eurocentric position that assumes military innovation emerges from within the European world and then spreads outwards – much of the older critical literature on the arms trade shares this perspective, even as it identifies itself as politically progressive. Yet colonialism was not something that happened after the European world industrialised and became modern – it was part of the process through which the European world industrialised and became modern, and through which the non-European world got called under-industrialised and pre-modern. Non-Eurocentric accounts of military production and trade are rare, but valuable. They help us understand the international circulation of techniques, practices and ideas in the arms trade, and challenge entrenched notions of superior western military ingenuity.¶ Second, methodologically, this means reading the history and contemporary politics of North and South together, as a single shared story. It encourages us to think in terms of feedback loops and mutual constitution, rather than transmission, diffusion or other linear metaphors that we often use to think about the spread and circulation of military technologies and practices. Such linear metaphors dominate both liberal and leftist accounts, as the rise of the West and transmission of its good ideas or domination of the developing world, respectively.¶ Third, and relatedly, thinking in such a way requires taking seriously Southern agency (albeit under conditions of hierarchy) and considering it as central rather than an add-on. In arms trade terms, this means we have to pay attention to Southern autonomy in weapons acquisition; the importance of blowback and the controversy that ensues when patrons are unable to control the use of weapons they transfer; and the ways that relations with the South shape developments in the North, such as when export concerns distort domestic weapons acquisition. ¶ Fourth is the importance of avoiding technological determinism and bean-counting. That is, it’s not technology per se that matters but how weapons are incorporated into military practice and social relations. For me, this is the importance of a militarism frame for analysing the arms trade, one inflected through an imperial perspective. It means we cannot simply count the number of tanks or sniper rifles exported and cite that as evidence of complicity in repression and militarisation. This is not to toe the government and arms company line that assumes innocence as to the likely use of weapons. But it does require us to demonstrate the entrenched patterns that mean weapons are likely to be misused, even if this particular technology or that one hasn’t been directly used previously. Whilst some of this is being done by NGOs such as Amnesty International, they remain on the same terrain as the government in pursuing a case-by-case approach to arms export decisions. What a militarism frame adds is that the direct use of weapons is just the tip of the iceberg: their indirect role in repression and war through the climate of fear, as well as political economy and patronage networks they facilitate is equally significant.¶ Fifth, a key advantage of an imperial perspective on the arms trade is that it allows us to overcome one of the key distinctions drawn in most extant scholarship, namely that between the West and non-West on the basis of human rights and other supposed liberal values. Even when there is criticism of western suppliers for transfers that violate human rights, the commitment to human rights itself is generally taken as genuine, and forms the key line of distinction with suppliers such as Russia and China. But to my mind, the separation between western and non-western practices on the basis of liberal values is one of the key tropes obscuring the operation of the arms trade. Justifications based on values of human rights (as per European suppliers), and justifications based on legal strictures around sovereignty (as per Russia and China) facilitate some remarkably similar practices: the arming of proxies, cultivation of patronage relations, the core trying to organise force in the periphery.

### Threats/Insecurity

#### The 1AC is part of a desire to displace the insecurities of everyday life onto an external narrative- this entrenches militarism as ideology and presents it as a necessity

Victoria M Basham in 2018

Cardiff University, UK, Liberal militarism as insecurity,¶ desire and ambivalence: Gender,¶ race and the everyday geopolitics¶ of war, Security Dialogue¶ ﻿1–¶ 12

As Salter (2006: 180) explains, though, it is not simply that states manage subjects but that the¶ price of ‘freedom’, of an everyday life removed from insecurity, is that ‘we come to manage ourselves¶ through a confessionary complex’. Key to this is that we ‘recognize ourselves as a society, as¶ part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or of a state’ (Michel Foucault, cited in Salter, 2006: 181)¶ and regard others as outside this. The desire for this way of life means, therefore, that it is not just¶ existential insecurity that facilitates war and war preparedness, but the multitude of insecurities that¶ make up everyday life, from needing to have steady employment to wanting to feel part of a social¶ and political community. Thus, while global fears are materialized and affective in everyday sites,¶ other and often more pressing matters also play a role in the reproduction of liberal militarism (Pain¶ and Smith, 2008). As Dowler (2012: 497) points out, this is why it is vital to consider how ‘militarization¶ takes root in the banal processes of daily life that are essential to the reproduction of¶ sovereignty’.¶ As Eastwood (this issue) argues, though, everyday desire for war also animates militarism; fear¶ only gets us so far. Importantly, however, as Eastwood also contends, desire is not necessarily¶ fervent: it can be more ambiguous, even unconscious. Anthropologist Gerald Sider (2008: 124–¶ 125) sheds further light on this when describing the everyday as an achievement; as those ways in¶ which people work through and against the chaos, rupture and discontinuity that shape their lives¶ to ‘try to make and to claim some kind of ordinary – some stability to today, some continuity¶ between yesterday and tomorrow, in some parts of their lives at least’. Sider (2008: 125) moreover¶ maintains that ‘what we call everyday life does not name a feature or an aspect of social existence¶ … but a very high-stakes struggle’ – a struggle that is for many people throughout the world¶ ‘largely unavoidable and often in the medium to long run unwinnable’. The desire for the ordinary¶ should not be underestimated, therefore; it takes on a profound, if often taken-for-granted, importance¶ not least ‘because it belongs to the people who have it – it is their time, their space, what¶ makes their moments and their interactions their space and place’ (Sider, 2008: 129–130, emphasis¶ in original).¶ It is not difficult to imagine why this possession of ‘normality’ would be desirable to liberal¶ populations promised that freedom is the very condition of their existence. Perceived threats to that¶ freedom might motivate fears and suspicions that foster militarism. Equally, though, in the example¶ of Syrian airstrikes, and hostility and ambivalence to resettling Syrian refugees, the desire of¶ British citizens to have everyday lives free from concern about the everyday lives of others may¶ call into question the ability of Syrians to have not only an everyday but any life at all. While such¶ effects of desire to protect one’s own everyday are not always deliberate or callous, the prioritization¶ of some lives and ways of life over others facilitates biopolitical forms of state power that¶ entail that ‘the liberal way of war is governed, in part, by the very exercise of such discrimination¶ and the application of lethal violence to it’ (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 49).

### War/Peace Focus

#### The affirmative’s geopolitical imagination of policy centers on macropolitical state rivalries and threats—this conflict prevention strategy rationalizes the world for an institutionalized slow violence that squashes any resistance.

Dalby 11

professor @ Carleton University

(Simon, ‘PEACE AND GEOPOLITICS: IMAGINING PEACEFUL GEOGRAPHIES,’ Paper for presentation to the University of Newcastle symposium on Peace in Geography and Politics)

Contemporary social theory might point to Michel Foucault, and the argument drawn from his writings that politics is the extension of war rather than the other way round. Given the interest in biopolitics and geogovernance within the discipline these matters are obviously relevant but the connection to peace needs to be thought carefully beyond formulations that simply assume it as the opposite of wars (Morrissey 2011). This is especially the case given the changing modes of contemporary warfare and the advocacy of violence as an appropriate policy in present circumstances. The modes of warfare at the heart of liberalism suggest that the security of what Reid and Dillon (2009) call the biohuman, the liberal consuming subject, involves a violent series of practices designed to pacify the world by the elimination of political alternatives. The tension here suggests an imperial peace, a forceful imposition of a state of non-war. In George W. Bush’s terms justifying the war on terror, a long struggle to eliminate tyranny (Dalby 2009a). Peace is, in this geopolitical understanding, what comes after the elimination of opposition. In late 2011 such formulations dominated discussions of the death of Colonel Gadaffi in Libya.¶ The dramatic transformation of human affairs in the last couple of generations do require that would-be peaceful geographers look both to the importance of non-violence and simultaneously to how global transformations are changing the landscape of violence and social change, all of it still under the threat of nuclear devastation should major inter-state war occur once again. The re-emergence of non-violence as an explicit political strategy, and in particular the use of Gene Sharp’s (1973) ideas of non-violent direct action in recent events pose these questions very pointedly. Geographers have much to offer in such re-thinking that may yet play their part in a more global understanding of how interconnected our fates are becoming and how inappropriate national state boundaries are as the premise for political action in a rapidly changing biosphere.¶ But to do so some hard thinking is needed on geopolitics, and on how it works as well as how peace-full scholarship might foster that which it desires. Linking the practical actions of non-violence from Tahrir Square to those of the Occupy Wall Street actions, underway as the first draft of this paper was keyboarded, requires that we think very carefully about the practices that now are designated in terms of globalization. Not all this is novel, but the geopolitical scene is shifting in ways that need to be incorporated into the new thinking within geography about war, peace, violence and what the discipline might have to say about, and contribute to, non-violence as well as to contestations of contemporary lawfare (Gregory 2006).¶ Whether the delegitimization of violence as a mode of rule will be extended further in coming decades is one of the big questions facing peace researchers. The American reaction to 9/11 set things back dramatically, an opportunity to respond in terms of response to a crime and diplomacy was squandered, but the wider social refusal to accept repression and violence as appropriate modes of rule has interesting potential to constrain the use of military force. The professionalization of many high technology militaries also reduces their inclination to involve themselves in repressing social movements, although here Mikhail Gorbachev’s refusal to use the Red Army against dissidents in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s remains emblematic of the changes norms of acceptable rule that have been extended in the last few generations.¶ A geography discipline seriously interested in peace needs to link the social processes on the relatively small scale such as the non-violent protests Megoran (2011) highlights, and the peaceful accompaniment actions that Koopman (2011) documents, to the larger geopolitical transformations of our times, to make the eminently geographical point that peace activities vary widely from place to place, but now are an important part of larger contemporary geopolitical transformations. ¶ Geopolitics has mostly been about rivalries between great powers and their contestations of power on the large scale. These specifications of the political world focus on states and the perpetuation of threats mapped as external dangers to supposedly pacific polities. Much geopolitical discourse specifies the world as a dangerous place, hence precisely because of these mappings, one supposedly necessitating violence in what passes for a realist interpretation of great powers as the prime movers of history (Mearsheimer 2001). Geopolitical thinking is about order and order is in part a cartographic notion. Juliet Fall (2010) once again emphasizes the importance of taken for granted boundaries as the ontological given of contemporary politics. Politics is about the cartographic control of territories, as Megoran (2011) too ponders regarding the first half of the twentieth century, but it also about much more than this, despite the fascination that so many commentators have with the ideal form of the supposedly national territorial state. Part of what geographers bring to the discussion of peace is a more nuanced geographical imagination than that found in so much of international studies (Dalby 2011a).¶ On the other hand much of the discussion of peace sees war as the problem, peace as the solution. Implied in that is geopolitics as the problem, mapping dangers turns out to be a dangerous enterprise insofar as it facilitates the perpetuation of violence by representing other places as threats to which our place is susceptible. But this only matters if this is related to the realist assumptions of the inevitability of rivalry, the eternal search for power as key to humanity’s self-organisation and the assumption that organized violence is the ultimate arbiter (Dalby 2010). Critical geopolitics is about challenging such contextualizations, and as such its relationships to peace would seem to be obvious, albeit as Megoran (2011) notes mostly by way of a focus on what Galtung (1969, 1971) calls negative peace. Given the repeated reinvention of colonial tropes in contemporary Western political discourse such critique remains an essential part of a political geography that grants peoples “the courtesy of political geography” (Mitchell and Smith 1991). Undercutting the moral logics of violence, so frequently relying on simplistic invocations of geographical inevitability, to structure their apologetics, remains a crucial contribution.¶ Both the practical matters of recent history and the scholarly contributions by geographers do not allow simple binary distinctions of peace and war to be used as the premise of either scholarship or political practice. History and scholarship suggest rather that peace is what comes after war; the relationship is temporal, stages in matters of violence, geography and reorganizing facts on the ground. Historically in the era of European warfare, coincident with the rise of modernity, that many people hope is now near its end, peace was that which was imposed by the victors, who in turn were the most powerful in whatever contest was followed by a “peace”. Much recent geographical scholarship suggests that post conflict re-construction is a mode of peace building literally (Kirsch and Flint 2011). But those of us who would challenge war as a human institution, or think about non-violence as a strategy for a better world, will not be satisfied with a geography that is concerned only to pick up the pieces and reconfigure them after they have been shattered by the latest round of organized violence.¶ The key points are that reconstruction is a violent transformation of society, a world where frequently neo-liberal globalization is seen as the imposition of social forms that will not resist its logics. Hence peace is what victors impose, an imperial peace that may eventually be quite welcome to those who benefit from the new arrangements. Is peace then post-war? Perhaps it can be understood in these terms. But the corollary is the equally important point that peace is also frequently what comes before the next war. The normal human situation these days is a matter of non-war, but it is far from clear where security is enforced that this is more than a limited form of negative peace. Without large-scale de-militarization then peace is just what happens between wars. But given this then one additional key point that geographers interested in war need to pay attention to is the matter of how peace fails, how conflict escalates and how geography matters in these processes (Flint et al 2009). Peacekeeping is frequently about geographical separation as the Orwellian names for contemporary walls in terms of lines of peace have it. But there is much more geographical thinking to be done about these matters and the scales of interactions across supposedly peaceful borders, not least where what matters most is state security and its ordering principles rather than local interactions across frontiers. This is so not least because of the marked current trend to build fences around states as the supposed solution to numerous security challenges (Jones 2011).¶ Putting matters into historical context also suggests that war is not what it used to be, at least not after the events of the 1940s. Negative peace is about preventing conflict; non-violence is about political strategies to delegitimise violence, to challenge the human norms of behavior that allow cultures of violence. It is important to link this to the issues of what are now called lawfare (Morrissey 2011), the use of law as power and coercion to set the rules of social and political life too. This has been a key part of the US strategy for a long time; shaping institutions to the benefit of the US economy as been what much of international relations has been about, but the larger benefits of constraining conflict are part of the larger process that international law struggles to legitimize. Rules of conduct matter in the international system and the wide-scale repudiation of the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 demonstrated this point clearly.

Ext Dalby- External Threats L

* + - * + rivalries between state powers focus on external threats to prevent future conflicts
        + mapping dangers perpetuates violence by picking and choosing enemies to justify violence against them
        + in a world of militarization, peace becomes recognized as only a time between wars instead of a sustained process
        + the alt solves this through an understanding of why the state labels certain groups as threats and instead of acting on those, recognizing the structural conditions that creates those conflicts in the first place

## Impacts

### Endless Violence

#### Structural violence locks in social and environmental tension---culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable

Tamás Szentes 8, Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. “Globalisation and prospects of the world society” 4/22/08 http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf

It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but --numerous local wars took place, --terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries, --arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development, --many “invisible wars” are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that --the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life. Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intrasociety inequities and distorted development patterns , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars. It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system. Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development. “Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with overexhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced. Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism. When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”. While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe. One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution. Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, wellfed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other. Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

### Env/Survival

#### Every aspect of militarism exacerbates environmental destruction- survival is impossible without addressing the ideological sources of destruction

Mag. Florian Polsterer in 2015

University of Luxembourg¶ European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation¶ Academic Year 2014/2015; ¶ The Impacts of Militarism on Climate¶ Change: A sorely neglected relationship; European Inter – University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation

It is obvious that during active combat fighter jets, destroyers, tanks and whole arsenals of¶ other weapon systems are extremely carbon-intensive165 and often discharge other highly ¶ toxic emissions, not to mention the emissions that are released by oil fires.¶ 166 This causes¶ catastrophic devastation at all levels of the biosphere167¶ . However, the active hostilities are¶ only responsible for a fraction of the actual damage to the environment.168¶ As if the relation between the natural environment and humanity was not complex enough,¶ the developments that this relationship is going through in times of crisis and conflict are¶ adding further complications in blurring the borders of war and peace. Environmental harm is¶ not confined only to combat, claims the environmental historian Tait Keller when he analyses¶ this relation and expands his focus beyond actual hostilities. He argues that the environmental¶ damage that was created by the First World War lies not so much in the destruction of actual¶ battlegrounds but rather in the change of human behaviour and drastically increased industrial¶ production. This new behaviour is essentially different in regards to consumerism and energy¶ consumption with connections to fossil fuels, deforestation, toxic waste and general¶ pollution.169 What actually destroyed our natural environment and is still active in its¶ destruction is “the spread of industrial methods and mentalities of production that hindered¶ natural processes, upset local ecological balances, and increased human exploitation the world¶ over.”170¶ In fact, the environmental (and human) sufferings created by militarism “are so far-reaching¶ that a full examination of them would produce countless volumes”.171¶ The International Peace Bureau lists a number of direct ways in which military activity affects¶ our physical environment172¶ :¶  Pollution of the air, land and water in peacetime¶  Immediate and long-term effects of armed conflict (explosions, landmines, unexploded¶ remnants, chemical weapons, burning oil wells and oil spills, etc.)¶ Land use (vast areas of land and water occupied by military bases, target ranges,¶ weapon stores, training grounds; pollution and degradation from storage,¶ deforestation, scorched earth tactics, etc.)¶  Weapons development and production (design, development, manufacturing, tests,¶ storage, transport, disposal, etc.)¶  Militarisation of outer space (rocket launches, missile systems and satellites, space¶ littering)¶ Additionally, indirect effects through the diversion of resources have to be taken into¶ account.¶ 1¶ This list is by no means exhaustive and one could find hundreds of disastrous examples, like¶ reduction of biodiversity from the extinction of 47 plant species and 19 classes of trees in the¶ Nagorno-Karabakh war174¶ , or the 91,000 litre oil spill in Micronesia from an US tanker that sunk¶ in 1944175¶ , or the 50 nuclear warheads and 11 nuclear reactors littering the ocean floor from¶ naval accidents in the Cold War176¶ , or the brain drain and waste of young lives by the military¶ sector, or the depletion of ecosystems for food and energy supply after conflicts, etcetera.¶ Literally “all aspects of military activity defile our environment in some way.”177¶ Special attention has to be paid to the huge and permanent costs of maintaining military¶ equipment and personnel, who require housing, infrastructure, heating, air conditioning,¶ transport, nourishment and many other goods and services. The production of military¶ equipment consumes enormous amounts of materials, like metal, rubber, plastics and rare¶ earths. Also there is massive energy usage involved, mostly from unsustainable resources.¶ Nuclear weapons are particular heavyweights in production and maintenance, not to speak of¶ their dismantling.178¶ When there is no actual combat, 70% of soldiers’ activities are military exercises and training,¶ consuming vast amounts of ammunition and fuel, disrupting local ecosystems or killing ¶ animals179¶ .¶ 180 Also, military material and technology is by no means faultless and accidents¶ occur regularly.¶ 181¶ Several authors regard MIMEC as the largest polluter on the planet.182 When all the facts¶ above are taken into account it seems quite possible that militarism is the biggest contributor¶ to climate change with its massive GHG emissions, destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity,¶ massive waste of energy supplies, huge impacts on social, cultural and economic behaviour,¶ destabilisation of international politics and obstruction of climate policies. Consequently, there¶ can be no successful overcoming the climate crisis without peace and dismantling MIMEC.¶ 182

#### Militarism causes cycles of environmental destruction- it’s engrained in the ideology

Mag. Florian Polsterer in 2015

University of Luxembourg¶ European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation¶ Academic Year 2014/2015; ¶ The Impacts of Militarism on Climate¶ Change: A sorely neglected relationship; European Inter – University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation

The treadmill of destruction is a descendant of the treadmill of production, a theory that¶ argues that environmental degradation is an inherent part of economic development and that¶ the capitalistic growth imperative creates a perpetual conflict between human societies and¶ the environment. An important aspect of the theory is that producers strive for externalisation¶ of environmental costs to increase their profits.185 The treadmill of destruction (military) is¶ closely intertwined with the treadmill of production (economy) but generates distinct ¶ tendencies of growth, requiring humongous amounts of capital, energy and raw materials, 186¶ thus creating a path dependency.187¶ In recent times, militarism’s aspect of defence has been increasingly invoked in relation to neocolonialism and acquiring resources like oil.188 Nations with larger and advanced militaries¶ regularly use their coercive power to obtain disproportionate access to natural resources,¶ predominantly in the global South.¶ 189 Geopolitical competition between states often drives¶ arms races, which in turn boost technological developments, which in consequence enhance¶ the damaging capabilities of military forces. Since the Second World War the military was¶ promoted into the political and economic elites, rooting the treadmill of destruction in¶ national and international politics.190 This is particularly true for the situation of the USA where¶ military production averted economic stagnation and supported the entire economic¶ structure.191 Military spending is perfectly suited for the capitalist growth system, pumping¶ capital into private production, distributing income upward and always finding a market192, if¶ not producing its own. Militarism influences the willingness and timing of states to ratify¶ environmental treaties193, as was obvious from the USA’s behaviour in the Kyoto negotiations.¶ Access to oil has become a fundamental motive for wars, in which massive amounts of oil are¶ burned, aggravating climate change.¶ 194 The huge reliance of militaries on fossil fuels and their¶ enormous contributions to burn it quickly conclude “a self-perpetuating cycle of¶ destruction.”¶ 195

#### Militarism makes environmental destruction inevitable

Bennis 18 (Phyllis Bennis -- fellow @ the Institute for Policy Studies, “A Green New Deal Needs to Fight US Militarism”, Jacobin Magazine, https://jacobinmag.com/2019/05/green-new-deal-fight-militarism-imperialism, 8 October 2018)

The war on terror unleashed in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attack has led to almost two decades of unchecked militarism. We are spending more money on our military than at any time in history. Endless wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and elsewhere are still raging, more wars are threatened against Iran and beyond, costing the US trillions of dollars and creating humanitarian disasters. Treaties to control nuclear arms are unraveling at the same time that conflicts with the major powers of Russia and China are heating up.

The Green New Deal must have anti-militarism at its core. Wars and the military render impossible the aspirations contained in the Green New Deal. And slashing the out-of-control military budget is crucial to provide the billions of dollars we need to create a sustainable and egalitarian economy.

To fund the Green New Deal, with all of its component parts, we must transition away from the current war economy that pollutes the planet, distorts our society, enriches only the war profiteers. An end to US wars across the globe and massive cuts to the military budget will provide funds for green jobs, public education, health care for all, green infrastructure development. And we will transition our nation’s security away from failed and failing wars into a new foreign policy based on peace and diplomacy, not war.

The Military and the Environment

The United States’ militarized war economy plays a major role in the destruction of our planet’s vital life support systems. The military uses enormous amounts of fossil fuels and other chemicals that poison the air, water, and land human beings depend, both within US borders and across the globe where US forces, planes, drones and other war machines go to war. Where the US military establishes bases abroad, the local environment always suffers. As David Vine noted in his seminal book Base Nation, the carbon footprint of military bases is enormous. They house carbon-spewing tanks and aircrafts, and use tremendous energy for climate control and electricity. “The military’s thirst for petroleum,” Vine writes, “is so great that on a worldwide basis, the US armed services consume more oil every day than the entire country of Sweden.” To make matters worse, in many countries, Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) with the host government prohibit local authorities from investigating environmental destruction caused by US military bases.

As documented by the Institute for Policy Studies and the Poor People’s Campaign, US wars have left a toxic legacy in their global wake, poisoning soil and water and polluting air for decades after the formal end to hostilities. And the military sows environmental destruction within the US, as well. The IPS/PPC report notes that “the Pentagon is directly responsible for 141 Superfund sites” — ten percent of all such sites, far exceeding any other polluter — while “760 or so additional Superfund sites are abandoned military facilities or sites that otherwise support military needs.” The carbon footprint of the military industrial complex is also staggering: In 2016, the Department of Defense (DoD) emitted 66.4 million metric tons of carbon dioxide, representing over two-thirds of the entire emissions of the US government. Tellingly, however, the military’s overseas emissions are exempted from the U.S. government’s carbon accounting — despite representing a majority of the DoD’s emissions.

Slash the Military Budget, Fund Green Jobs

The US military is clearly an obstacle to a safe climate — so any comprehensive climate justice policy must confront US militarism head on. What would the Green New Deal’s peaceful foreign policy look like?

### Global Warming/Env

#### Militarism is the largest cause of global warming- it’s impossible to address climate change without demilitarization

Mag. Florian Polsterer in 2015

University of Luxembourg¶ European Master’s Degree in Human Rights and Democratisation¶ Academic Year 2014/2015; ¶ The Impacts of Militarism on Climate¶ Change: A sorely neglected relationship; European Inter – University Centre for Human Rights and Democratisation

Within MIMEC the US Department of Defense (DoD) is the largest polluter and waster.¶ 135¶ Although data is generally hard to come by, it reportedly burns at least a startling 365,000¶ barrels of oil daily (other estimations amount to 500,000 barrels)¶ 136¶ . Per year this is a usage of¶ unimaginable 20 billion litres (5.46 billion gallons)¶ 137¶ . To make matters worse, this number¶ might include neither fuel consumed by contractors or in leased and privatised facilities nor¶ the excessive energy and resources used to produce and maintain weapons and equipment.138¶ It has been calculated that about one third of the total US military spending just accounts for¶ securing energy supplies worldwide.139 To top it all, the efficiency of fuel use is far from¶ improving, admitted the pentagon, with soldiers in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars consuming¶ 16 times more fuel140 than in the Second World War.141 Bearing in mind that the data from the¶ pentagon are possibly even undervalued, it is clear that the USA is a hopeless oil addict142¶ ,¶ making the US military “the world’s largest institutional source of greenhouse gases.”143¶ The DoD is alone responsible for about 40% of global military expenditures.¶ 144 Including the¶ costs of bygone wars145, the USA is spending 40% (almost 1 trillion USD146) of its annual budget¶ on militarisation. This imbalanced spending has dire consequences for programs addressing¶ climate change, education, healthcare, culture, preventing war or reducing income¶ inequality.147 It is troubling that the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) has not been¶ able to audit the DoD for the last 20 years and deems it to be of high risk for waste, fraud and¶ abuse.148¶ This serious diversion from better use is obvious and weighs even heavier when one compares¶ the annual subsidies to fossil fuel industries (37,5 billion USD)149 to (only non-binding) pledges¶ for long-term climate finance (1,5 billion USD)¶ 150¶ .¶ 151¶ Interestingly, already in 1992 the UN Secretariat estimated the annual costs for effectively¶ preserving the environment (and securing development) to be 1000 billion USD, back then the¶ almost exact amount the world spent per year for military defence. Today the ratios surely¶ have changed (and probably for the worse, since delayed climate investments have to be far¶ bigger), but it is unthinkable to curb climate change without a fundamental redirection of the¶ financial and material resources that are being wasted on the illusion of military security. An¶ illusion because modern weapons are a main threat to all life forms and life-supporting¶ systems.¶ 152¶ Comparing the graphs of rising GHG emissions and the US military expenditures (Figure 14),¶ one can find similarities. The rise of GHG emissions and military spending reflects an¶ undeniable connection between MIMEC and global warming.153¶ The USA was so bold to demand the inclusion of a provision exempting its military activities¶ from measurement and reductions worldwide before signing the Kyoto Protocol in 1997. But¶ even after seizing this concession the Bush Administration refused to sign the protocol.¶ Furthermore, the US Congress adopted a provision guaranteeing the US military forces¶ immunity from any measurement or energy consumption limits. The executive order from¶ President Obama for federal agencies to reduce their GHG emissions (only by 2020) does not¶ apply to the US military and leaves it free from any climate responsibility154¶ .¶ 155¶ The US military industry is of course a blatant example of how militarism threatens the¶ achievement of climate goals, but many of its conditions are also true, in varying degrees, for¶ other militaries.156 Europe, as a major conglomerate of military forces and an ally of the US in¶ many wars requires a quick inspection as well.

### Racial Violence

#### Militarism is inextricably linked to the maintenance and expansion of white supremacy- their call to shore up the US’s defense is a racial project to project violence into every pore of American society

Joshua Inwood & Anne Bonds in 2016

Inwood- Affiliation: Pennsylvania State University Research interests: Geography, Critical Race Theory, Landscape studies & Bonds- PhD, Geography, University of Washington, 2008. MA, Women's Studies, University of Arizona, 2003

Confronting White Supremacy and a Militaristic Pedagogy in the U.S. Settler Colonial State; Annals of the American Association of Geographers Volume 106, 2016 - Issue 3

The analytic of militarism requires first a focus on the United States as produced through settler colonialism (Morgensen 2011; Smith 2012; Hixson 2013; Veracini 2013). A. Bonds and Inwood (2015) explained settler colonialism as a continuously unfolding project of empire that is enabled by and through specific racial configurations that are tied to geographies of white supremacy. In a U.S. context, settler colonialism begins with the removal of first peoples from the land and the creation of racialized and gendered labor systems that make the land productive for the colonizers. This includes the removal of Native peoples and geographies of indentured servitude, slavery, sharecropping, and, more contemporarily, urban abandonment and practices of mass imprisonment. Settler colonialism, therefore, emphasizes the ongoing processes of racialized capital accumulation and displacement necessary to sustain the permanent occupation of a territory. In this sense, it is an enduring structure—an interrelated political, social, and economic process that continuously unfolds—requiring continued reconfigurations and interventions by the state (Wolfe 2006). Because of the constant reworking of social and political economic hierarchies necessary to sustain settler relations, this sociospatial dialectic is central to understanding how particular place-based configurations of race, class, ethnicity, and gender come to predominate in the United States (for a broader discussion see S. Hall 1996; Gilmore 1999; A. Bonds and Inwood 2015). According to Smith (2012), settler colonialism is sustained by three primary logics that enshrine white supremacy. The first of these logics is that of slavery, which is usually premised on the enslavement of black people, the devaluation of black life, and the racialized political economy established through this system. Rather than being located in the past, the logic of slavery mutates and mobilizes across time and space, systematized through various structures of social control that dispossess and retain black bodies as permanent property of the state. This logic connects slavery, sharecropping, welfare programs, and mass imprisonment (Smith 2012). The logic of slavery rationalizes racial exploitation and is the cornerstone for the very notion of private property. As Harris (1993) argued, “The origins of property rights in the United States are rooted in racial domination” (1734) that is connected to slavery and gives rise to a very specific form of U.S.-style political economy built on and through the subordination of persons of color. Thus, slavery introduces into the life of the nation the routine and naturalized “statesanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” that is the heart of U.S.-style racism (Gilmore 2007, 28). The associated practices and systems not only justify death as the “collateral consequences” of U.S. development, but they undergird the social and premature death of structural racism (Gilmore 2007). A second and interconnected logic is genocide, premised on the ongoing disappearance of indigenous peoples in support of the appropriation and privatization of indigenous lands (Smith 2012). Genocide sustains a spatial politics of erasure and exclusion, institutionalized by state practices that justify indigenous removal and settler land claims. The practices of genocide are animated by and through logics of private property that connect geographies of indigenous disappearance with labor systems meant to make the land productive. Finally, a third pillar is orientalism, grounded in the belief of the inferiority and threatening menace of non-Western nations and peoples (Smith 2012).1 This introduces into the United States a state of permanent warfare in which the nation is consistently besieged by enemies (externally and internally); as a consequence, there is a constant need to protect “the well-being of empire” (Smith 2012, 69). The foundational rationales of slavery, genocide, and orientalism contour the white supremacist settler state: The founding moments of US nationalism [meaning the social and cultural identity of the nation] are foundational to both state and culture. The US was conceived in slavery and christened by genocide. These early practices established high expectations of state aggression against enemies of the national purpose and that valorized armed men in uniform as the nation’s true sacrificial subjects. (Gilmore 2002, 20) These logics are reformulated and continue to take shape in an era of ostensible color-blindness predominated by official discourses and government commitments to racial equality. Even as overt racism is eschewed, taken for granted socioeconomic hierarchies, racial exploitation, and the redistribution of wealth reproduce and sustain white supremacy. The U.S. settler state internalizes a “righteous violence” predicated on an expanding “quest for total security” that has come to characterize domestic and foreign policy (Hixson 2013, 198). Although there are myriad ways to explore the interrelations between state-sanctioned violence and militarism, we find the connections between domestic policing and the U.S. military-industrial complex to be particularly illustrative. Kraska and Cubellis (1997) noted that there is a long history of collusion between the military and police departments in the United States and the military paradigm is an important organizing principle within the development of modern policing practices, organization, and tactics (e.g., Bittner 1970; Manning 1977; Enloe 1980; A. Hall and Coyne 2012). These practices took on added significance during the latter half of the twentieth century as U.S. cities faced increased pressure to “get tough on crime” and as local police departments developed specially trained tactical teams, commonly referred to as Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams (Kraska and Cubellis 1997). The interactions between the military and domestic police practices intensified yet again during the “war on drugs” and in a post–11 September 2001 world where domestic terror concerns have fueled the explosive growth of military and police cooperation (A. Hall and Coyne 2012). Although ostensibly unconnected to questions of race and economic inequality, militarism is fundamentally linked to structural violences of poverty and social difference (Loyd 2009, 2014), and the pursuit of total security connects settler state militarism across scales, legitimating the expansion and protection of the nation-state, the policing of its borders and communities, and internal and external monitoring and surveillance in the name of defense. Securing the white supremacist settler state relies on racial, gender, and class hierarchies that enable the coherence of an imagined nation with clearly marked inclusions and exclusions. That is, the targeted and widespread violence that characterizes the U.S. settler state—seen in everything from the genocide directed toward Native peoples to the criminalization of communities of color—depends on and reinforces discursive constructions that demonize those who stand in the way of the settler state and, more often than not, culminates in national campaigns against those beyond the scope of U.S. settler state justice. The indiscriminate killing associated with this kind of violence is easily dismissed as an unfortunate consequence of war (Hixson 2013). U.S. interventionism relies on a “defensive solidarity . . . built on the institution of slavery and the racialization of Blackness” that reaffirms white supremacist cultural identity by managing both internal and external threats (Loyd 2009, 406). These practices continue even after the settler state has displaced and “removed” native peoples who had previously occupied the land, creating political landscapes with an aggressive propensity for violence (Veracini 2010). This understanding of the United States as a settler state is significant for theorizing militarism, we argue, because it situates the persistent violences of genocide and slavery as enduring structures shaping social and political economic relations. Rather than being projects of the past, settler practices are central to the continued development and futurity of the United States. A settler colonial perspective disrupts the spatial imaginaries of war by emphasizing the ongoing racialized violence necessary to secure contested, although taken for granted, homelands in settler nations. Moreover, it connects the indiscriminate violence stretching from U.S. settler colonial history to contemporary military engagements (Hixson 2013). As Blackhawk and Apache helicopters swoop and attack and Tomahawk cruise missiles explode, and as U.S. Special Forces head into “Indian country” to search and destroy the enemy, the ramifications and taken for granted sensibilities of settler geographies become all too clear (Hixson 2013, 198). Hixson (2013) further clarified, “American settler colonialism is a winnertakes- all proposition that demanded the removal of indigenous peoples and the destruction of their cultures,” and these geographies have “profound consequences for national identity and subsequent foreign policy” (197). The settler state is premised on permanent war, inscribing militarism and violence into everyday geographies and naturalizing racialized power hierarchies and the dispossession and erasure of racialized bodies.

### War/Extinction

#### Militarism causes war, suffering, and deepens inequality – only understanding militarism’s global reach will avert extinction

Gusterson and Besteman in 2019

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It goes without saying that militarism, like its close siblings¶ capitalism and colonialism, is deeply imbricated with suffering¶ and social injustice. While everyone who is not a pacifist can¶ reference armed struggles they consider for just cause (from¶ the Sandinistas for some on the left to the Afghan Mujahadeen¶ of the 1980s for some on the right), it is the very essence of¶ military operations that they kill and terrorize people—including, inevitably, innocent civilians as well as combatants.¶ Some military operations exact a higher death toll than others,¶ and some are more discriminate in picking targets than others¶ (and we should not be dismissive of the importance of these¶ distinctions), but it is the lowest common denominator of¶ military operations that they all inflict death, injury, and suffering. This suffering includes a lingering aftermath to conflict¶ that may take the form of cancer and other ailments settling¶ into a population over decades because depleted uranium¶ weapons, defoliants, heavy metals, solvents, and other toxins¶ were released in war or preparation for war; or it may take the¶ form of elevated rates of suicide, drug addiction, alcoholism,¶ and spousal abuse among mentally and spiritually injured¶ veterans. And, even when military forces are not used in war,¶ there is a high incidence of prostitution, violence against women,¶ and damage to public health and the environment around military bases (Lutz 2001; McCaffrey 2002; Vine 2015).18 Essays in¶ this volume by Lutz (2019) and Vine (2019) explore this kind of¶ damage with nuance and precision. Moreover, the ways military spending is directed tend to reinforce and deepen social¶ inequalities, enriching senior executives and stockholders of¶ large military contractors such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing,¶ BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Dyncorp, and CACI as well¶ as the penumbral swarm of retired military officers and highpriced consultants who provision them with advice, “studies,”¶ and lobbying services. It should come as no surprise that¶ macroeconomic analysis has found a clear correlation between¶ high levels of military spending and high levels of social inequality (Abell 1994; Ali 2007). Seen in this light it is surely of¶ the utmost concern that global military spending continues to¶ rise and that processes of militarization reach ever more deeply¶ into social and cultural life—from Hollywood movies to children’s toys and video game design (Allen 2017; Cheng 2013;¶ Enloe 2000a, 2000b; Gibson 1994; Jauregui 2015).¶ Much anthropological writing on militarism, imbued with¶ anthropology’s traditional preferential option for the poor and¶ marginalized, emphasizes the suffering militarism leaves in its¶ wake. However, some ethnographers have studied up or sideways (Stryker and Gonzalez 2014) to understand the perspectives of actors inside militarist organizations, and some strands¶ in the literature on the anthropology of militarism make descriptively real, for example, the aesthetic beauty soldiers and¶ weapons designers see in weapons, the threats soldiers and¶ planners fear, or the felt righteousness of the causes for which¶ warriors fight. In this volume Weiss (2019) provides a complex¶ evocation of the contradictions and ambivalent feelings experienced by Israeli soldiers rebelling against their expected role in¶ the subjugation and occupation of the Palestinian community.¶ Analyses such as Weiss’s provide a much-needed window into¶ the lived experience of militarist actors, challenging anthropologists to empathize with their dilemmas rather than just¶ condemning them. Anthropology cannot produce a complete¶ descriptive analysis of militarism without exploring the experience and cultural logics of soldiers, weapons scientists, and¶ intelligence officers—perhaps anthropology’s ultimate others—¶ as well as militarism’s victims. This raises problems of method¶ and writing. How do anthropologists study people who may not¶ want to be studied or are for other reasons inaccessible for¶ conventional fieldwork? This may involve defetishizing participant observation in favor of a mixed-method approach that¶ gives more weight to textual sources and set-piece interviews of¶ the kind journalists practice. And, when it comes to writing,¶ how do we write critically about militarist actors without leaving¶ our subjects (as well as some of our readers) feeling set up and¶ betrayed? Alternatively, how do we convey the cultural sense of¶ militarist practices and institutions without feeling complicit¶ (Gusterson 1997)?19¶ Militarism’s Global Web¶ This volume goes to print at a moment when military programs¶ continue to enjoy strong public support in the United States¶ despite the fact that militarist processes have set entire regions of¶ the planet (especially in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa)¶ ablaze. According to Brown University’s Costs of War project¶ (http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/) the US interventions in¶ Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan have led to at least 370,000 direct deaths and 800,000 indirect deaths, have displaced over¶ 10 million people, and have so far cost US taxpayers $5.6 trillion.¶ If we then consider the conflict in Syria, that adds another¶ 350,000–500,000 deaths and, astoundingly, over 6 million more¶ refugees. And then there are the conflicts in Somalia, Yemen,¶ and Libya, which have killed and displaced many more. And,¶ while the numbers are horrifying enough, they do not begin to¶ speak to other dimensions of suffering and destruction associated with the sundering of families, the trauma of witnessing¶ relentless, organized violence for years, and the hopelessness¶ that comes from watching the collapse of social institutions.¶ From our perspective as analysts of militarism, these conflicts¶ in different countries, which tend to be reported separately in¶ the media, are coproduced by a single bundle of underlying¶ militarist processes and are integrated with one another, no¶ matter how much local dynamics may vary. Indeed, this is the¶ essence of militarism—its ability to be simultaneously local and¶ global, to connect different geographical spaces and meaning¶ systems through organized violence or the preparation for it,¶ while obscuring the workings of the connective circuitry. The¶ conflicts that appear to be “in” the Middle East, but that are¶ really global in their reach and origins, are simultaneously¶ “about” Sunni-Shi’a hostility in local Iraqi neighborhoods, the¶ rivalry between Pashtuns and Tajiks in Afghanistan, jihadists’¶ dreams of a new Caliphate, the diaspora’s fantasies of“home,” a¶ “clash of civilizations” in the heads of American neoconservatives, human rights hawks’ claims to want to protect Muslim¶ women’s rights, military planners’ search for pipeline routes¶ and geostrategic advantage, US presidents’ anxieties about reelection, and aerospace executives’ drive for increased profits.¶ Barefoot guerillas in the Hindu Kush, suicide bombers in Mosul,¶ US special forces knocking down doors in the middle of the¶ night, drone operators in Nevada, bemedaled generals in the¶ Pentagon, speakers in suits at Washington think tanks, refugees¶ clinging to flimsy boats in the Mediterranean, and assembly line¶ workers churning out ammunition for M16s may never meet¶ one another but are fundamentally joined by processes of mil¶ itarism that adhere to certain patterns: through a process of¶ polarization, they create and intensify enmities, turning neighbors against one another; they create novel alliances between¶ locals and outsiders; they inject weaponry beyond the normal¶ reach of local fighters; and they spread, through a sort of process¶ of contagion, exporting violence to and bringing weapons and¶ fighters from contiguous territories and diasporic communities.¶ Above all, following global capitalist and colonial pathways that¶ have sedimented over centuries, they tend to transmogrify the¶ bodily suffering and death of those in the periphery into wealth¶ in the metropole: jobs in munitions factories or in the everexpanding US Department of Defense, profits for shareholders¶ in arms manufacturers, book contracts for defense intellectuals,¶ and roles for actors in Hollywood war movies. This is not to say¶ that no one in the metropole suffers and dies, but militarism is a¶ global system that is tilted in favor of the West, which profits¶ from suffering beyond its borders.¶ A number of commentators observed that, after World¶ War II, Western societies failed to demobilize as they had after¶ World War I, and that the world was increasingly in a permanent war orientation: military research and development¶ continued; the arms industry remained a leading sector in the¶ economy; nuclear weapons were placed on hair-trigger alert,¶ and the horizon was constantly scanned for incoming missiles;¶ the United States built a global network of hundreds of military¶ bases, while both superpowers used military aid to build global¶ patron-client networks; the United States and the Soviet Union¶ used their military and intelligence forces to intervene in other¶ countries’ affairs; and conflicts, invariably worsened by superpower sponsorship of contending factions, regularly erupted in¶ the global south. Far from ameliorating this situation, the end of¶ the cold war has, in the context of a struggle for resource access¶ in the global south and the emergence of the so-called war on¶ terror, produced a further intensification of militarism, which¶ has morphed opportunistically as it has adapted to new economic, ideological, and strategic realities. If, instead of focusing¶ on particular conflicts, we try to hold in awareness the system of¶ global militarism in its entirety, we see a system that generates¶ expansionary energy from its own internal conflicts: as actors¶ within the system argue that threats from elsewhere within the¶ system justify the accumulation of weaponry, the use of force, or¶ the further securitization of daily life, the system deepens its grip¶ upon us To make this case is to recapitulate an argument made by the¶ great social historian E. P. Thompson (1980) in a much debated¶ essay on “exterminism, the last stage of civilization.” Analyzing¶ the cold war nuclear arms race, Thompson argued that Western¶ and Eastern bloc critiques of the other bloc seemed, in their own¶ context, progressive, but, seen from outside the entire conflict,¶ merely served to consolidate and expand the underlying system,¶ which he dubbed “exterminism.” He reframed democratic capitalism and communism not as contending systems but as complementary components of this exterminist system. Looking¶ forward, he feared that this system could only be ended in a¶ self-destructive genocidal spasm as its own contradictions became inescapable. The question before us now is whether exterminist militarism might be ended otherwise, slowly rolled¶ back (as slavery and colonialism were) through the combined¶ efforts of intellectuals, institutions, and social movements.¶ Until we recognize militarism for what it is, we cannot begin to¶ roll it back.

#### Prioritizing everyday violence is key- responding to it later causes error replication and movement burn out, only re-orienting focus away from macro-level violence produces sustainable political coalitions

Cuomo ’96

(Chris, Prof. of Political Science @ U of Cincinnati, “War is not just an event: reflections on the significance of everyday violence”, Hypatia, vol. 11, no. 4 Fall (1994))

Theory that does not investigate or even notice the omnipresence of militarism cannot represent or address the depth and specificity of the everyday effects of militarism on women, on people living in occupied territories, on members of military institutions, and on the environment. These effects are relevant to feminists in a number of ways because military practices and institutions help construct gendered and national identity, and because they justify the destruction of natural nonhuman entities and communities during peacetime. Lack of attention to these aspects of the business of making or preventing military violence in an extremely technologized world results in theory that cannot accommodate the connections among the constant presence of militarism, declared wars, and other closely related social phenomena, such as nationalistic glorifications of motherhood, media violence, and current ideological gravitations to military solutions for social problems. Ethical approaches that do not attend to the ways in which warfare and military practices are woven into the very fabric of life in twenty-first century technological states lead to crisis-based politics and analyses. For any feminism that aims to resist oppression and create alternative social and political options, crisis-based ethics and politics are problematic because they distract attention from the need for sustained resistance to the enmeshed, omnipresent systems of domination and oppression that so often function as givens in most people's lives. Neglecting the omnipresence of militarism allows the false belief that the absence of declared armed conflicts is peace, the polar opposite of war. It is particularly easy for those whose lives are shaped by the safety of privilege, and who do not regularly encounter the realities of militarism, to maintain this false belief. The belief that militarism is an ethical, political concern only regarding armed conflict, creates forms of resistance to militarism that are merely exercises in crisis control. Antiwar resistance is then mobilized when the "real" violence finally occurs, or when the stability of privilege is directly threatened, and at that point it is difficult not to respond in ways that make resisters drop all other political priorities. Crisis-driven attention to declarations of war might actually keep resisters complacent about and complicitous in the general presence of global militarism. Seeing war as necessarily embedded in constant military presence draws attention to the fact that horrific, state-sponsored violence is happening nearly all over, all of the time, and that it is perpetrated by military institutions and other militaristic agents of the state.

### Turns Case- SPF

#### The aff’s solvency rests on the promise of ‘restabilizing’ the future- it ignores that the socio-economic contradictions that created the crisis are inevitable- the result is a suture of the system that forecloses change and ensures serial policy failure

Peter Bloom in 2016

Open University Business School, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK; Back to the capitalist future: Fantasy and the

paradox of crisis; Culture and Organization, 22:2, 158-177, DOI: 10.1080/14759551.2014.897347

Yet these leaders’ responses also bear witness to a certain contradiction implicit in¶ the naming of an event as a crisis. It simultaneously speaks to the need for transformation¶ and the desire for stability. Indeed, the uncertainty surrounding this near catastrophe¶ was assuaged through the trumpeting of the ability of elites to ‘solve’ and¶ ‘fix’ the problem and in doing so return to a state of ‘normalcy’. George W. Bush¶ thus stated optimistically in late 2008 that whereas ‘this problem did not develop overnight¶ and it will not be solved overnight’, nevertheless, ‘with continued cooperation¶ and determination it will be solved’ (BBC News, 15 November 2008). Illustrating the¶ global reach of this discourse Yi Gang, deputy governor of the People’s Bank of¶ China (the Chinese central bank), promised that his country would ‘actively participate¶ in rescue activities for this international financial crisis’ (BBC News, 15 November¶ 2008).¶ This longing for renewed security, for the problem to be ‘solved’, plays into the¶ rearticulation of ‘crisis’ as an element of a broader fantasmatic narrative of recovery.¶ Fundamental to this narrative framing is the characterizing of these dislocating¶ events as markedly different than the stable period preceding them, thus opening the¶ way for the promotion of the possibility of ‘recovery’ and consequently the ability to¶ recapture the subjective security associated with a less anxious time prior to the¶ crisis. More precisely, these discourses promoting ‘recovery’ are symptomatic of the¶ attempt to construct a new beatific discourse promising individuals uncertain over¶ their future the ability to ‘recapture’ their former stability as social subjects.¶ The immediate responses to the crisis illustrate this phenomenon. A continual¶ refrain from elites following the meltdown were themes not of transformation but¶ recovery. This emphasis was apparent in newly elected President Obama’s February¶ 2009 address to a joint session of congress. After acknowledging that ‘the impact of¶ this recession is real, and it is everywhere’ he strikes a triumphant tone stressing the¶ nation’s inherent capacity to ‘recover’:¶ But while our economy may be weakened and our confidence shaken, though we are¶ living through difficult and uncertain times, tonight I want every American to know¶ this, We will rebuild, we will recover, and the United States of America will emerge stronger¶ than before. (Obama 2009a)¶ Whereas this triumphant rhetoric is perhaps to be expected by any incoming leader¶ faced with the daunting task of confronting massive socio-economic problems, what¶ is of interest is the framing of such optimism around the promises of recovery. The¶ ringing pledge that ‘we will rebuild’ and ‘we will recover’ contains within it an assumption¶ that current troubles are temporary and ultimately exceptional rather than reflective¶ of deeper and more fundamental problems with contemporary capitalism.¶ Through this fantasy, the crisis was changed from a threatening encounter with the¶ ‘real’ to a more manageable ideological ‘reality’ linked to romanticized themes of¶ recovery and future progress. This narrative of crisis was on full display in the aftermath¶ of the events of 2008. In Obama’s 2009, State of the Union, he proclaims¶ The answers to our problems don’t lie beyond our reach. They exist in our laboratories¶ and our universities; in our fields and our factories; in the imaginations of our entrepreneurs.¶ What is required now is for this country to pull together, confront boldly the challenges¶ we face, and take responsibility for our future once more. (Obama 2009b)¶ The articulation of these events as a ‘crisis’ then served ironically as a force for subjects¶ to once again stabilize their identity. The narrativizing of this event as a temporary aberration¶ lent itself to the proffering of an idealized vision of the future emphasizing¶ themes of ‘stability’ and ‘normalization’. Reflected, in this respect, was the ideological¶ paradox of crisis – where the failure of an ideology is transformed into an opportunity¶ for re-identification and potential ideological renewal.

## Alts/Framework

### Alt- Critical Peace Research

#### The alternative is critical peace research, a strategy that continuously critiques and questions sovereign conceptions of violence and peace while simultaneously committing to the ethical and practical imperative of non-violent resistance to structures of domination.

Jackson 15 – prof of peace and conflict studies @ U of Otago

(Richard, ‘Towards critical peace research: Lessons from critical terrorism studies,’ chapter in *Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition*, edited by Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, pp. 24-31)

Critical peace research: a proposal On the basis of the above assessment, this section briefly outlines a set of core commitments which I believe ought to characterise CPR. I conceive of ‘critical’ (peace) research in two primary senses. First, it simply means an intellectual orientation or attitude which attempts to stand apart from the existing order (while at the same time acknowledging that one can never fully escape one’s own situatedness or biases), which questions widely accepted common- sense and dominant forms of knowledge about peace and conflict, and which asks probing questions about how existing social and epistemic orders came into existence and the processes by which they are maintained. Second, and more narrowly, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to approaches which draw upon the analytical tools and insights of Frankfurt School- inspired Critical Theory, as well as related critical-normative social theories and disciplinary approaches such as critical constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, post- colonialism and others. In the first instance, critical approaches are characterised by a healthy scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas, and instead, seek to continuously question and interrogate that which is taken for granted. In particular, critical scholars are committed to interrogating how the status quo is implicated in some of the very problems that traditional theory seeks to solve, in this case, the ‘problems’ of conflict, violence, lack of reconciliation and the like. In part, this is because critical approaches recognise that knowledge and power are intimately connected– that knowledge is never neutral, but ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981). Lastly, in contrast to the social scientific adoption of a purportedly neutral standpoint on political and ethical issues, critical approaches are characterised by an openly ethical- normative commitment to human rights, social justice, progressive politics, and improving the lives of individuals and communities – or what is often called ‘emancipation’ or praxis (McDonald 2009). Ontological commitments What exactly are the things called ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘mediation’, ‘reconciliation’ and the like, that we study, and how should we conceive, understand and speak of them? An openly critical approach would suggest that all of these objects of study are not free- standing, ontologically distinct phenomena discoverable by objective social scientific study. Instead, things like ‘peace’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘cultural violence’ or ‘reconciliation’ are social formations and sets of social activities that are in large part contingent upon, and constituted by, the terms, languages and discourses used to describe and study them. A concept like ‘peace’ is actually ‘an ontologically suspicious concept’ (Elshtain quoted in Neufeld 1993: 172), and whether a particular society is described as ‘peaceful’, ‘post- conflict’, ‘reconciled’, or ‘violent’ is not a value- free fact or ‘truth’ waiting to be discovered by a scholar through the scientific method, but the consequence of the operation of a series of academic, political and social discourses, judgements and practices in different locales. In other words, there is a discursive, political, cultural and academic process by which real world actors and processes are given meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels, categories and narratives, including a set of discursively constructed measures by which ‘peacefulness’ or ‘violence’ can be ranked, or groups judged to be ‘spoilers’, for example. Such measurements are inherently ideological in that they prioritise some values over others: direct violence over structural violence, order over social justice, dialogue over resistance. Moreover, such labels, concepts, categories and meanings are prone to change and contestation; they never just ‘speak for themselves’. In terms of exactly what a ‘conflict’ consists of, for example, something that started as a ‘rebellion’ might then become a ‘terrorist campaign’ (or ‘The troubles’), before being designated a ‘civil war’ (usually, by virtue of reaching an arbitrary fatality threshold), a ‘genocide’ or a ‘counter-insurgency campaign’. This is not to say that critical approaches do not recognise actual physical violence in the ‘real world’ which is experienced by people as ‘civil war’ or ‘terrorism’, or conditions of low direct violence which is understood as ‘peace’. Rather, it is to adopt a Frankfurt School- inspired ontology which maintains a ‘minimal foundationalism’ in which the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualised as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other (Toros and Gunning 2009). Such an ontological standpoint recognizes that there are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists might call laws), and that one can distinguish between different phenomena on the basis of their delineated characteristics, while at the same time recognising that these characteristics and how they are interpreted are a product of their social and historical context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ in the positivist sense. Consequently, for critical scholars, the acceptance of the relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts results in a real sensitivity to the politics of labelling and categorising, and extreme care in the use of different terms during research and teaching. However, critical approaches go even further, recognising that peace, conflict, violence, reconciliation and the like are in themselves constituted by social and political narratives, discourses and practices. As a consequence, critical scholars are interested in the constitutive nature of norms, ideas and other discursive elements which make the social practices of conflict, violence, dialogue, peace and reconciliation possible in specific historical and spatial contexts (Alkopher 2005: 716). In other words, critical approaches suggest that violent conflict cannot be fully understood apart from the particular kinds of narratives, discourses and social practices which make it possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable (see Jabri 1996). Crucial to this process is the role played by existing normative structures which function to construct identities, interests and modes of social action (Alkopher 2005: 720). Importantly, in addition to critical civil war research (see Jackson 2014) within the conflict analysis side of the field, a critical ontology which accepts the social construction and inherent instability of the key concepts is also starting to inform approaches to the study of peace (Richmond 2007, Shinko 2008) and conflict resolution (Hansen 2008), among others. Epistemological commitments A critical epistemology accepts that creating knowledge is ultimately a social process which depends on a range of contextual and process- related factors, not least the social position of the researcher, the institutional context within which they conduct their research, and the kinds of methods they employ. Such factors impact on the kinds of knowledge produced, as well as the purposes to which it is ultimately put. Importantly, this does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that scholarly standards and procedures in research should be rejected, or that ‘anchorages’ – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth 2008). Rather, it suggests that CPR should be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its own epistemology, methodology and assumptions. It also means that there are few if any knowledge claims about conflict, violence, peace, reconciliation and the like that cannot be challenged or questioned. Related to this, a critical perspective also recognises that no individual, including academic researchers, can completely put aside their personal identity, values, perceptions, and world view and then engage in purely objective, dispassionate, value- free research. Rather, every researcher brings with them a particular culture and set of values and understandings which shapes their research in important ways. At the very least, critical scholars argue that recognising and acknowledging the personal subjectivity of the researcher is an important step (see Breen Smyth 2009), not least because such continuous reflexivity acts as an antidote to the dangerous claim that some kinds of knowledge are objective and wholly unbiased, and therefore superior to others. Crucially, such an epistemological stance does not entail a wholesale rejection of the social scientific notion of objectivity, but instead accepts that there are multiple ways of knowing about objects of social analysis, such as conflicts or peace processes, that it is in any case beyond the capacity of any single narrative to provide the best account of such processes, and that through a pluralisation of perspectives and their inevitable clashes a more justifiable knowledge can be assembled (see Campbell 1998: 279–281). A critical approach therefore suggests that ‘continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry’ (ibid.: 281). A third important epistemological stance is a deep awareness of the linkages between power and knowledge, particularly in terms of the different ways in which knowledge can be employed by actors as a political tool of influence and domination. For example, critical scholars are sceptical of the way in which certain kinds of knowledge claims about peace and conflict – for example, that movements who resist and contest neoliberalism or reject dialogue are by definition ‘spoilers’, or that dialogue is an inherent social good, or that neo- liberal peacebuilding leads inevitably to ‘peace’ – have been used by governments and international organisations to de- legitimise certain kinds of struggles and support certain kinds of externally imposed ‘solutions’ (see Duffield 2001). Consequently, critical scholars begin by asking: Who is peace and conflict research for? How does peace research support particular interests? What are the ideological effects of peace research, particularly on those societies being studied? Another important epistemological issue for CPR is the notion of categories and how they are applied, particularly in research on political violence, peace, reconciliation and the like (Jackson et al. 2011: 158–164). While categories can be very useful for understanding complex realities and uncovering salient aspects of a particular phenomenon, they are at the same time profoundly problematic. In particular, critical scholars are concerned that when typologies are presented as universally applicable, without recognition of the specific power- knowledge structures in which they emerged and which sustain them, they can function as a tool of ideology, in part through their assumptions of ‘sameness’ and ‘otherness’, and their reliance on presumed essences and binary differences. As Foucault (1970) argues in The Order of Things, at their root, orders or categories are never natural or objective, but part of a political- historical structure. In contrast, critical scholars do not view their categories as timeless or universal, but as products of a particular set of power structures and their regimes. As such, they should be continuously interrogated, their boundaries, dichotomies and causal implications problematised, and their political and ideological effects exposed. This has certainly been the case by CTS scholars in the terrorism field (see Jackson et al. 2011). Methodological commitments The ontological and epistemological commitments outlined thus far have a number of important specific consequences for method and research practice. First, critical scholars are committed to transparency about their own values and standpoints, particularly as they relate to the interests and values of the societies in which they live and work. For Western- based scholars, this translates into an abiding commitment to being aware of, and trying to overcome, the Eurocentric, Orientalist, and patriarchal forms of knowledge often prevalent within Peace Studies, Security Studies, IR, and other areas of social science more generally (see Henderson 2013; Toros and Gunning 2009). Related to this, critical scholars are committed to taking subjectivity seriously, in terms of both the researcher and the research subject (Dauphinee 2007). This means being aware of, and transparent about, the values and impact of the researcher on the process and outcomes of the research, and being willing to seriously engage with the viewpoint and perceptions of the Other, particularly those who have been demonised or silenced in broader peace and security discourses. As Jutila, Pehkonen and Vayrynen (2008: 628) put it, the peace researcher ‘should enter into the life- worlds of the groups she or he studies before venturing to write about them’. Another commitment of a critical approach is to methodological and disciplinary pluralism – a willingness to embrace the insights and perspectives of different academic disciplines, intellectual approaches, and schools of thought. In particular, critical scholars see value in post- positivist and non- IR-based methods and approaches, such as discourse analysis, post-structuralism, constructivism, Critical Theory, historical materialism, history, ethnography and others. In one respect, this means refusing to be limited by the narrow logic of normal social scientific explanation based on linear notions of cause and effect. Instead, a critical perspective argues that adopting an interpretive ‘logic of understanding’ rooted in ‘how possible’ rather than ‘what causes’ questions, can open space for subjects, perspectives and affective forms of understanding that are often foreclosed by traditional social science (see Doty 1993). A final important methodological commitment is a permanent adherence to a set of responsible research ethics which take account of the various end- users of peace and conflict research, including informants, the communities from which insurgents or rebels come, vulnerable populations like refugees or child soldiers, and the populations who bear the brunt of counter- insurgency campaigns or peacebuilding programmes – as well as the wider public, other academics, and policymakers. More concretely, this means ‘recognising the human behind the label’ (Booth 2008: 73), identifying marginalised and silenced voices, the adoption of a ‘do no harm’ approach, operating transparently as a researcher, recognising the different kinds of vulnerability of those being researched, honouring undertakings of confidentiality and protecting interviewees, utilising principles of informed consent, and taking responsibility for the anticipated impact of research and the ways in which it may be utilised (Breen Smyth 2009). A critical praxis of peace research Simultaneous with the ontological, epistemological and methodological commitments described above, CPR is rooted in a broad but clear set of ethical- normative and praxiological commitments. These commitments are based first and foremost on the recognition that ‘no reality transforms itself ’ (Freire 1993: 53); rather, human agents must engage in critical interventions – critical praxis – in order to transform oppression. Related to this, it is based on the acceptance of the inherently degenerate and harmful nature of all forms of structural, cultural and direct violence. Consequently, critical research implicitly and explicitly questions both the ways in which dominant Western narratives have constructed their own practices of war and humanitarian intervention as legitimate violence, and the power structures, practices and narratives in the Western- dominated status quo which make direct and structural violence possible – including narratives of ‘new barbarism’, ethnic essentialism, worthy and unworthy victims, ‘good wars’, democratic peace, peacebuilding and the instrumental rationality of legitimate political violence (see Jabri 1996). More specifically, a critical approach involves a shift from state- centrism and making state security and system stability the central concern, to a focus on the security, freedom, and well- being of human individuals and communities. Critical scholars tend to prioritise human security and societal security over national security, and they are committed to minimizing all forms of physical, structural, and cultural violence (Toros and Gunning 2009), including that which results from states and international organisations, and from practices such as humanitarian intervention, diplomacy, peacebuilding, and the like. Importantly, this means abandoning the established conflict resolution norm of neutrality in conflict resolution practice, because ‘a neutral stance, without an analysis of power between the parties in conflict, can obfuscate the power differential that exists between parties in conflict and actually undermine the efforts of oppressed people by tacitly or explicitly supporting the prevailing ideology and social order oppressing them’ (Hansen 2008: 412). Third- party neutrality, in this context, functions to reinforce the status quo and unwittingly oppress the very people they are serving. Related to this, CPR takes seriously the scholarly and practical exploration of non- violent resistance and agonistic dialogue as practical alternatives to both legitimate and illegitimate forms of political violence. Importantly, this entails the adoption of an explicitly critical approach to conflict resolution practice, whether it is third- party peacemaking or peacekeeping (Pugh 2004, 2005) during the open conflict stage, or stabilisation and peacebuilding (Mac Ginty 2012a) during the post- conflict stage. In either case, CPR entails a commitment to non-violent alternatives to the use of military force, local ownership and empowerment, resistance to oppression, the priority of social justice, the transformation of structures of structural and cultural violence (which may therefore entail the rejection of neo- liberal economic and political forms), and agonistic forms of politics. Critical scholars are committed to engaging equally with both policy-makers – the officials who have to make policies to deal with conflict and violence – and policy- takers – the groups and wider societies who have to bear the brunt of humanitarian intervention, neo- liberal peacebuilding policies or other peace efforts. Engaging with policy- takers lessens the risk of co- option by the status quo, particularly if those thus engaged include members of communities labelled as ‘protestors’, ‘activists’, ‘rebels’, ‘insurgents’ or even ‘terrorists’. However, to be effective in realising the potential for positive change within the status quo, critical scholars must simultaneously strive to engage with those who are embedded in the state, international officials, and so on. Collectively, this set of commitments – to human security over state security, to ending avoidable suffering, to minimising and questioning all forms of violence, to continuous immanent critique, including conflict resolution practice, and to positively transforming existing structures, including neo- liberal capitalism – can be described as a broad commitment to the notion of emancipation (see Jackson et al. 2009: 226–227), or what Freire (1993: 66) more simply calls ‘the ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human.’ Despite objections to the term and its past implication in violent hegemonic projects, critical scholars for the most part see emancipation as a process of trying to construct ‘concrete utopias’ by realising the unfulfilled potential of existing structures, freeing individuals from unnecessary structural constraints, and the democratisation of the public sphere (Wyn Jones 2004: 229–232). Importantly, emancipation should be seen as a continuous process of struggle and critique rather than any particular endpoint or universal grand narrative. Critical pedagogy Lastly, given the importance and centrality of teaching to Peace Studies, I would argue that CPR is openly committed to critical pedagogy (Freire 1993; see also Hansen 2008). Such a commitment is rooted in an understanding that teaching can never be neutral; instead, ‘education either functions as an instrument that is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes . . . the means by which men and women . . . discover how to participate in the transformation of their world’ (Shaull 1993: 34; original emphasis). In other words, instead of problem- solving education, CPR ought to be oriented towards a kind of ‘problem- posing education’ in which ‘students learn to deconstruct the societal ideology affecting them in their everyday lives, see how it inhibits attainment of their interests, and visualize possible societal changes that could better serve their interests’ (Hansen 2008: 408). This necessarily entails providing students with a language and set of conceptual tools for understanding the ‘problematics of power, agency, and history’ (Macedo 1993: 17), and for developing appropriate modes of resistance and emancipatory action. Such forms of critical pedagogy are inherently praxiological because ‘when individuals reach critical consciousness, it allows them to become subjects in their world, actively and consciously co- creating it, rather than passive “objects” who accept their social reality’ (ibid.). From one vantage point, it also means accepting that ‘education is . . . a subversive force’ (Shaull 1993: 29), and the goal of teaching is in part to radicalise the student because ‘the more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can better transform it’ (Freire 1993: 39). Clearly, at the present juncture, such a critical pedagogy is far removed from the current teaching of Peace Studies, which is largely focused on abstract theorising, (positivist) methodological training, the accumulated empirical findings of the field, inter- personal conflict resolution skills transfers, and the like.

### Alt- Structural criticism

#### Beginning with a widened structural criticism of militarism is a pre-requisite to effective critical ethico-political interventions – voting aff crowds out critical readings of militarism

Eastwood, 18 – James, Professor in the School of Politics and IR at the University of London. “Rethinking militarism as ideology: The critique of violence after security,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 49 (1-2) – Special issue on Militarism and security: Dialogue, possibilities and limits. 44– 56, doi: 10.1177/0967010617730949, p. 52-54 – KLab

The range of critical security studies literatures calling for desecuritization therefore do not yet offer a full account of militarism as I have elaborated it above, in which organized political violence is made desirable through ideology and thereby loses strategic impetus and restraint. This is important because it has also shaped the response of those seeking to reclaim security against these critiques. Revealingly, these responses tend either to reject the call for desecuritization as too pacifist or to develop safeguards against the specific effects that these critics identify with ‘militarization’, rather than engaging with the underlying ideological nature of militarism. While this has certainly left their analysis wanting, and reveals an equally unsatisfactory conceptualization of militarism, it also shows the limitations and vulnerability of critical security studies arguments calling for desecuritization. For example, Booth argues that security should only ever be the ‘means’ for the ‘end’ of emancipation (Booth, 2007: 114–115) and that means and ends should be related ‘non-dualistically’ (i.e. the means should be consistent with the ends sought; see Booth, 2007: 428–441). He explicitly includes political violence as a means that must be subject to this rule (Booth, 2007: 429–431), and he even embraces aspects of Gandhian nonviolence (Booth, 2007: 115). Discussing the critique offered by securitization theory, he responds, ‘we would all presumably agree that the unnecessary securitisation (militarisation) of issues is to be deplored, but there are occasions when introducing a military dimension is sensible’ (Booth, 2007: 168). Booth’s ethical criteria for the use of force therefore give him the confidence to respond that not all militarization is a bad thing, and that it can be used for progressive ends. What is notable here is that Booth also invokes a thin notion of ‘militarization’, more or less reducible to the decision to use force, to establish his claim. He is quite comfortable with the risks of militarization identified by securitization theory because he believes he has circumvented them. By contrast, the critique of militarism as ideology gives us more powerful tools to disagree with Booth here. For Booth ignores the danger that, in conditions of militarism, war can begin to serve a wide array of non-strategic instrumentalities as a result of its ideological penetration of social relations. Militarism can entrench a pattern of conflict by binding social relations, subjectivities and identities to the pursuit of war, thereby making war far less amenable to ethico-political discipline than he imagines. By setting up emancipation as an imperative that must be ‘secured’, including militarily, Booth opens a dangerous pathway to the entrenchment of violence. Responding to critiques of securitization in their cosmopolitan approach, Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald are more sensitive to these dangers, admitting that the use of force can entrench conflict and thus impair the longer term pursuit of global security (Burke et al., 2014: 19–21). In response, they argue that the ultimate aim of security practice should always be nonviolence, ‘a gradual but determined demilitarisation of global politics’ in which force is permissible under strict conditions but always regrettable – ‘a pacifism of ends rather than means’ (Burke et al., 2016: 74). They place their confidence in a set of detailed principles restricting the use of force in different circumstances, which they hope will help to avoid these risks (Burke et al., 2014: 71–97, 119–145). Again, however, the ambition for nonviolence rests on the thin basis of an aspiration for ‘demilitarization’, something that they in fact derive from the critique of securitization, rather than an understanding of militarism as ideology. As I have explained above, what characterizes militarism is not violence with a lack of a true justification but an ideological desire for war and military activity. Militarism is therefore fully compatible with a credible justification for violence, and may even draw strength from it. Burke, Lee-Koo and McDonald’s criteria for the use of force may well be stricter than available alternatives, therefore, but this is still no guarantee against militarism. Even if they succeeded in preventing some wars, they would still not ensure that the remaining, apparently justified wars did not indulge in and encourage militarism. Cosmopolitan theories therefore do not disrupt the ideological factors making war desirable; rather, they risk supplementing them with additional justifications. A more effective critical intervention against cosmopolitan security is therefore to highlight the dangers of militarism as ideology, rather than simply to call for demilitarization. Conclusion What the above arguments stress is the importance of embracing a critical concept of militarism, one premised on the explicit ambition to disrupt its ideological effects. With this in mind, it is worth considering why most critical security studies scholars prefer to adopt the term ‘militarization’ rather than ‘militarism’. ‘Militarization’ in this usage seems to imply the process of making something a military concern. In this way, it is similar to Shaw’s account, in which militarization implies an increase in the penetration of social relations in general by military relations – or, in other words, the process by which more and more things are made military concerns. For Shaw, the concept of militarism functions as a measure of this penetration. But this is not the same as a critical concept of militarism, in which the specific kind of penetration being analysed is an ideological penetration and in which the intention is to disrupt this penetration through critique. Like Shaw, critical security studies has also understood militarism as a measure (of ‘militarization’) rather than as a critical concept, with the result that its analytic and political potential has been blunted when engaging in the critique of violence. However, this may also be a reflection of an underlying tendency in critical security studies itself. For we could argue that neither security nor securitization are critical concepts in the sense intended by ideology critique. Instead, they are more like measures, in that they measure either how secure something is or how securitized an issue has become. One consequence of this, which is particularly problematic for scholars seeking desecuritization, is that these concepts therefore also actively participate in the process they seek to critique: they name things as ‘security’ issues, even when the argument is that these issues should not be security issues at all. This proliferation of security concerns, encouraged as much by scholarship as by practitioners, results in the ‘crowding out’ of other frameworks that may more accurately reflect the underlying dynamics – concepts such as war (Barkawi, 2011) or neoliberalism (Montesinos Coleman and Rosenow, 2016) – and that may be more appropriate for critical ethico-political interventions into phenomena that critical security studies interprets as security or securitization. My final suggestion is that militarism is yet another concept that risks being obscured in critical security studies analysis by this tendency to measure rather than critique. By contrast, I have shown above how a more critical concept of militarism as ideology can offer a superior starting point for an analysis of the shortcomings of various justifications for the use of force, including those encountered in critical security studies. Militarism can help us to think more precisely about the circumstances in which the use of violence to achieve political objectives (such as ‘security’) can descend into a more generalized and intractable desire for war and military activity. My hope is that from such an understanding we might also better equip ourselves to intervene in this process and resist it.

### Alt 🡪 Structural Focus

#### Our alt’s theory of language allows an understanding of the relationship between discourse and socioeconomic structures.

Joscha Wullwebera in 2015

a Political Science Department, University of Kassell, Kassel,¶ Germany, Global politics and empty signifiers:¶ the political construction of high¶ technology, Critical Policy Studies, 9:1, 78-96, DOI:¶ 10.1080/19460171.2014.918899

Some words, phrases or slogans have their own set of dynamics and special importance¶ within international politics. They convey a global problem or threat such, as the¶ Cold War, the war on terror, or global warming and climate change. They label political¶ developments such as perestroika, the alterglobalization movement or the Arab Spring.¶ They articulate desired political and social developments and visions such as sustainable¶ development, social security, global justice and world peace. Some phrases accompany¶ and propel social change, including examples such as Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity¶ during the French Revolution, Bread, Peace and Land in the Russian Revolution, or We¶ are the 99 percent, the slogan of the Occupy movement (Laclau 2005, p. 97). Other terms¶ designate political programs, such as social market economy, neo-liberalism, green¶ economy, socialism and, of course, democracy.¶ Drawing on theorists such as Foucault, Derrida or Butler, many scholars in the field of¶ international relations (IR) theory have pointed out the importance of discourse for reality¶ construction (George 1994, Edkins 1999, de Goede 2006). Such approaches emphasize the¶ production of reality byway of articulatory practices while underlining the connection between¶ language, knowledge and power. Studies based on a Foucauldian genealogy (Foucault 1976,¶ 1979, 1985) or Derrida’s method of deconstruction (Derrida 1976, 1978, Cornell and¶ Rosenfeld 1992), for example, point to power relations that shape social reality. In this respect,¶ post-structural studies in IR are concerned with the construction of political identities.¶ Given the centrality of specific terms in global politics, it is surprising that the theory¶ of empty signifier proposed by Ernesto Laclau (1996a, 2005) has not been taken up¶ widely and systematically within IR theory. In fact, only very few studies at all draw on¶ the discourse theory of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (Laclau and Mouffe 1985, see¶ Daly 2004, Howarth and Torfing 2005, Wæver 2005, Hansen 2006). And of those that do,¶ even fewer make reference to the concept of the empty signifier (Neumann 1999,¶ Methmann 2010, Herschinger 2012). Although a number of such contributions have¶ successfully addressed a variety of political issues, none have systematically explored¶ the concept of the empty signifier or its analytical possibilities for global policy studies. I¶ argue that engaging with this concept provides fruitful insights for IR and critical policy¶ studies by opening up new dimensions for analysis. First, it accounts for the political¶ dimension of the centrality of certain terms; second, it highlights the very process of¶ constructing these terms and third, it foregrounds the political struggles which seek to¶ launch certain terms and define their content. More precisely, an empty signifier can give¶ meaning and hence identity to a policy field, a political process or a socioeconomic¶ program while at the same time being shaped by ongoing politics. The concept makes it¶ possible to explain, on the one hand, how some words or phrases take on political¶ importance, and, on the other hand, how ongoing political struggles seek to establish¶ the definition of certain terms, giving them a specific relevance for social processes.¶ Political identity construction is conceptualized with political strategies and dynamics,¶ which make the concept of the empty signifier interesting for gaining a better understanding¶ of different issues associated with global politics. The concept emphasizes the¶ importance of considering references to general public interest in global politics and the¶ way in which such interest is constructed. It strengthens the possibility of examining¶ political strategies in the process of developing policy programs.1 It also provides a foil¶ for scrutinizing the interplay between universal and particular interests.

### Alt k 2 Policymaking

#### Our alternative is a prior question to any policy making- we must examine hegemonic struggles over empty signifiers to understand the relationship between social groups and power

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The conceptualization of the general interest as an empty space opens up an analytical¶ perspective that sheds light on the different political struggles to occupy that space. In this¶ respect, the concept of the empty signifier and its use for political analysis is not just about¶ the power of certain political terms. More fundamentally, it is about the construction of¶ political identities. The concept of the empty signifier, then, enables a refined operationalization¶ and, hence, analysis of the way certain political identities are constructed. Its¶ very starting point is the assumption that naming is a hegemonic operation and identity¶ construction, a political process. Based on this assumption, and as shown in the foregoing¶ analysis, the political processes that (seek to) launch or convey certain empty signifiers¶ and the political ‘selection processes’ are of interest for policy analysis. Once a universal¶ political term becomes hegemonic, struggles arise around this empty signifier: Who will¶ be able to fill the empty signifier with what kind of meanings; by which means it is¶ possible to broaden the chain of equivalence that points to this empty signifier? ‘To¶ hegemonize something is exactly to carry out this filling function’ (Laclau 1996a, p. 44).¶ Based on the assumption that it is only the exclusion that enables a stable identity, it¶ becomes analytically interesting to scrutinize the politics of exclusion. This raises the¶ question: Which meanings are excluded from that chain of equivalence?¶ As stated above, a privileged and positive relation of the empty signifier vis-à-vis the¶ (hegemonic) common good must be present. This implies that the empty signifier has to¶ have a positive connotation within the discourse formation in question (Torfing 1999, p.¶ 152). As has been shown, this is by no means self-evident, as an empty signifier can also¶ become the expression of deficiency and evil. In fact, the same empty signifier can¶ represent the common good for one discourse community and simultaneously constitute¶ the incarnation of evil for another (as in the case, e.g., of socialism and capitalism). It is a¶ task for the protagonists of a certain empty signifier to strengthen the relation to the¶ hegemonic common good within the discourse of interest. At the same time, alternatives¶ to the hegemonic project have to be presented as inconceivable and impracticable. Hence,¶ for an empty signifier to become established, it has to have strong repercussions within¶ the respective global discourse formation. Accordingly, it is imperative for empirical¶ purposes to analyze and assess the global political context.¶ Obviously, this is not just a struggle over words. On the contrary, these political terms¶ convey meaning, they structure the political arena and national policies; they privilege¶ some meanings, interests and practices over others, thereby excluding other political¶ alternatives. It is the claim of this contribution that empty signifiers matter for global¶ politics. Even more, empty signifiers are the very basis of and for (global) politics. They¶ give orientation, structure the horizon of truth and guide political practices.¶ Meaning, identity and social practices are in a permanent state of flux: ‘As society¶ changes over time this process of identification will be always precarious and reversible’¶ (Laclau 1996a, p. 46). While we can reflect on a ‘snap-shot’ of ongoing global politics¶ and analyze such a ‘frozen picture’ of political relations and practices, these practices¶ continuously change over time. In this way, objectivity becomes social objectivity whose¶ truth is in a state of permanent negotiation. More generally stated, the very existence of a¶ gap between particular meaning and universal meaning, and between particular interests¶ and universal interests makes it not only possible but also necessary for political struggles¶ to fill that gap. This is an essential condition for vibrant democracy.

### Alt- Judge Solves

#### The judge has agency to prevent depoliticization- it’s an iterative process between speaker and audience- voting neg prevents the depoliticizing frame from succeeding

Matt Wood and Matthew Flinders in 2014

University of Sheffield, UK; Rethinking depoliticisation: beyond the governmental; Policy & Politics • vol 42 • no 2 • 151-70;

But – to continue a by now familiar pattern – if a focus on technical, managerial and scientific discourses provides a relevant but not particularly original set of insights, then a focus on security, risk and resilience arguably provides a more imaginative and contemporary perspective. Put simply, securitisation theory has in recent years identified a distinct pattern of depoliticisation that tends to involve the identification of an existential threat that requires emergency executive powers, and, if the audience accepts the securitising move, the issue is depoliticised and is considered a ‘security’ issue outside the rules of normal politics (Balzacq, 2005; Salter, 2008; 2011; Salter and Piche, 2011). As such, security studies often regard the politicisation of an issue as representing a form of ‘desecuritisation’ (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larking, 2010; Salter and Piche, 2011). This discursive process may be called ‘securitisation’ in the sense that it makes issues ‘more firmly constrained… decisions about them are taken in technical terms’ (Edkins, 1999, 11). Such an interpretation goes against the influential view of Buzan et al (1998, 120) that securitisation represents a form of hyper-politicisation, due to the manner in which it creates heightened public attention around a social issue (compare Salter, 2011, 120; Buofino, 2004). The theory of moral panics and the concept of a ‘folk devil’, however, provide a way of reconciling these positions. In essence, the creation of an intense political controversy (that is, hyper-politicisation) is little more than a tool through which to then impose a definitive position that closes down political debate (thereby depoliticising the issue). It is in exactly this vein that scholars have examined the ‘war on terror’ (De Goede, 2008a; 2008b; Balzacq, 2008; Salter, 2011), illegal immigration (Huysmans, 2000; 2006), financial security (De Goede, 2004), fear of crime (Parnaby, 2006), as well as climate change and resource depletion (Carvalho and Burgess, 2005; Trombetta, 2008; Corry, 2012). Possibly the most novel insights delivered by this perspective are the manner in which discursive depoliticisation must engage with different types of audience that each require a specific language type (generally identified as popular, elite, technocratic and scientific), and how the process of securitisation through which an issue is depoliticised is rarely passive or static, but is generally an iterative process between speaker and audience. This, in turn, brings us back to wider issues concerning depoliticisation, governance and the state which in themselves encourage us to engage with Mary Douglas’ (1999) work on the depoliticisation of risk, Ulrich Beck’s (2001) analysis of ‘new’ risks, Frank Furedi’s (2005) writing on the ‘politics of fear’, or even some comment on the link between politicisation and depoliticisation in the context of Bauman’s (2001) ‘liquid modernity’. But for now these temptations must be denied in favour of a more focused account of why this paper’s attempt to ‘rethink depoliticisation’ actually matters.

### FW- Epistemology First

#### Epistemology is prerequisite to any of their scenarios- all of their impacts rely on specific beliefs about violence that naturalize military power

Tyner and Henkin in 2015

James A Tyner and Samuel Henkin, Kent State University, Kent, OH, USA; ¶ War and Terrorism, Geography of; International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Second Edition), 2015

Geography as an academic discipline has a long history of¶ peace-related research. Two early efforts include The Geography¶ of War and Peace (Pepper and Jenkins, 1985) and The Quest for¶ Peace: Transcending Collective Violence and War Among Societies,¶ Cultures and States (Vayrynen et al., 1987). In part, the¶ promotion of more peaceful geographers was in response to¶ the specter of nuclear annihilation. More recently,¶ geographers have critiqued not only the naturalness and¶ necessity of war (Kobayashi, 2009; Loyd, 2009a,b, 2011,¶ 2012; Gregory, 2010; Koopman, 2010, 2011; Ross, 2011;¶ Williams and McConnell, 2011), but have also promoted¶ a more normative vision of geography as an academic¶ discipline (Megoran, 2008, 2010, 2011; Inwood and Tyner,¶ 2011).¶ Such efforts have not been easy. As Williams and¶ McConnell (2011: 927) highlight, “our understanding of¶ what peace looks like, and how to research it, remains underdeveloped and analysis of its complexities and contradictions¶ problematically lacking.” Indeed, considerable discussion has¶ centered around the politics and contestation over the¶ ‘meaning’ and ‘definition’ of peace; this work has been¶ spurred, partially, out of a recognition of the false¶ dichotomy between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ as well as ‘violence’¶ and ‘nonviolence.’ Drawing inspiration from Galtung’s¶ (1969) influential separation of ‘direct’ and ‘structural’¶ violence, many geographers have destabilized the¶ epistemological foundations of a range of artificial, socially¶ constructed binaries, including but not limited to war,¶ peace, violence, nonviolence, conflict, and postconflict¶ (Kirsch and Flint, 2011; Ross, 2011; Loyd, 2012). Flint¶ (2011: 31) accordingly calls for an approach that views the¶ spaces of ‘peace’ and ‘war’ as intertwined; he suggests that¶ social relations are basis of construction of both and¶ concludes that instead of discrete categories, it is more¶ productive to think of a continuum of social settings in¶ which power relations and political differences always exist,¶ but in varying degrees of consensus and nonviolence¶ compared to disagreement and violence. Much of this work¶ has, subsequently, drawn attention to the ways in which¶ such false dichotomies fetishize the unremitting processes of¶ the ‘production of violence’ under the current mode of¶ global militarization (Farish and Vitale, 2011).¶ For Williams and McConnell (2011: 929; see also Loyd,¶ 2012), it is necessary to understand peace as a social and¶ spatial process, such as “shifts attention towards issues of power¶ and politics and opens up questions on contingency, agency and¶ embodiment .. Subsequently, the spectrum of violence and¶ non-violence is exposed for investigation and peace revealed to¶ be a highly differentiated landscape.” By extension, Springer¶ (2011, 2012) has challenged geographers to consider¶ ‘violence’ also as a process. For Springer (2012: 138) “to treat¶ the material expression of violence only through its directly¶ observable manifestation is a reductionist appraisal” and¶ “ignores the complexity of the infinite entanglements of social¶ relations.” It is more appropriate, therefore, to conceive of¶ violence not as ‘thing’ or ‘event’ or even ‘act’ but rather as¶ a process; violence as moment implies momentum. In other¶ words, the imposition of political-economic structures¶ designed to ‘make life’ are carried forward with a momentum¶ far beyond the initial act. Violence conceived as such therefore¶ redirects attention toward those actions and relations that are¶ hidden from empirical observation.¶ Those scholars working in the areas of peace have enlarged¶ the discussion to address other forms of conflict (and terrorism)¶ that have traditionally been neglected in the geographic study of¶ war and terror. Both feminist and critical geographers, in¶ particular, have highlighted the violence directed toward¶ (especially) women’s bodies – as manifest, for example, in the¶ geographies of intimate partner violence and rape (Katz, 2007;¶ Fluri, 2009; Tyner, 2012). This research has, by extension,¶ documented how the violence of sexism, racism, classism,¶ genderism, ableism, ageism, homophobia, and xenophobia –¶ to name but a few – continue to be legitimized through the¶ production of militarized and normalized geographical¶ imaginations. As Loyd (2009a: 865–866) concludes, “to¶ understand who is made most vulnerable where and how¶ socially produced harms are naturalized discursively and¶ materially, it is necessary to theorize specific economic,¶ political, and social relations of oppression and domination¶ and how they articulate (or intersect) in particular historical,¶ geographic moments.”

#### Justifications for the plan are a key site of analysis- leads to an improved understanding of arms control

NEIL COOPER in 2011

Humanitarian Arms Control and Processes of¶ Securitization: Moving Weapons along the¶ Security Continuum¶ Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.32, No.1 (April 2011), pp.134–158¶ ISSN 1352-3260 print/1743-8764 online

One of the features of the post-Cold War arms control agenda has been the emergence¶ of a set of control initiatives that are increasingly being categorized under the rubric¶ of humanitarian arms control (HAC)1 or humanitarian disarmament.2 This includes¶ the 1997 Ottawa convention on landmines, the 2008 Convention on Cluster¶ Munitions, various initiatives to restrict the trade in small arms and light weapons,¶ and current attempts to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) by 2012. This¶ article focusses, in particular, on the issue of landmines and cluster munitions but¶ also discusses the issue of small arms and the putative ATT. The article has a¶ number of aims. First, to interrogate the claims of proponents that such initiatives represent¶ a novel and benevolent post-Cold War turn in conventional arms trade control,¶ one that illustrates the ability of global civil society to exercise bottom-up power by¶ successfully interjecting human security concerns into a policy field previously¶ dominated by the national security concerns of states. Second, to undertake a critical¶ historical political economy of both pariah weapons regulation in particular and¶ conventional arms transfer regulation in general with a view to highlighting the¶ elements of continuity and change represented by contemporary humanitarian arms¶ control initiatives in comparison with previous eras. Third, to frame this more critical¶ reading of past and current regulation in relation to current debates about the¶ relationship between moments of securitization, the everyday practices of (in)security¶ exercised by the professionals and networks of security, the ability of the powerless¶ to speak security, and the consequences arising from processes of securitization¶ and desecuritization.¶ The first section of the article will outline the Copenhagen School’s (CS) concept¶ of securitization as well as highlighting particular critiques of the concept relevant to¶ the subsequent analysis of humanitarian arms control. The following section will then¶ summarize the key elements in conventional accounts of the post-Cold War HAC¶ agenda and particularly the campaigns on landmines and cluster munitions. The¶ next section will locate such campaigns in the much longer history of attempts at¶ pariah weapons regulation that has included attempts to ban various weapons technologies¶ such as the crossbow, the gun, the dum dum bullet, and the submarine. It will be¶ suggested that four factors are crucial in determining the nature of pariah regulation¶ and its relationship to the broader regulatory frameworks governing the conventional¶ defence trade. These are the relationship between regulation and the political and¶ material interests of powerful actors, the relationship between pariah weapons and¶ legitimized military technology, the relationship between economic philosophy and¶ the approach to arms regulation, and the relationship between regulation and the¶ dominant framing of threats. The article will outline how these different factors¶ have influenced conventional weapons regulation in different eras in order to¶ locate contemporary HAC initiatives within this much broader historical political¶ economy of regulation. This provides the basis for a more critical, and historically¶ informed, reading of the HAC agenda, particularly the claim that it represents a¶ novel and benign post-Cold War expression of bottom-up power that has successfully¶ challenged traditional arms control practices that privilege the military security of¶ states over human security considerations. The final section will discuss the relevance¶ of the preceding analysis for both the current debates on the concept of securitization¶ and the campaigning practices of arms trade Non-Governmental Organizations¶ (NGOs).

Ext Cooper-

The justifications behind the plan must be evaluated before determining whether or not they engage in ethical policy making. The guise of humanitarian disarmament covers the relationship between political and material interests of powerful actors – means they must prove the epistemology of the aff is ethical before getting to evaluate their impacts

#### **The lenses with which we view war and peace influence the policy options we consider**

Cady 10 (Duane L., prof of phil @ hamline university, From Warism to Pacifism: A Moral Continuum, pp. 115-117)

The very notion of restraint in war— common to all positions along the full continuum in varying degrees— puts the burden of proof on going to war and on how the fighting is done. These are the activities in need of justification. The moral presumption should be to peace, positive peace, rather than the pervasive presumption of warism and negative peace. Recognizing the grip that warism has on dominant culture may be the most formidable task of genuine peacemaking for the fore- seeable future because it is warism that blocks evolution toward more pacifistic societies. Only occasionally will individuals back into the most absolute form of pacifism; the cultural predisposition to warism confines most of us to a narrow range of options toward the war- realist end of the scale. This brings us full circle and we end this consideration of a moral continuum on the morality of war and peace where we began, confronting warism. The normative lenses of warism, the spectacles through which we in modern culture tend to see and interpret all that happens, turn out to be as much like blinders as lenses because they restrict our vision to a narrow range of options. Nietzsche said that if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything begins to look like a nail. Under such conditions it is pretty hard to resist hammering. Analogously, if the only vision we have is warist and the only tools we build are weapons, then every conflict invites military intervention and it is hard to resist war- ring. Unless we envision a wider value perspective than the warist, we will not see the nonviolent options before us. But to see more widely we need to acknowledge and remove the blinders. Peace education is a small, struggling, but growing segment of contemporary education. The dominant presumption of warism has made it difficult for those committed to peace education to develop and establish it as a legitimate discipline devoid of the image of mere anti- militarist propaganda. Some scholars call themselves peace educators while many within the traditional disciplines are reluctant to be so labeled; they may be sympathetic with genuine peace research and teaching but afraid of the stigma that goes with the label. Those scholars interested in applying their professional training and skills to peace issues face a monumental task. Education at all levels must address warism, just as they have had to address racism, sexism, ageism, classism, homophobia, and other forms of domination.4 There is increasing academic interest in what scholars call “institutional violence”— social structures like racism, sexism, and poverty that involve constraints that injure and violate; systems that have entrapping, coercive effects. Institutional forms of violence tend to be more covert than overt; nonetheless pacifists— peacemakers—of various sorts tend to work toward the recognition and abolition of these forms of oppression as the natural manifestation of their commitment to positive peace. Such work involves recovery of lost or neglected history, consideration of a full range of options beyond traditional social constraints holding the forms of domination in place, and serious, systematic, and legitimized study of conditions constituting positive peace. Preparing for war in an effort to prevent war and preserve the status quo must be distinguished from preparing for genuine positive peace in an effort to en- courage cooperation and preclude a resort to war. Unless such issues are entertained routinely across all educational levels— including the recognition of how the various forms of domination are entangled in and reinforced by warism— the presumption of warism will continue to drive us toward war realism and prevent progress toward an evolving positive peace.5 Easing the grip of warism may be unlikely, but then racial integration in public schools, abolition of slavery, women voting and holding public office, the end of apartheid in South Africa and the Iron Curtain in Europe, the election of an African American as U.S. president, all were exceedingly unlikely not long before they became realities. People imagine, work for, and sacrifice for important goals even if they never are achieved. To the wonder of us all, unlikely goals are sometimes reached. Martin Luther King, Jr., believed that “the arc of history bends toward justice.” He knew th

at racial segregation would end . . . some- day . . . so he called on Americans to “plan for the inevitable.”6 Similarly, pacifists envision a broad cultural evolution from warism toward (and eventually, to) pacifism, so pacifists ask us to prepare for the inevitable by recognizing and backing away from warism and by working to create and sustain the conditions of genuine positive peace. While education is crucial, peace educators cannot bear the burden of the wider cultural failure to see beyond warism. Scholars and teachers in traditional disciplines must address the relevant warist/pacifist issues of their fields just as feminist scholarship has been undertaken by academics in all fields, and just as racist claims have been tested and dispelled by research in all disciplines. Anti-warism work and positive peace making cannot be ghettoized in token departments and journals and dismissed for pushing an agenda; they must be undertaken across every curriculum, not marginalized but central, if we are to assist in preparing for the inevitable. It is remarkable how low peace research is among government and foundation priorities. The moral continuum here may prove useful in eroding warist obstacles to taking peace positively if only because it recognizes gradual variations among views within a single moral tradition rather than encouraging polarized views. Peace research and study need not lead to any conversion experiences; it would be surprising were they to do so, despite popular fears.

Ext Cady- it’s a net benefit to our fw

#### **The lenses with which we view war and peace influence the policy options we consider – means epistemology is a prereq to effective policy options**

1. Pedagogy should come first- when researching IR the aff makes assumptions about what kinds of violence matters- ie) war in [ ] - but they ignore the ongoing structural violence that creates the conditions of those problems
2. Debate become valueless without epistemological evaluation bc people can just defend false arguments and we never actually learn anything

### FW At: Policymaking Key

#### Their policy only framework is a link- it papers over key questions about the nature and structure of society- these are the backdrops that shape the very terrain of what ‘policy’ is

Matt Wood and Matthew Flinders in 2014

University of Sheffield, UK; Rethinking depoliticisation: beyond the governmental; Policy & Politics • vol 42 • no 2 • 151-70;

At first glance, our third face appears remarkably similar to societal depoliticisation, in the sense that it can be initiated both from within and outside the state, it primarily relates to debate and deliberation, and it focuses on the tools through which debates concerning political choice and contingency are closed down. The point of departure, however, lies in discursive depoliticisation’s focus, not on institutions, arenas or actors but on ideas and language. It therefore offers a decentred approach that cuts across conventional boundaries (that is, public/ private) and instead recognises the manner in which any speech act which seeks to form ‘necessities, permanence, immobility, closure and fatalism… concealing, negating or removing contingency’, is itself a powerful tool of depoliticisation (Jenkins 2011, 160). As such, depoliticisation occurs when the debate surrounding an issue becomes technocratic, managerial, or disciplined towards a single goal, and hence changed in content. (A process of discursive politicisation would therefore involve the promotion of a topic as a public issue where competing interpretations exist as choices.) The promotion of an issue, but alongside a single interpretation and the denial of choice would, therefore, create a form of depoliticisation from this discursive perspective. Moral panics, for example, serve to politicise certain issues in an explosive manner, while at the same time tending to depoliticise those issues by focusing attention on specific ‘folk devils’, alongside a grossly simplified narrative that posits a simple solution (constrain, reject, kill the folk devil) to a complex problem. The demonisation of social groups therefore adds a new twist to our understanding of depoliticisation, in the sense that a dominant sociology of knowledge rapidly emerges that tends to create an intense social reaction, while also succeeding in closing down debate and deliberation (see Cohen, 2002). At the centre of this third ‘face’ is therefore what might be termed a ‘Gramscian’ intellectual perspective, with an emphasis on radical thinking and the role of language and culture in relation to political debates. Analyses of the discursive ‘face’ of depoliticisation developed from radical theoretical literature during the post-Cold War period, which highlighted how the dominant ‘anti-political’ culture transcended certain political divisions, thereby creating the illusion of ‘consensus’. Scholars, such as Pierre Bourdieu (2003), Slavoj Žižek (2002), and more recently Chantal Mouffe (2005), argued in favour of new forms of radical democratic action that exposed the existence of antagonism and ‘difference’. Jacques Rancière (1995, 5) sums up the attitude of this literature to the post-Cold War world, arguing that politics ends ‘as a secret voyage to the isles of utopia’ to become ‘the art of steering the ship and embracing the waves, in a natural, peaceful movement of growth’. In other words, grand ideological clashes give way to technocracy and acceptance of neoliberal discourse. The value of identifying the existence of discursive depoliticisation is therefore simply the manner in which it exposes the power and capacity of certain political actors to promote ‘the politics of denial’ but, more importantly, the manner in which it seeks to re-politicise certain issues. Put slightly differently, the scholars who work within this approach tend to be critical social and political theorists who seek to challenge hegemonic interpretations of the ‘end of history’ and seek to promote the existence of antagonism, conflict, difference and choice (see for example Mouffe, 2005). ‘Politics’ from this perspective is therefore distinct from ‘the political’, as Žižek (2002, 193) explains: The difference [is] between ‘politics’ as a separate social complex, a positively determined sub-system of social relations… and ‘the political’ [le politique] as the moment of openness, of undecidability, when the very structuring of society, the fundamental form of the social pact, is called into question – in short, the moment of global crisis overcome by the act of founding a ‘new harmony. ‘Politicisation’, in this sense, is a radical act of recognising ‘the political’; the possibility that society can be constituted differently; it is the opposite of fatalism and denial. Discursive perspectives on depoliticisation therefore resonate with Bauman’s In search of politics (1999), in the sense that they are concerned with how language and a careful approach to the ‘framing’ of issues can serve to close down certain options by making any opposition appear almost ‘irrational’. This is an approach that has some traction in the governance literature, informing Rogers’ (2009a, 2009b) analysis of British economic policy making in the mid-1970s, Kerr et al’s (2011) study of David Cameron’s approach to statecraft ,and Flinders and Buller’s (2006) emphasis on discursive ‘preference shaping’ (the weakness of these studies being their exclusive focus on the discourse of politicians). Discursive depoliticisation therefore brings with it a powerful set of methods, theories and insights that reflect an intellectual history, including Habermas’ (1996) analysis of ‘scientism’ and its capacity to depoliticise both language and decision making, not to mention Foucault’s (Burchell et al, 1991) analysis of the depoliticising capacity of neoliberal ‘governmentality’ (see also Dean, 1999; Lemke, 2001). These meta-theoretical positions have come to inform governance studies in several ways. The ‘interpretive turn’ in political science has, for example, emphasised the role of beliefs and traditions, as well as dilemmas and competing narratives, and how these can politicise certain issues while depoliticising others (for example, Bevir and Rhodes, 2010). Within International Relations, by contrast, constructivist approaches have been deployed to expose the depoliticising power of discourse and language around global governance and international institutions, as illustrated in the work of Widmaier et al (2007) and Schmidt (2010).

### At: War Declining

#### War hasn’t declined, it’s just transformed- modern tech means fewer battlefield soldiers, more targeted killing, and higher intensity

Michael Mann in 2018

Department of Sociology, University of California Los Angeles; Have wars and violence declined?; Theor Soc (2018) 47:37–60

<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-018-9305-y>

War is not ending but it is changing. There has been a striking shift, identified by¶ Randall Collins in Theory and Society (1974) from “ferocious” to “callous” cruelty¶ embodying indifference toward the victim. There might be no evolutionary trend¶ toward kindness, merely a shift from inter-personal ferocity to long-distance callous¶ indifference. Plunging sharp weapons into flesh has been replaced by bombing at a¶ distance. Historically swords and javelins inflicted direct bodily violence, one person¶ trying to hack at the body of another. Ferocity is required for this and was valued as a¶ social trait. Bowmen were partly an exception, inflicting death at a distance, but if their¶ infantry and cavalry protectors were dispersed, they would probably be slaughtered.¶ Sports like tournaments and jousting, archery, and quarter-staff combat were specifically¶ geared to ready the medieval population for physical combat. The great warrior¶ was he who was most ferocious and vicious. But the deadliest weapons are now¶ wielded by people who never see the enemy they kill. This was early typified by¶ artillery corps firing on dots in the landscape and it was epitomized by World War II¶ bombers who never saw the enemy at all. Here are the mundane yet chilling words of¶ William Sterling Parsons, the commander of the Enola Gay immediately after he had¶ dropped the first atomic bomb at Hiroshima:¶ Results clear cut successful in all respects. Visible effects greater than any test.¶ Conditions normal in airplane following delivery (quoted by Malesevic 2010, p. 83).¶ There is no hint of any violence in the tone of his log entry, only bureaucratic¶ indifference to the impact of atomic bombs on the victims.¶ Postwar guided missiles further lengthened the distances between killers and victims,¶ while today’s drones can be fired from a continent away. The bulk of military¶ training is now technical, and calmness and callousness, not ferocity, are the dominant¶ martial virtues. There are special force and infantry exceptions to this but ferocity is¶ largely removed from the culture of the Northern countries making war. Randall¶ Collins (2008) has produced extensive data on violent encounters within countries of¶ the North. He notes that those involved are not actually very skilled at body-to-body¶ violence. They flail and slap and they lack the ability to go for the jugular. The abolition¶ of conscription and the use of specialized mercenaries is growing. This removes war¶ from the everyday experience of most young men in the North of the world. There is no¶ need for much cultural resonance of violence or training for inter-personal violence.¶ Indeed, today we regard physically vicious people as deviants. We still have sports like¶ boxing and wrestling (as did medieval people) but these are no longer relevant to war.¶ Again, it is fantasy violence.¶ Also relevant to the question of culture is the proportion of army size to total¶ population, “the military participation ratio,” MPR, pioneered by Stanislas Andreski¶ (1954). Ratios in peacetime ratios are always lower than in wartime so large fluctuations¶ are to be expected across time and space. The earliest estimated ratios are for¶ classical Greece and Rome (ancient Chinese texts give unbelievable figures). Most¶ ratios in the Greek city-stats were in the range of a 3–5% MPR but when threatened by¶ major war this could rise above 10%. Roman figures were higher. As in Sparta the¶ Roman ratio sometimes rose during over 20% (Morris 2005, Patterson 1993). In¶ medieval and modern Europe ratios again fluctuated—under 2% in the twelfth century,¶ growing because of wars in the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries, rising to near 20%¶ during the Thirty Years War and then dropping to only about 2% by 1789. The¶ Napoleonic Wars inaugurated another cycle of surge and decline. The ratio reached¶ 11% in the US civil war, and between 7% and 11% among the European Powers in¶ World War I. Ratios were under 1% in the inter-war period but surged to 7–12% in¶ WorldWar II. It then fell through the abandonment of conscription in most countries to¶ under 2% by 2000, and 1% by 2010. Yet a few states in dangerous areas, like the¶ Middle East or East Asia, continue to mobilize 10% of the population.¶ It is difficult to discern long-term trends from this, yet in the advanced countries¶ lower MPRs are likely to stay, the consequence of armed forces becoming much more¶ capital-intensive, requiring the services of fewer soldiers but much larger numbers of¶ civilians to supply them. World War II figures suggest that the United States, Britain,¶ the Soviet Union, and Germany all mobilized at least half of their national product for¶ military spending (Harrison 1988, Harrison table 3). If we could construct an” economic¶ mobilization ratio,” it would probably be much higher than in most prior history.¶ In pre-industrial periods we cannot measure total product, but armaments industries¶ were smaller while most of the total product in a near-subsistence economy would have¶ to be consumed by farmers who had to be fed in order to supply the armies. Now mass¶ armies have become rare, conscription has been abolished, but a large military industrial¶ complex has appeared. The workers in that complex are highly unlikely to¶ experience bodily violence, still less death. All that is required of them is a certain¶ callous indifference to the likely victims of the weapons they are making.

## Perm

### At: Perm- Compartmentalizes

#### The aff’s attempt to reclaim security through the perm compartmentalizes understandings of militarism to believe progress is possible

James Eastwood in 2018

Queen Mary, University of London, UK, Rethinking militarism as ideology:¶ The critique of violence after¶ Security, Security Dialogue¶ ﻿1–¶ 13¶ © The Author(s) 2018¶ Reprints and permissions:¶ sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav¶ DOI: 10.1177/0967010617730949

The range of critical security studies literatures calling for desecuritization therefore do not yet¶ offer a full account of militarism as I have elaborated it above, in which organized political violence¶ is made desirable through ideology and thereby loses strategic impetus and restraint. This is¶ important because it has also shaped the response of those seeking to reclaim security against these¶ critiques. Revealingly, these responses tend either to reject the call for desecuritization as too pacifist¶ or to develop safeguards against the specific effects that these critics identify with ‘militarization’,¶ rather than engaging with the underlying ideological nature of militarism. While this has¶ certainly left their analysis wanting, and reveals an equally unsatisfactory conceptualization of¶ militarism, it also shows the limitations and vulnerability of critical security studies arguments¶ calling for desecuritization.¶ For example, Booth argues that security should only ever be the ‘means’ for the ‘end’ of emancipation¶ (Booth, 2007: 114–115) and that means and ends should be related ‘non-dualistically’ (i.e. the¶ means should be consistent with the ends sought; see Booth, 2007: 428–441). He explicitly includes¶ political violence as a means that must be subject to this rule (Booth, 2007: 429–431), and he even¶ embraces aspects of Gandhian nonviolence (Booth, 2007: 115). Discussing the critique offered by¶ securitization theory, he responds, ‘we would all presumably agree that the unnecessary securitisation¶ (militarisation) of issues is to be deplored, but there are occasions when introducing a military¶ dimension is sensible’ (Booth, 2007: 168). Booth’s ethical criteria for the use of force therefore give¶ him the confidence to respond that not all militarization is a bad thing, and that it can be used for¶ progressive ends. What is notable here is that Booth also invokes a thin notion of ‘militarization’,¶ more or less reducible to the decision to use force, to establish his claim. He is quite comfortable¶ with the risks of militarization identified by securitization theory because he believes he has circumvented¶ them. By contrast, the critique of militarism as ideology gives us more powerful tools to disagree¶ with Booth here. For Booth ignores the danger that, in conditions of militarism, war can begin¶ to serve a wide array of non-strategic instrumentalities as a result of its ideological penetration of¶ social relations. Militarism can entrench a pattern of conflict by binding social relations, subjectivities¶ and identities to the pursuit of war, thereby making war far less amenable to ethico-political¶ discipline than he imagines. By setting up emancipation as an imperative that must be ‘secured’,¶ including militarily, Booth opens a dangerous pathway to the entrenchment of violence.

### At: Perm- Negative Peace Incompatible

#### The alt’s positive peace is mutually exclusive from the aff’s negative peace – short-term solutions to war foreclose critical analysis of underlying systemic causes.

Pankhurst 3 (Donna-, May 1, Development in Practice, “The 'sex war' and other wars: towards a feminist approach to peace building”, Vol. 13 # 2&3, Infomaworld)

Turning to the meanings of the term ‘peace’, Galtung’s (1985) conception of negative peace has come into widespread use, and is probably the most common meaning given to the word, i.e. the end or absence of widespread violent conflict associated with war. A ‘peaceful’ society in this sense may therefore include a society in which social violence (against women, for instance) and/or structural violence (in situations of extreme inequality, for example) are prevalent. Moreover, this limited ‘peace goal’, of an absence of specific forms of violence associated with war, can and often does lead to a strategy in which all other goals become secondary. The absence of analysis of the deeper (social) causes of violence also paves the way for peace agreements that leave major causes of violent conflict completely unresolved. Negative peace may therefore be achieved by accepting a worse state of affairs than that which motivated the outburst of violence in the first place, for the sake of (perhaps short-term) ending organised violence. Galtung’s alternative vision, that of positive peace, requires not only that all types of violence be minimal or non-existent, but also that the major potential causes of future conflict be removed. In other words, major conflicts of interest, as well as their violent manifestation, need to be resolved. Positive peace encompasses an ideal of how society should be, but the details of such a vision often remain implicit, and are rarely discussed. Some ideal characteristics of a society experiencing positive peace would include: an active and egalitarian civil society; inclusive democratic political structures and processes; and open and accountable government. Working towards these objectives opens up the field of peace building far more widely, to include the promotion and encouragement of new forms of citizenship and political participation to develop active democracies. It also opens up the fundamental question of how an economy is to be managed, with what kind of state intervention, and in whose interests. But more often than not discussion of these important issues tends to be closed off, for the sake of ‘ending the violence’, leaving major causes of violence and war unresolved—including not only economic inequalities, but also major social divisions and the social celebration of violent masculinities.

### At: Perm- Legal Solutions Fail

#### Reject the perm’s imperfect progressivism – the claim that legal solutions are compatible with the alt only religitimizes militarism by obscuring moral responsibility and other broader systemic violence.

Stavrianakis 16 [Anna Stavrianakis, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at University of Sussex, MScEcon in Security Studies from University of Wales, Aberystwyth and PhD in Politics from University of Bristol, author of *Taking Aim at the Arms Trade*, “Legitimizing liberal militarism: politics, law and war in the Arms Trade Treaty”. Third World Quarterly, 37 (5), pp. 840-865, 2016, <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/57545/1/TWQ%20Legitimizing%20liberal%20militarism%20-%20accepted%20clean%20version.pdf>] *\*\*\*Note: the ATT is the Arms Trade Treaty, a previous attempt at restricting arms sales led by the US and the UK*

The analysis of the ATT advanced here suggests instead, however, that it is precisely the turn to law, the supposed compatibility between military preponderance and human rights protection, and the failure to move beyond direct use of weapons, that helps legitimise (particular forms of) war. Critical legal studies scholars advocate “a form of law-politics to develop humanitarian principles into a concrete, normative agenda:” 154 and yet this is exactly what humanitarian disarmers have been trying to do with the ATT and previous arms transfer control regimes. It is important to recognize “that some degree of complicity in previous social structures is inherent in social change.” 155 Price argues that scholars should not underplay the morally progressive significance of “practices that at once contain elements of progressive change … yet at the same time are predicated on or produce the conditions of possibility for other forms of exclusion, hierarchy, inequality, repression or violence.” 156 However, the widespread emphasis on the progressive, if imperfect character of the ATT in scholarship and policy, has failed to interrogate the justificatory claims around moral responsibility that so pervaded its negotiation. These claims contribute to obscuring a significant scale of human rights violations and the wider systems of war preparation that arms transfers are a part of. Further, such claims are part of what sceptical southern states are responding to and resisting, thus making wider normative change more difficult. The ATT negotiation process shored up liberal states’ actions whilst invoking their benevolence and assuming them to be distinct from illicit or irresponsible actors. The supposed effectiveness of normative change is muted by the existence of regimes that claim already to exceed the standards of the ATT. This may not be the ideological glorification of war that we tend to equate with the concept of militarism, but the ATT signals the contemporary mobilisation of legitimacy for liberal war-making and war-preparation nonetheless.

# Affirmative

## Framework

### At: Epistemology – Case O/Ws

#### Epistemological critique may decrease our ability to know the future with certainty, but this only supports defaulting to any risk of impacts large in magnitude-these are more important than small structural factors

TYLER **COWEN** **in** **2006** The Epistemic Problem Does Not Refute George Mason University Consequentialism Utilitas, Dec2006, Vol. 18 Issue 4, p383-399

**The epistemic critique increases the plausibility of what I call 'big event consequentialism'**. In this view, **we should pursue good consequences, but with special attention to consequences that are very important**and very good, or correspondingly, very bad. **This includes stopping the use of nuclear weapons**, saving children from smallpox, **making progress against**global **poverty**, and maintaining or spreading liberal democracy. **Big events**, as I define them, **typically are of significant practical importance,**involve obvious moral issues, and their value is not controversial to benevolent onlookers. In contrast, consider 'small events'. Preventing a broken leg for a single dog, however meritorious an act, is a small event as I define the concept. Making American families wealthier by another $20 also would count as a small event. **We should not count small events for nothing, but epistemic issues may well lower their importance in refiective equilibrium**. Of course we do not need a strict dividing line between big and small events, but rather we can think in terms of a continuum. In some cases a large number of small benefits will sum up to a big benefit, or equal the big benefit in importance. It then can be argued that we should treat the large benefits and the small benefits on a par. If we lift a different person out of poverty one billion times, this is no less valuable than lifting one billion people out of poverty all at once. Here two points are relevant. First, sometimes we are facing a single choice in isolation from other choices, rather than examining a rule or general principle of behavior**.**In this case it does not matter whether or not the small benefits would, if combined in larger numbers, sum up to a greater benefit. The small benefits will not be combined in greater numbers, and we should still upgrade the relative importance of larger benefits in our decision calculus. Second, **not all small benefits sum into equivalence with larger benefits**. **Sometimes one value has a lexical relationship to (all**or some) **other values**. For instance **arguably a large number of canine broken legs, even a very large number, do not sum in value to make a civilization. It does not matter how many dogs and how many broken legs enter the comparison**. In other words, civilization may be a lexical value with respect to canine broken legs. And when lexical elements are present, the mere cumulation of numbers of broken legs does not trump the more significant value. Numerous value relationships have been cited as lexical. A large number of slight headaches, no matter how numerous, may not sum up in value to equal a smaller number of intensely painful deaths or personal tortures." **A very large number of**'muzak and **potato' lives do not sum to overtake the value of a sophisticated civilization**.^^ Rawls put forward liberty and the difference principle as his lexical values for all political comparisons.^^ For our purposes, we do not require a very strict notion of lexicality for these designations to matter. A big value need not be lexical against a (multiplied) smaller value at all possible margins. Instead **the big value need only be lexical across the comparisons that arise under relevant policy comparisons.**Furthermore a big value need not be lexical in absolute terms against all other smaller values. **We therefore receive further guidance as to which big events are upgraded in the most robust fashion. The big values that receive the most robust upgrading would be those values with some lexical importance**, relative to possible comparisons against other smaller values.^" To sum up these pointsz**, critics of consequentialism would like to establish something like the following: 'We find it hard to predict consequences. Therefore consequences do not matter very much**, **relative to**other **factors, such as deontology**or virtue ethics. **We should abandon consequentialist morality.' But so far epistemic considerations have yet to produce a strong argument for this view. The arguments support a different conclusion, namely downgrading the importance of minor consequences, and upgrading the importance of major consequences. The most robust major consequences are those which carry values with some lexical properties**, and cannot be replicated by a mere accumulation of many small benefits.

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### At: Epistemology- Policy First

#### Evaluate the plan before epistemology – knowledge is always contextual and fractured which means specificity is key – focusing debate on abstract risk modeling is intellectual hubris.

Lake, Poli Sci Prof @ University of California San Diego, 14

(David, “Theory is dead, long live theory: The end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in International Relations,” European Journal of International Relations 19(3) 567–587, <https://quote.ucsd.edu/lake/files/2014/02/Lake-EJIR.pdf>)

\*ableism corrected In the end, I prefer progress within paradigms rather than war between paradigms, especially as the latter would be inconclusive. The human condition is precarious. This is still the age of thermonuclear weapons. Globalization continues to disrupt lives as countries realign their economies on the basis of comparative advantage, production chains are disaggregated and wrapped around the globe, and financial crises in one country reverberate around the planet in minutes. Transnational terrorism threatens to turn otherwise local disputes into global conflicts, and leave everyone everywhere feeling unsafe. And all the while, anthropomorphic change transforms the global climate with potentially catastrophic consequences. Under these circumstances, we as a society need all the help we can get. There is no monopoly on knowledge. And there is no guarantee that any one kind of knowledge generated and understood within any one epistemology or ontology is always and everywhere more useful than another. To assert otherwise is an act of supreme intellectual hubris. This is not a plea to let a hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand intellectual flowers bloom. Scholars working in cloistered isolation are not likely to produce great insights, especially when the social problems besetting us today are of such magnitude. All knowledge must be disciplined. That is, knowledge must be shared by and with others if it is to count as knowledge. Positivists and post-positivists are each working hard to improve and clarify the standards of knowledge within their respective paradigms. This is an important turn for both, as it will facilitate progress within each even as it raises barriers to exchange across approaches. So, if not a thousand flowers, it is perhaps better for teams of scholars to tend a small number of separate gardens, grow what they can best, and share when possible with the others and, especially, the broader societies of which they are part. Do not mourn the end of theory, if by theory we mean the Great Debates in International Relations. Too often, the Great Debates and especially the paradigm wars became contests over the truth status of assumptions. Declarations that ‘I am a realist’ or pronouncements that ‘As a liberal, I predict …’ were statements of a near quasi-religious faith, not conclusions that followed from a falsifiable theory with stronger empirical support. Likewise, assertions that positivism or post-positivism is a better approach to understanding world politics are similarly [misleading] blinding. The Great Debates were too often academic in the worst sense of that term. Mid-level theory flourished in the interstices of these debates for decades and now, with the waning of the paradigm wars, is coming into its own within the field. I regard this as an entirely positive development. We may be witnessing the demise of a particular kind of grand theory, but theory — in the plural — lives. Long may they reign.

### At: Structural Violence First

#### Structural violence framing is analytically useless – can’t distinguish war from other types of violence – the move to conflate the two makes politics ineffective

**Thomas 11** (Claire, Professor of International Politics at Sheffield University, “Why don’t we talk about ‘violence’ in International Relations?” *Review of Int’l Studies* 37 p. 1829-1831)

Much of the attractiveness of this idea of structural violence is that it broadens the remit of security studies, or of research into violence. Thus, economic issues and the damage done by poverty and so on become just as important as the damage done by direct, physical violence. Authors who work with the concept of structural violence aim to highlight the hidden structures in order to work towards their transformation.63 The problem with this is that it is defining a concept dependent on what we want to be able to study within its remit. A concept should not depend for its meaning on how we want to study it, but rather on what the concept means. The concept of structural violence is performing a similar role to the debate about broadening the definition of security. Within the security debate we are used to people posing the challenge of securitisation – that people call something a security problem in order to make it sound more urgent, more policy relevant and so on. One can pose the same challenge to structural violence. Rather than having a clear academic reason for stretching the concept of violence to incorporate other, equally bad, social ills, the main reason proposed is that these other social ills cause as much or more damage than the damage caused by violence. This may well be the case, and these issues should have urgent academic and policy attention. However, re-defining a concept like violence to incorporate these issues in order to gain that attention is a poor way of achieving this. A clear argument that states the reasons why wider social ills are more worthy of our attention does not need the further argument that we should also call them violence. So, by calling something violent, or designating it as an issue of security, an author is claiming a certain importance for the issue, escalating it up the policy agenda, and allowing for extraordinary reactions. For example, by saying that extremists use violence, one designates it as a significant and bad problem, which allows an exceptional response of violence (called military force) to counter it. The aim of calling something violence in order to push it up the policy agenda, meaning it requires special, urgent action, can also lead to dealing with these issues in a different, exceptional way, outside the realm of ‘ordinary’ politics. This may or may not be beneficial in dealing with the issue in question, or for our politics in general.64 A similar move is made by Žižek when he claims that alongside subjective violence (direct, intentional violence), there is also objective violence, one form of which is systemic violence – the damaging consequences of the ‘normal’ functioning of the system. This systemic violence must be taken into account, according to Žžiek, in order to make sense of subjective violence.65 He argues that this systemic violence needs to be given prominence, despite the urgency attributed to direct violence which fights for our attention.66 Again, this argument is valid in that systemic problems cause more suffering in the world than direct violence. But there has to be a further reason to also call this violence. After all, the argument can be made without the need to label something as violence. One could argue that seeing as our concepts are important because they change the way we think about the world, and change the way we act in it, a definition of violence that incorporates these other social ills would be valuable. However, broadening the concept in this way also has the potential for being damaging. If we conceive of all these things as equally violent, in order to see them as equally important, there is an implication that we are also going to tackle the issues as problems of violence. Issues of poverty are not helpfully tackled in the same way as issues of direct violence. The concept of structural violence is problematical as it means that the definition of violence becomes linked to the result of an act (or influence), and not to the intention or actual action of the actor. This illustrates a key difference in the way violence is conceived: one way sees violence from the perspective of the perpetrator, and sees it as intentional, destructive force; the other way sees violence from the point of view of the victim, and sees it as a form of violation.67 Bufacchi points out that these two concepts of violence stem from the Latin roots of the term. The root of the word violence is violentia, meaning a passionate and uncontrolled force, but the meaning is often conflated with ‘violation’, from the Latin violare, meaning ‘infringement’.68 Although the definition of violence is partly contingent on the result of an act, in that it requires that the intention is to physically harm the victim, it is also necessary for that result to be a means to an end, not an end in itself. Because the result of many different acts or situations is physical harm or death (or unequal power or life chances), many things become incorporated into the definition of violence if the concept of intention is not used, and if the instrumental nature of violence is ignored. Roberts goes some way to improving on the debate about structural violence by pointing out that structures are created by people, and thus structural violence can be prevented and does have responsible actors. He also operationalises it by referring to specific acts of structural violence, looking at avoidable civilian deaths. He argues that his way of looking at human insecurity enables the analysis of structures, institutions and human agency, but without the problems caused by broadening the debate to include Galtung’s concept of realising full human psychosomatic potential.69 But this does not prevent the problem that structural violence still refers to anything an author wants it to. Interestingly, many of Roberts’ choice of examples can be incorporated under the title of direct violence in any case (they are preventable female deaths: infanticide, maternal mortality, intimate killings (normal domestic murder, dowry murders and ‘honour’ killings), lethal female genital mutilation; and avoidable deaths in children under five).70 Some caution is needed in this approach, however. It is easy to think of examples where violence is not intentional, for example a natural disaster, or bombing an empty building that accidentally harms someone nearby. We have already recognised that the concept has fuzzy boundaries, and thus we can recognise that some violence occurs naturally. The point here is to discuss that violence which is most relevant for the study of international politics. This is not the same as accepting that everything that causes harm in some way can be captured within the term violence. It is also not going so far as to say that accidental acts of violence are not violence at all. Collateral damage is still violent. The point of including the idea of intentionality in the definition of violence is that it ensures the violence we are discussing in international politics has an actor and does not end up including indeterminate ideas like a state of violence. It does not just happen on its own. It is also an action that is done with the intention of harming, unlike acts such as a doctor causing some pain in order to heal.

#### Prioritize war impacts

John Horgan, Director of the Center for Science Writings at the Stevens Institute of Technology, 2012, The End of War, Chapter 5, Kindle p. 1600-1659

Throughout this book, I’ve examined attempts by scholars to identify factors especially conducive for peace. But there seem to be no conditions that, in and of themselves, inoculate a society against militarism. Not small government nor big government. Not democracy, socialism, capitalism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, nor secularism. Not giving equal rights to women or minorities nor reducing poverty. The contagion of war can infect any kind of society. ¶ Some scholars, like the political scientist Joshua Goldstein, find this conclusion dispiriting. Early in his career Goldstein investigated economic theories of war, including those of Marx and Malthus. He concluded that war causes economic inequality and scarcity of resources as much as it stems from them. Goldstein, a self-described “pro-feminist,” then set out to test whether macho, patriarchal attitudes caused armed violence. He felt so strongly about this thesis that he and his wife limited their son’s exposure to violent media and contact sports. ¶ But by the time he finished writing his 522-page book War and Gender in 2001, Goldstein had rejected the thesis. He questioned many of his initial assumptions about the causes of war. He never gave credence to explanations involving innate male aggression—war breaks out too sporadically for that—but he saw no clear-cut evidence for non-biological factors either. “War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes,” Goldstein writes. “Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.” He admits that all his research has left him “somewhat more pessimistic about how quickly or easily war may end.” ¶ But here is the upside of this insight: if there are no conditions that in and of themselves prevent war, there are none that make peace impossible, either. This is the source of John Mueller’s optimism, and mine. If we want peace badly enough, we can have it, no matter what kind of society we live in. The choice is ours. And once we have escaped from the shadow of war, we will have more resources to devote to other problems that plague us, like economic injustice, poor health, and environmental destruction, which war often exacerbates. ¶ The Waorani, whose abandonment of war led to increased trade and intermarriage, are a case in point. So is Costa Rica. In 2010, this Central American country was ranked number one out of 148 nations in a “World Database of Happiness” compiled by Dutch sociologists, who gathered information on the self-reported happiness of people around the world. Costa Rica also received the highest score in another “happiness” survey, carried out by an American think tank, that factored in the nation’s impact on the environment. The United States was ranked twentieth and 114th, respectively, on the surveys. Instead of spending on arms, over the past half century Costa Rica’s government invested in education, as well as healthcare, environmental conservation, and tourism, all of which helped make the country more prosperous, healthy, and happy. There is no single way to peace, but peace is the way to solve many other problems. ¶ The research of Mueller, Goldstein, Forsberg, and other scholars yields one essential lesson. Those of us who want to make the world a better place—more democratic, equitable, healthier, cleaner—should make abolishing the invention of war our priority, because peace can help bring about many of the other changes we seek**.** This formula turns on its head the old social activists’ slogan: “If you want peace, work for justice.” I say instead, “If you want justice, work for peace.” If you want less pollution, more money for healthcare and education, an improved legal and political system—work for peace.

## Alt

### Alt Fails- Incremental Key

#### Refusing all U.S. engagement won’t solve -- you should prefer incremental reform that reduces U.S. imperialism while retaining beneficial presence

Swanson 18 (David Swanson -- 2015 Nobel Peace Prize Nominee; author/activist/journalist/radio host, “Isolationism or Imperialism: You Really Can’t Imagine a Third Possibility?”, Foreign Policy Journal, https://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2018/12/28/isolationism-or-imperialism-you-really-cant-imagine-a-third-possibility/, 28 December 2018)

Of the United Nations’ 18 major human rights treaties, the United States is party to 5, fewer than any other nation on earth, except Bhutan (4), and tied with Malaysia, Myanmar, and South Sudan, a country torn by warfare since its creation in 2011. The United States is the only nation on earth that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It is the only country to have pulled out of the Paris Climate Agreement. It is by many measures a top destroyer of the natural environment, yet has been a leader in sabotaging climate protection negotiations for decades. Seven countries and the European Union reached an agreement on Iran and nuclear energy, but the United States uniquely withdrew. President Donald Trump is threatening to withdraw, and Congress is threatening to allow it, from critical nuclear disarmament treaties reached by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev.¶ The United States not only stands outside the International Criminal Court, but openly threatens sanctions against it and against nations that support it. The United States leads opposition to democratization of the United Nations and easily holds the record for use of the veto in the Security Council during the past 50 years, having vetoed U.N. condemnation of South African apartheid, Israel’s wars and occupations, chemical and biological weapons, nuclear weapons proliferation and first use and use against non-nuclear nations, U.S. wars in Nicaragua and Grenada and Panama, the U.S. embargo on Cuba, Rwandan genocide, the deployment of weapons in outerspace, etc.¶ Contrary to popular opinion, the United States is not a leading provider of aid to the suffering of the world, not as a percentage of gross national income or per capita or even as an absolute number of dollars. Unlike other countries, the United States counts as 40 percent of its so-called aid, weapons for foreign militaries. Its aid as a whole is directed around its military goals, and its immigration policies have long been shaped around skin color, and lately around religion, not around human need — except perhaps inversely, focusing on locking up and building walls to punish the most desperate.¶ Keeping the above context, discussed at greater length here, in mind, let’s add to it one other set of facts. Unarmed civilian protectors and nonviolent peaceworkers from groups like Nonviolent Peaceforce have been proving for many years that people can accomplish more without guns than with them. Thorough studies of violent and nonviolent campaigns over the past century have well established that principally nonviolent efforts are more likely to succeed and those successes virtually guaranteed to be far longer lasting. A consensus has developed even within military establishments that much of what militaries do is counterproductive on its own terms, so much so that “there is no military solution” has practically become a required mantra to be pointlessly but accurately repeated by those attempting military solutions. The tools of diplomacy, cooperation, aid, nonviolent investment, the rule of law, skilled conflict resolution, disarmament, and peaceful conversion have become extremely well-developed and understood, if hardly ever thought of or employed or widely communicated.¶ Now, keeping all of that in mind, does anything strike you as odd about exclamations that withdrawing U.S. troops from a war is a form of “isolationism”? Is there anything peculiar about the scores of people steadily emailing me to condemn a planned protest of NATO as, you guessed it, “isolationism”? Five years ago, there was a debate over whether to bomb Syria flat, and those opposed to doing so were accused of “isolationism.” Now the idea of pulling troops out of Syria or Afghanistan or ceasing to help bomb and starve the people of Yemen is subjected to the same rhetorical assault. That Trump promises to keep the occupation of Iraq going is understood as reassuring “engagement with the world” by people who demanded an end to the occupation of Iraq when George W. Bush was president, and who pretended to celebrate its ending when Barack Obama pretended to end it.¶ This is simple-minded thinking in the extreme, notwithstanding its claims to be just the opposite. “I’m against war but we can’t be simplistic about it and just end one of them willy-nilly, abandoning our allies.” This is the type of language used to support imperialism in the great debate between isolationism and imperialism, a debate wholly dependent on the ridiculous pretense that these two choices constitute the full range of possible human behaviors.¶ A lot of people no longer fall for such sophistry when it comes to domestic politics. “Should we ignore drug users or lock them up?” The obvious answer of “No, we shouldn’t do either of those things,” actually occurs to a good many people unprompted. “Should we allow shoplifting or imprison shoplifters for the rest of their lives?” This is a question so patently stupid that it will actually elicit from some people asked it the creative response: “Why not end poverty instead? It’s not like we don’t have plenty of money to do that!” But what about this question: “Should we keep the U.S. military engaged in each of these wars or ignore and abandon and forget about and forsake the people there?” Ah, now we have a patently stupid question that has been repeated so many, many times that it’s hard to hear the stupidity of it.¶ Each year that a war gets worse while continuing somehow fails to constitute outrageous proof that it should not have been continued. The past year of the war on Afghanistan has been one of the deadliest, yet it is the fear that things might go badly after U.S. troops leave that is supposed to concern us. And we are supposed to be powerless to do anything about it other than increase the bombings or avert our eyes to focus on blaming peaceniks. Here’s another idea that I think has been proposed so infrequently in part because most people either find it unthinkable or find it too obvious to bother saying: What if we were to try an approach of real anti-isolationism?¶ What if the United States were to sign and ratify and abide by the major laws of the world, support the world’s systems of justice, cooperate in disarmament (including the nuclear weapons ban treaty), collaborate on climate protection, provide humanitarian aid on an unprecedented scale (albeit miniscule in comparison with military spending), jumpstart a reverse arms race, democratize the United Nations, participate in truth and reconciliation hearings, invest in unarmed peacekeeping, cease arming and training brutal dictatorships, and actually back democracy abroad and by its own example?¶ The son of the last dictator the United States imposed on Iran is waiting hopefully in Bethesda, Maryland, for the next U.S. overthrow of the Iranian government, while Iran has not picked out a future King of America. What if the United States ceased worrying about rogue nations and focused on ceasing to be one?¶ But, you may object, none of that fantasy is going to happen this week, while meanwhile the Kurds are going to be massacred without their U.S. military friends. Back here in the real world, in which the United States and its allies are going to go on flooding the Middle East with weapons and using war as foreign policy, each war must be continued until . . . well, until a fantasy becomes possible, or Jesus comes back from wherever he’s been, or the Democrats take the throne but don’t act like, you know, the Democrats have always acted, or something! Of course, we all know what the something is going to be: climate collapse, the Middle East becoming uninhabitable for humans, and extreme weather disasters in much of the rest of the globe. And the response to this shocking if completely predictable and predicted development will be violence or nonviolence, depending on what we have been conditioned to suppose is normal or “natural” or “inevitable.”¶ Given that what is at stake here is human survival, given that the U.S. presidency has been gradually endowed with imperial powers such that the fate of thousands of people can be determined by a tweet, are we really obliged to limit our short-term thinking to (a) “support the troops” by keeping them in a desert exchanging bullets with the locals, or (b) “abandon” people? Why not demand of the U.S. government and/or other nations purporting to care about humanity, immediate announcement of an end to the weapons trade, the opening of diplomatic talks with all relevant parties, the commencement of a major aid program, and support for a major new program of unarmed peacekeeping through a coalition of the decent or if possible through a United Nations in which the United States foreswears the veto?¶ Such an alternative to the imperialism-or-isolationism trap is no more difficult to think of or to act on than treating drug addiction or crime or poverty as reason to help people rather than to punish them. The opposite of bombing people is not ignoring them. The opposite of bombing people is embracing them. By the standards of the U.S. communications corporations Switzerland must be the most isolationist land because it doesn’t join in bombing anyone. The fact that it supports the rule of law and global cooperation, and hosts gatherings of nations seeking to work together is simply not relevant. How about in the new year at least we try a little new thinking?

### Alt Fails- Realism

#### State-centric and realist analysis are inevitable- the alt can’t effect other countries’ beliefs- default to the aff’s minimization of threats

**Agnew 2k15** (John, professor of geography at UCLA, The Geopolitics of Knowledge About World Politics: A Case Study in U.S. Hegemony)

In fact, **considerable energy in academic international relations today in the United States and elsewhere focuses on the weaknesses of the neorealist synthesis** even as the master’s programs continue to churn out would-be practitioners often oblivious to the political and theoretical bases of the arcane debates among some of their teachers (Long et al., 2005 ). The continuing, even revived, appeal of the neorealist synthesis seems to lie in its ritual appeal to U.S. centrality to world politics (the “necessary nation,” “the lender of last resort,” etc.) and in the enhanced sense since the end of the Cold War and after 9/11 of a dangerous and threatening world that must be approached with trepidation and preparation for potential violent reaction and intervention as mandated by realist thinking. Yet in practice there is a massive gap between the predictions of such theorizing and what actually goes into the making of U.S. (or any other) foreign policy, much of which has to do with persisting geopolitical orderings of the world and domestic interests and their relative lobbying capacities (Hellmann, 2009 ; Oren, 2009 ). **International relations as a field around the world has followed largely in American footsteps.** I can attest that my own introduction to it in the late 1960s in Britain involved reading textbooks that came overwhelmingly from the United States. Debate about the relative degrees of theoretical “pluralism” in the United States and Britain suggests that at least the modes of categorizing theories are somewhat less hidebound in the latter than in the former and that in recent years at least there has been something of a parting of the ways across the Atlantic, with nonrealist views becoming much more widespread in British universities than in their American counterparts (Schmidt, 2008 ; Smith, 2008 ). More recently and elsewhere around the world, **U.S. theories, particularly neorealism, have proved rather more pervasive and persistent.** **In Russia**, for example, which one might not expect to be particularly congenial to U.S. ideas**, the main academic journal about world politics, Mehdunarodnyye protsessy (International Trends), seems to adhere to ideas about international anarchy, nation-state developmentalism, and systemic constraints on state action that are remarkably similar to those represented by U.S. neorealism.** Even the more liberal currents, refl ecting on globalization and a less state-oriented world, mainly cite U.S. sources (Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2007 ). Perhaps this tendency refl ects the lack of local alternatives following the demise of offi cial Marxist conceptions, dependence on funding from Western foundations, and a general disorientation following the collapse of the Soviet Union. It does not, however, entail much by way of support for U.S. foreign policy, only a similar theoretical logic in arriving in this case at Russiancentered positions (Müller, 2008 ). The recent revival of Eurasian geopolitical thinking perhaps is a harbinger of a more Russian-centric mode of thinking as an alternative to imported brands (Tsygankov & Tsygankov, 2004 ). Given the cumulative crisis of the United States in world politics over the past two decades, one might expect to see some emerging alternative theoretical visions emanating from beyond U.S. shores. The so-called English School of international relations, associated in particular with the idea of “international society” but effectively realist in many respects, has recently undergone a concerted revival as an alternative to U.S. theories. It has certainly traveled well beyond Britain, even if with questionable success (e.g., Waever, 1992 ; Wendt, 1999 ). Zhang ( 2003 ) has examined how well it has traveled to China since Adam Roberts, one of its main advocates, visited Beijing in 1991. Lacking in equivalently talented entrepreneurs or salesmen and the institutionalized connections between U.S. and Chinese universities, the English School has had limited infl uence, according to Zhang, in comparison to the continuing dominance of U.S. scholars. But most of the main works are also not available in Chinese, and the major research institutes in China are run by people trained in the United States. **To a large extent, therefore, academic Chinese knowledge of the “international” largely remains refracted through intellectual lenses made in the United States**. Within China, however, change is in the offing. Some Chinese academics write explicitly about what they term “international relations theory with Chinese characteristics” (Xinning, 2001 ). In other words, China has become involved in developing something akin to what happened in the United States in the 1940s and 1950s. What is this Chinese synthesis? According to Xinning ( 2001 ), there are two variants, with the second smaller but growing more quickly. The fi rst borrows the phrase “Chinese characteristics” from Deng Xiaoping to indicate an international relations theory that centers on China’s need to protect its sovereignty, engage in peaceful coexistence with other states, and use Chinese language, thought, and expression. The second asserts a more radically Chinese vision of the world with China’s status at the center of a surrounding system, Confucian “benevolent governance,” the winning of confl icts without resorting to war, and interests, not morality, as the basis of interstate behavior. In Xinning’s words: After the Tiananmen Square incident of 1989, most social science disciplines (especially political science, sociology, and journalism) suffered a setback because of the government’s campaign against the ideological liberalism of Chinese scholars and the so-called peaceful evolution initiated by the West. However, International Relations received a different treatment. Theoretical studies on IR continued to develop. **The teaching of Western IR theories continued at key universities, and academic exchanges with the West in IR studies became more active. This was mainly because Chinese leaders worried more about China’s isolation from the outside world than a “peaceful evolution**.” (Xinning, 2001 , p. 62) More recently, as Xinning makes clear, a new Chinese international relations is evolving which combines a range of elements (also see Yang & Li, 2009 ). **As in the U.S. case, however, it is its connection to state policy that gives it special status. As in so many other features of the relationship between the United States and China, there is an almost mirror image in assumptions between the theory imported from the United States and what increasingly goes for “Chinese” international relations theory.** Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. In brief compass, I have tried to illustrate one facet of the geography of knowledge, what I have called the geopolitics of knowledge, in relation to one body of thinking, so-called international relations theory. I have emphasized its founding in the early postwar United States, its travels around the world as a function of American hegemony, and the story of two alternatives, the English School, to illustrate the limits of pluralism, and the rise of an IR theory with “Chinese characteristics,” to show how an alternative with hegemonic potential can begin to emerge. Who knows, particularly if this latter, as Callahan ( 2001 ) has said in direct response to Xinning’s ( 2001 ) essay on Chinese thinking about world politics, adjusts to the more globalized and transnational world that has seemed, at least until recently, to be in the offing, then we may actually end up with a theory of world politics that avoids the inside–outside views of sovereignty and the need for a single hegemonic power that so much of recent IR theory has been devoted to normalizing (Agnew, 2009 ). Don’t bet your house on it. **As long as we have global political hierarchy, we are likely to have parallel “theories” of world politics which naturalize that state of affairs.**

#### Realism is human nature. Critique does nothing to stop states from struggling for power

Schweller 99 (Randall L. is Professor of Political Science, Director of the Program for the Study of Realist Foreign Policy, a Social and Behavioral Sciences Joan N. Huber Faculty Fellow at Ohio State University, and editor-in-chief of Security Studies, Forum: fantasy theory)

The problem is that Linklater argues by fiat rather than by the weight of hard evidence, which is in scant supply here. Again and again, radical propositions are supported by nothing more than references to some other critical theorist who shares Linklater’s vision and/or tendency to rely on slippery, undefined and unmeasured concepts, primarily globalisation and fragmentation. This simply will not do. **Whether Linklater, or Kant, or Marx, or Habermas, or other contemporary critical, feminist, postmodern theorists believe that something will happen,** must happen, **can happen, and should happen, does not make it so**—or likely to be so—in the foreseeable future. Moreover, **as a work of critical political theory, it is neither very critical nor very political**. **To believe, for instance, that the goals of the triple transformation will be advanced by wider dialogic relations, one must naively assume not only that there is an underlying global harmony of interests from which a consensus can be forged on important political and social issues, but that such ‘agreements will not be reached by ignoring or suppressing marginal and dissident voices’** (p. 41). In this view as in others, **Linklater simply skates over the central rationalist-realist explanations for international conflict and the struggle for power and security, e.g., states have an incentive to misrepresent private information about their capabilities and resolve**, and they may be unable to commit credibly to uphold bargains that they would mutually prefer to war;1 the nature of many international disputes are indivisible and therefore do not admit compromise; states exist under conditions of material and social scarcity with no sovereign arbiter to settle and enforce distributional disputes. **As long as things commonly enjoyed cannot be commonly shared, individuals and groups will seek to influence and control others and their environment; that is, they will struggle for social and material power. That is what politics is all about and what distinguishes it from other modes of human behaviour.** Politics so defined is largely absent from Linklater’s book. **Leaving aside the problem of indivisible scarce goods, a meaningful reduction in global material inequality would require significant sacrifices from those enjoying the good life. Surely, no one really believes that the ‘haves’ will voluntarily hand over their riches to the ‘have-nots’. There is no historical precedent for such altruism on a global scale, and, no matter how much we all communicate with each other in the future, I cannot imagine that human nature will change so dramatically in my lifetime.** Thus, unless one desperately wants to believe in this alternative future world, Linklater’s book will appear as little more than an intellectual exercise in historical speculation and theoretical wishful thinking along familar liberal lines.

## Perm

### Perm Best- Policy Solutions

#### Political analysis is a mechanism in which we can learn to challenge current issues, find effective alternatives, and create better political solutions.

Hird 17 [John Hird, Dean of the College of Social and Behavioral Sciences and Professor of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Massachusetts Amherst. “How Effective is Policy Analysis,” in D. Weimer & L. S. Friedman (eds.) *Does Policy Analysis Matter? Exploring Its Effectiveness in Theory and Practice*. University of California Press. 44-76.]

Classical policy analysis, however absent from actual policy making, remains an important vehicle for teaching policy analysts the connections between their analysis and the policymaking world in which their recommendations would live. Even if it implies more power than analysts will ever have, classical policy analysis teaches that politics, law, implementation, social structures, organizational behavior, and other factors are critical to policy outcomes and must play key roles in thinking through possible ways to address policy problems. Bringing policy ideas to fruition, bridging the worlds of research and policy making, is a critical skill for analysts to develop.¶ In addition, policy schools are instilling in prospective policy analysts the structure and habits of mind to engage successfully in the policy enterprise. 28 Teaching disciplined thinking for public service is important. Policy analysts not only have a problem-oriented, interdisciplinary approach to policy and the ability to synthesize and bring policy relevance to problems that social scientists are not trained for, but they understand the "rational lunacy of policy-making systems" (Weiss 2009).¶ In the absence of written classical policy analyses, policy analysts become their human embodiment. Their training will provide a mental picture of how a classical policy analysis should be performed. They can derive elements of policy analysis from writing position papers, briefing policy makers, and controlling meetings. They anticipate counterarguments and frame their analyses recognizing alternative options. In short, the mental map of a policy analysis allows good policy analysts not only to be effective in their jobs but also to advance into the public debate the appropriate elements of a policy analysis. Further, the problem orientation of policy analysis focuses at least some attention on social problems, not just political expediency. The role of policy analysts is not merely to translate research for policy makers, but to use creative means to turn available knowledge about the implications of various policy options into actionable policy recommendations appropriate for their clients. This is a subtle skill requiring attention to both political realities and the best available research.¶ Finally, prospective policy analysts are instructed repeatedly about the importance of their relationship to the client(s), yet far less attention is paid to the other part of the policy analyst's relationship: to the community of knowledge producers. Policy analysts play critical roles as intermediaries between "custodians of the knowable" and policy makers. Their training should include the ability to understand and interpret the academic literature on a topic at a far deeper level than most journalists have the time or, often, the analytic skill set to uncover. Identifying and connecting pertinent knowledge and analysis with policy makers should be a core principle of a public policy education. Policy analysts may offer the central means to provide policy makers with the key elements of classical policy analysis, though not in the way, through written reports, it was originally conceived. Creating a profession for committed, accomplished, and well-trained individuals to participate in the world of public policy may be among the most important contributions of policy analysis education.

### Perm Best/Alt Fails- Specific Policies key

#### Perm is the best option- the alt’s universalizing rhetoric papers over nuance- prefer the aff’s ability to target and address specific threats of violence

Browning & McDonald 13 (Christopher S., University of Queensland, c/o Political Science and International Studies and Matt, University of Queensland, “The future of critical security studies: Ethics and the politics of security,” European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, pg. 248-251)

If the critical security studies project is deficient in providing us with a sophisticated and convincing understanding of either the politics or ethics of security — two core animat - ing themes of its research agenda — where does this leave such a project? Does the contribution of critical security studies extend no further than a compelling critique of traditional approaches to security on a range of analytical and normative grounds? We would argue that there is a future in critical security studies. This future will ulti - mately be determined by the extent to which scholars recognize the limits and tensions of existing approaches (especially ‘Schools’) and take up the challenge of moving beyond first principles or universalized assumptions about security to engage in nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security. Indeed, we make such a case using the critical theoretical tool of immanent critique, defined here as a method of critique concerned with locating possibilities for progressive change in existing social and political orders. 6 In this context, we note in particular the possibility for building upon the tensions and limits in existing critical security studies scholarship to move this research project forward. We identify two key imperatives for this project by way of conclusion. The first of these imperatives concerns the need to develop understandings of the poli - tics of security that are context-specific; that recognize and interrogate the role of differ - ent security discourses and their effects in different settings; and that come to terms with sedimented meanings and logics without endorsing these as timeless and inevitable. In terms of context-specificity, the Western-centric nature of (critical) security studies has ultimately encouraged a focus on how security ‘works’ in liberal democratic settings. This is particularly applicable to the Copenhagen School framework, whose dichotomy between ‘panic politics’ and ‘normal politics’ ultimately suggests a conception of politics parasitic on a liberal democratic political context (see McDonald, 2008; Williams, 2003). While some have attempted to explore securitization dynamics outside these settings (e.g. Wilkinson, 2007), the framework itself continues to work with a security–politics dichotomy that may be wholly unfamiliar to those outside liberal democratic states. In a fundamentally illiberal state regime such as Burma or North Korea, for example, what does the language of security do and what does ‘normal politics’ mean? In what ways do different cultural, social and historical contexts determine different security logics, and how do these dynamics look in terms of communities above and below the state? And can we accept the claim that there is no difference in the logic or effects of securitization if security is understood as referring to the welfare of the most vulnerable in global soci - ety, for example, rather than the territorial preservation of the nation-state? Here, the failure to differentiate between logics of security on the basis of what understanding of security inheres in a particular discourse potentially blinds Copenhagen School and post- structural theorists of security to (the possibility of) difference in security dynamics and logics in different places, for different actors and at different times. In the case of the Copenhagen School, such parsimony might be in part a response to the desire to provide analytical boundaries around the study of security rather than ‘descend’ into contextual analysis (see Williams, 2010: 213–216), but it nonetheless results in a partial and (we would argue) Western-centric image of the politics of security. at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from Browning and McDonald 249 Ultimately, these points suggest the need for far more nuance than is currently evident in critical security studies scholarship. As noted earlier, the critical security studies pro - ject appears bifurcated between opposing logics of security that position the logic of security as inherently pernicious (Copenhagen School, post-structuralism) or inherently progressive (Welsh School). In a sense, these ‘Schools’ correct the limits and tendencies of each other in important ways, suggesting (immanent) possibilities for a more nuanced understanding of the politics of security in the critical security studies project as a whole. Copenhagen School and post-structural theorists explore the logic of security that fol - lows from the dominant discourse of security in contemporary world politics, rightly cautioning against any assumed linkage between security and progress and pointing to the ways in which the promise of security can be used to justify illiberal practices. The Welsh School framework, meanwhile, recognizes that this dominant discourse of secu - rity does not necessarily capture the essence of security across time and space, in the process pointing to possibilities for progressive change in security dynamics and prac - tices. In a sense, these different approaches to the logic of security broadly reflect struc - tural and agential tendencies in International Relations more generally. We would argue that they suggest the need to take seriously the political limitations associated with domi - nant security discourses while recognizing and exploring the possibility for security to mean and do something different. A brief analysis of the different constitutive security logics underlying various secu - rity communities around the world provides ample evidence of the problems of univer - salizing claims about the politics of security. As Rumelili (2008) has noted, an instructive comparison can be drawn between the EU and ASEAN, in particular in terms of how these organizations’ conception of self-identity results in them relating themselves to otherness very differently. Propounding an inherently inclusive (i.e. democratic) identity and normative agenda, the EU is liable to locate otherness in an inferior position to itself, as something to transform and render acceptable/normal. Otherness is therefore something to be eradicated and to the extent to which it rejects transformation, it becomes destabilizing and potentially threatening. Such processes are, for example, clearly evident in the European Neighbourhood Policy (Browning and Pertti, 2008). In contrast, ASEAN operates with a largely exclusivist (i.e. civili - zational, geographic, ethnic) identity where norms of sovereignty and non-interfer - ence dominate. This, Rumelili suggests, facilitates more equitable relationships with otherness since the goal in such relationships is not one of conversion to the cause. In terms of the politics of security, what becomes evident here is how concepts of security and subjectivity are intimately connected to conceptions of identity and the limits of political community in different contexts. The second imperative for the future of the critical security studies project concerns the ethics of security. We advanced the claim that a shared concern with expanding the realm of dialogue underpins much of the critical security studies project, albeit to differ - ent degrees and in different ways. But to the extent that an ethics of security — a concep - tion of the good or progress regarding security — orients around a concern with such a position, this commitment needs to be acknowledged and defended. A range of pressing questions suggest themselves here, including the bases for prioritizing open dialogue; the relationship between spheres of deliberation and material conditions of existence; the at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from 250 European Journal of International Relations 19(2) possibilities for and limitations to the establishment of open dialogue; and the broader relationship between dialogue and outcomes. Elaborating on these commitments would also entail engaging with the argument that movements towards greater dialogue could potentially encourage the desire to exclude power, identity, emotion and other central features of global politics (see Price, 2008). Where difficult questions emerge about this and other dimensions of an ‘ethical’ engagement with security — such as the role of violence in the Welsh School framework, for example (Peoples, 2011) — these need to be confronted. If there is a consistency across critical security studies scholarship in this sense, it is that ethical commitments are evident (in commitments to resistance, desecuritization or emancipation, for example) but are insufficiently developed to provide a genuine account of what constitutes ethical action regarding security. Indeed, immanent possibilities for the development of the criti - cal security studies project arise from these (often implied) commitments that need draw - ing out and examining in the context of difficult dilemmas in world politics. This process of drawing out ethical commitments should be viewed as a reflexive movement towards recognizing the assumptions and potential implications of one’s own theorizing, a posi - tion central to both broader definitions of Critical Theory (see Cox, 1981) and to the compelling critique of traditional security studies as insufficiently engaged with the eth - ics and effects of its own theorizing about world politics. And it needs also to be matched up with the preceding understanding of the politics of security. Is the expansion of delib - eration and movement away from violence, for example, always progressive, and does it require the rejection of security as a political category or its reform? The example of Australian debates around the arrival by boat of asylum-seekers in 2010 illustrates tensions and ambiguities at work regarding the ethics of security, particu - larly as understood in key critical approaches to the study of security. In that context, Labor Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s call for ‘a frank, open, honest national conversation’ about asylum and border security particularly encouraged the articulation of negative and exclusionary views of asylum-seekers, paradoxically rendering the (re)securitization of asylum in the Australian context more likely (see McDonald, 2011). Particularly strik - ing here was the Prime Minister’s suggestion that this national conversation should take place outside the limits imposed by political correctness that would otherwise discourage the articulation of right-wing or racist sentiments towards asylum-seekers. In this exam - ple, the apparent opening of dialogic space encouraged by the Prime Minister was inti - mately related to the movement towards exclusionary security logics and practices orienting around the imperatives of ‘border security’. The point of this example is not to illustrate the limits of open dialogue per se, but rather to illustrate two broader claims regarding the relationship between security and ethics in the critical security studies project that we make here. First, while normative preferences are evident, these are often insufficiently developed or robust to enable the ethical adjudication between different practices or outcomes. The normative preference for deliberation evident in the commitment to desecuritization, for example, is not suf - ficiently robust to enable us to engage with difficult questions concerning the forms of deliberation that should be encouraged or even the circumstances in which ‘hate speech’, for example, might be curtailed (on this, see Gelber, 2010). Second, and to return to the central argument of the article, the Australian example reminds us of the need to explore the implications of security conceptions and practices in particular contexts, rather than at University of Kansas Libraries on February 25, 2016 ejt.sagepub.com Downloaded from Browning and McDonald 251 assume that a particular security logic will inhere — or outcomes will follow — from the use of the term ‘security’ or a stated political commitment to ‘dialogue’. The core challenge for the critical security studies project is ultimately moving beyond critique and agenda-setting and towards a contextual analysis of security dynamics and practices in global politics. There is no question that a focus on the politics of security and the ethics of security are crucial intellectual endeavours too readily elided or ignored in traditional approaches to the study of security. For this reason alone we need a ‘criti - cal security studies project’. However, universalizing claims concerning the politics of security — found in the securitization framework and much post-structural engagement with security — must ultimately give way to nuanced analyses of the ways in which security is constructed and challenged in particular social, historical and political con - texts. A range of theorists have — in different ways — sought to engage with precisely this question, illustrating the various ways in which security dynamics ‘play out’ in dif - ferent settings in terms of constructing community (e.g. Bubandt, 2005), challenging identity binaries (e.g. Avant, 2007) or enabling space for different forms of political response (e.g. Doty, 1998/9). Yet these insights ultimately remain marginal to key ‘Schools’ and conceptual frameworks of security, and are too often forgotten in our search for the universal in a complex world. Beyond the development of nuance in our understanding of the ‘politics of security’, the critical security studies project urgently needs to move beyond normative ‘leaps of faith’ concerning the ethics of security. This particularly applies to the Copenhagen and Welsh School preference for dialogue as a progressive means of escaping exclusive and illiberal security logics and practices. While genuinely open dialogue regarding the construction of security and threat has much to recommend it, crucial here is the need for advocates to reflect upon and lay bare the bases upon which these claims are made in philosophical terms, and to reflexively examine the implications of alternative security conceptions and practices in analytical terms rather than assume particular dynamics to be progressive. This too suggests the need to move towards a focus on the particular social, historical and politi - cal contexts in which security is constructed and practised in global politics.

## Link Answers

### At: Liberal Institutions Link

#### global liberal institutions are inevitable and good – reforming them requires engagement and intellectual rejection causes genocide and nuclear war.

Shaw 99 (Martin, Professor of International Relations and Politics at the University of Sussex, November 9, “The unfinished global revolution: Intellectuals and the new politics of international relations”)

The new politics of international relations require us, therefore, to go beyond the antiimperialism of the intellectual left as well as of the semi-anarchist traditions of the academic discipline. We need to recognise three fundamental truths: First, in the twenty-first century people struggling for democratic liberties across the non-Western world are likely to make constant demands on our solidarity. Courageous academics, students and other intellectuals will be in the forefront of these movements. They deserve the unstinting support of intellectuals in the West. Second, the old international thinking in which democratic movements are seen as purely internal to states no longer carries conviction – despite the lingering nostalgia for it on both the American right and the anti-American left. The idea that global principles can and should be enforced worldwide is firmly established in the minds of hundreds of millions of people. This consciousness will a powerful force in the coming decades. Third, global state-formation is a fact. International institutions are being extended, and they have a symbiotic relation with the major centre of state power, the increasingly internationalised Western conglomerate. The success of the global-democratic revolutionary wave depends first on how well it is consolidated in each national context – but second, on how thoroughly it is embedded in international networks of power, at the centre of which, inescapably, is the West. From these political fundamentals, strategic propositions can be derived. First, democratic movements cannot regard non-governmental organisations and civil society as ends in themselves. They must aim to civilise local states, rendering them open, accountable and pluralistic, and curtail the arbitrary and violent exercise of power. Second, democratising local states is not a separate task from integrating them into global and often Western-centred networks. Reproducing isolated local centres of power carries with it classic dangers of states as centres of war. Embedding global norms and integrating new state centres with global institutional frameworks are essential to the control of violence. (To put this another way, the proliferation of purely national democracies is not a recipe for peace.) Third, while the global revolution cannot do without the West and the UN, neither can it rely on them unconditionally. We need these power networks, but we need to tame them, too, to make their messy bureaucracies enormously more accountable and sensitive to the needs of society worldwide. This will involve the kind of ‘cosmopolitan democracy’ argued for by David Held80 and campaigned for by the new Charter 9981. It will also require us to advance a global social-democratic agenda, to address the literally catastrophic scale of world social inequalities. Fourth, if we need the global-Western state, if we want to democratise it and make its institutions friendlier to global peace and justice, we cannot be indifferent to its strategic debates. It matters to develop robust peacekeeping as a strategic alternative to bombing our way through zones of crisis. It matters that international intervention supports pluralist structures, rather than ratifying Bosnia-style apartheid. Likewise, the internal politics of Western elites matter. It makes a difference to halt the regression to isolationist nationalism in American politics. It matters that the European Union should develop into a democratic polity with a globally responsible direction. It matters that the British state, still a pivot of the Western system of power, stays in the hands of outward-looking new social democrats rather than inward-looking old conservatives. As political intellectuals in the West, we need to have our eyes on the ball at our feet, but we also need to raise them to the horizon. We need to grasp the historic drama that is transforming worldwide relationships between people and state, as well as between state and state. We need to think about how the turbulence of the global revolution can be consolidated in democratic, pluralist, international networks of both social relations and state authority. We cannot be simply optimistic about this prospect. Sadly, it will require repeated violent political crises to push Western governments towards the required restructuring of world institutions.82 What I have outlined tonight is a huge challenge; but the alternative is to see the global revolution splutter into defeat, degenerate into new genocidal wars, perhaps even nuclear conflicts. The practical challenge for all concerned citizens, and the theoretical and analytical challenges for students of international relations and politics, are intertwined.

### At: Think Tanks/Experts Link

#### Think tanks and foreign policy experts are a necessary supplement for national security- they’re crucial for immediate policy-relevant research

Abelson 6 [Donald E. Abelson, McGill Queen’s Unviersity Press, *Capitol Idea: Think Tanks and U.S. Foreign Policy*, professor of political science at Western University, where he has served as director of the Center for American Studies, as chair of the political science department, and as the founding director of the Canada-US Institute, 2006]

Hundreds of think tanks have not taken root in the United States because of a perceived shortage of policy expertise. They have proliferated, if we follow the logic of Simon and Stevenson's argument, because of a lack of *specialized* expertise. New think tanks may be required to address the complex set of issues that have arisen in the post—September I Ith world, just as think tanks were created before and after World War II to assist policy-makers to confront a wide range of economic, social, and security concerns. What Simon and Stevenson are suggesting is not radically different from what Robert Brookings, Andrew Carnegie, and a group of engineers at Project Rand proposed decades ago. The rise of think tanks is also closely associated with the type of expertise and services they offer and their ability to satisfy the needs of policy-makers, journalists, opinion leaders, philanthropists, and corporate and private donors in ways that other institutions engaged in research and analysis cannot. For example, unlike university professors, who in most instances must balance the demands of teaching, research, and administration, policy experts at think tanks have the luxury of concentrating on what they do best — monitoring, analyzing, and commenting on timely and relevant policy issues. Experts at think tanks often publish books and articles that stimulate discussion in the academic community, but they are concerned primarily with generating a range of research products that will be of immediate interest to policy-makers and to the public. They cannot afford, as their colleagues in universities often can, to invest five, ten, or even fifteen years on a research project. Moreover, most private or independent think tanks do not have the luxury of relying, as many academics at universities do, on government support for their research. Although a handful of prominent think tanks continue to draw heavily on government funding, many, including the vast majority of advocacy think tanks, look to philanthropic foundations, corporations, and private donors for assistance. Furthermore, like the institutes they fund, donors have a vested interest in influencing the political climate of the day. This in large part explains why so many advocacy think tanks have been created over the past several decades. They have struck a responsive chord with donors who are prepared to support their vision of how the United States ought to be governed. Experts at think tanks understand the importance of responding to the needs of policy-makers and therefore make this a priority. They need not be reminded that securing a captive audience on Capitol Hill and/or in the White House can pay handsome dividends. By contrast, scholars at universities are rarely concerned about meeting the daily demands of policy-makers. Instead, they prefer to engage in long-term research in the hope that their findings, based on years of rigorous analysis, will help to advance the public interest. In short, scholars working at think tanks and universities have very different priorities, objectives, and timelines. This is why universities cannot be a substitute for think tanks and why think tanks cannot take the place of universities.

## Impact Answers

### World Improving/Violence Declining

#### The US is not the same – the overall historical record is decidedly improving with changes in political norms and ideas in American diplomats, which disproves their whole theory, but dispensing with moralistic totalizations is necessary to prevent future active measures

Carothers 18 [THOMAS CAROTHERS is Senior Vice President for Studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 3/12. "Is the U.S. Hypocritical to Criticize Russian Election Meddling?" <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2018-03-12/us-hypocritical-criticize-russian-election-meddling>]

The U.S. response to Russian meddling in the 2016 election has been extraordinarily weak. Not only that, it has been accompanied by an attitude of “whataboutism” on the part of some Americans—the relativistic view that the United States has little ground to complain about Russia’s actions given its own history of meddling in other countries’ political campaigns and elections. It is certainly essential to be honest and realistic about the considerable record of past U.S. electoral meddling, and the contrast between Russia and the United States in this domain is certainly not black and white. Yet neither is it one of indistinguishable shades of gray. The United States is simply not engaging in electoral meddling in a manner comparable to Russia’s approach.

THE PAST IS NOT THE PRESENT

Two key flaws underlie relativist accounts. First, such a position fails to distinguish adequately between the pattern of U.S. interventionism during the Cold War, on the one hand, and U.S. activity since the end of the Cold War on the other. During the former period, the United States did indeed illegitimately intervene in numerous foreign elections, trying to tilt outcomes in favor of candidates the United States preferred and in a smaller number of cases laboring to oust legitimately elected leaders Washington saw as hostile to its security and economic interests. The record is long and dark, marked by some especially well-known cases in Guatemala and Iran in the early 1950s and in Chile and Nicaragua in the 1970s and 1980s.

Since the end of the Cold War, however, such interventionism has decreased significantly because U.S. policymakers no longer view the world as enmeshed in a global ideological struggle in which every country, no matter how small, is a critical piece on a larger strategic chessboard. Washington has thus become much less concerned about the outcomes of most foreign elections and much less engaged in trying to tilt them in any particular direction.

Of course, one can identify a few cases over the past 25 years when the United States has tried to manipulate foreign elections with the aim of getting its preferred candidate into power. When Russian President Boris Yeltsin faced reelection in 1996, the Clinton administration mobilized some economic relief to Yeltsin, to try to help him win. In the Palestinian elections of 2006, the George W. Bush administration employed U.S. economic assistance to try to bolster Fatah in its contest with Hamas (with predictably counterproductive results). In the lead up to the 2005 Iraqi elections, the Bush administration formulated a plan to funnel covert funds to favored Iraqi candidates and parties but reportedly backed away from the plan after Congress objected. In 2009, according to former Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ memoir, the United States worked behind the scenes prior to the Afghanistan elections to push President Hamid Karzai aside and keep him from winning.

There have no doubt been other cases, known only to those with access to classified information. Yet on the whole, U.S. electoral meddling has decreased significantly since the Cold War years. This is true because of the change in U.S. interests and because of an evolution of norms in many parts of the U.S. policy establishment about the acceptability of such actions. The overall picture today is of a Russia actively expanding its covert electoral meddling in multiple regions as U.S. meddling continues to decline. Those convinced that Washington must still routinely use covert means to influence election outcomes all around the world should consider the available evidence: in the last few years the rising pattern of Russian efforts to manipulate the political life of countries in central Europe, western Europe, the Balkans, the United States, and Latin America has left many telltale fingerprints—it seems highly unlikely Washington could have carried out a similar pattern of activities and not leave behind at least some noticeable traces of them.

WHAT ABOUT ALL THAT DEMOCRACY PROMOTION?

A second problematic element of the relativist position is the charge that U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad—which make use of diplomatic leverage, democracy aid, and cooperation with pro-democratic multilateral organizations—are just another, more covert form of electoral meddling akin to what the Russians are doing. Russian President Vladimir Putin is a strong subscriber to this viewpoint, convinced that U.S. and other Western democracy programs in his country represent efforts to manipulate its domestic political life against him. Many Western observers—acutely aware of the long record of U.S. interventionism—have their suspicions as well.

U.S. pro-democracy diplomacy and assistance do indeed seek to shape the political direction of other countries. And they are carried out with a strong sense of self-interest, not out of unalloyed idealism. They are driven by the belief that democratic outcomes abroad will generally be favorable to U.S. security and economic interests by producing stable governments amenable to deeper partnerships thanks to shared political values. But unlike Russian electoral meddling, U.S. democracy promotion does not seek to exacerbate sociopolitical divisions, systematically spread lies, favor particular candidates, or undercut the technical integrity of elections. On the whole, it seeks to help citizens exercise their basic political and civil rights in electoral processes, enhance the technical integrity of such processes, and increase electoral transparency.

Skeptics reluctant to accept the idea that democracy diplomacy and assistance are not about manipulating elections should look at some recent cases—such as U.S. efforts to support Tunisia’s democratic evolution, to help Gambia resolve the blockage that followed its 2016 elections, to encourage the Hungarian government to respect media freedom and civic space, and to push the Myanmar military at the start of this decade to make room for at least some democratic political life in the country.

Skeptics should also note that although the U.S. organizations engaged in democracy work are mostly funded by the U.S. government itself, they are regularly at odds with the preferences of U.S. diplomats, who often hold on to relationships with friendly autocrats, as they are wary of the strategic value of democratic change. In the mid-1990s, this was true in Indonesia under former President Suharto and in Kazakhstan under President Nursultan Nazarbayev. And in the first decade of this century, the same occurred in Egypt under former President Hosni Mubarak and in Azerbaijan under the Aliyev family. Skeptics should also bear in mind that in most cases where the United States is engaged in promoting democracy abroad, it is working alongside and sometimes in active partnership with other democracies not known for geopolitical interventionism, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, and Sweden.

GRAY AREAS Although the overall case is strong for distinguishing U.S. democracy support abroad from the sort of political meddling that Russia is now making a habit of, there are several difficult issues that necessarily complicate the comparison. First, in a small but important number of cases, the United States does assist one side of a contested electoral campaign against the other. This occurs when a strongman leader of doubtful democratic fidelity is trying to legitimate himself and perpetuate his rule through elections. In various such cases, as with Chilean President Augusto Pinochet’s plebiscite in 1988, Slobodan Milosevic’s reelection campaign in 2000, and various Belarusian elections in the 2000s, the United States and a number of other Western actors offered assistance both to the opposition political forces challenging the strongman and to civic groups that were mobilizing get-out-the-vote campaigns. From the Western point of view, such actions are not interfering in a free and fair election but rather trying to help level the playing field in an election that is stacked unfairly against the challengers. From the point of view of the power holders, of course, the United States and its allies are trying to shape the outcome of the election in a partisan fashion. Second, although U.S. and other Western assistance to civil society aims to aid civic actors in their advocacy of rights and democracy—not to take sides in partisan political struggles and campaigns—the line between political society and civil society is often blurry. What to Western providers are principled civic actors working to advance universally valid political and civil rights and democratic values such as transparency and accountability, are to local authorities political animals cloaked in civic garb challenging their hold on power. This is especially true in partially or fully closed political environments such as exist in Cambodia and Venezuela, where regimes have choked off the opposition and demonstrated an ability to undermine elections. Third, despite the fact that most U.S. and Western democracy promotion is carried out in a transparent manner, some aid providers are becoming less transparent in their assistance in order to protect their recipients from being harassed or persecuted. As a result, a growing number of regimes have accused the West of engaging in clandestine political meddling. This scenario creates a vicious cycle in which undemocratic regimes charge democracy promoters of secretive meddling and persecute those they work with, thus driving such organizations to adopt less transparent methods. This in turn further reinforces the perception of secretive meddling. U.S. democracy assistance directed at Iran, for example, has become much less transparent over the past ten years as crackdowns by the Iranian government on recipients of foreign assistance have intensified. Fourth, U.S. democracy policy is markedly inconsistent, even though U.S. efforts to promote democracy in other countries are generally driven by genuine pro-democracy motives. The U.S. government makes more funds available for democracy programs in countries that the United States views as strategic enemies, such as Iran and Cuba, than it does in nondemocratic countries the United States views as strategic partners, such as Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia. The inconsistency is not absolute. Washington does make some efforts to promote democracy and rights in states ruled by “friendly tyrants.” The Trump administration’s decision last year to withhold some U.S. assistance to Egypt as a means of expressing dissatisfaction with President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s antidemocratic policies is just one example. And the fact that one is inconsistent in applying the principle does not render meaningless the applications that are made. Nevertheless, the inconsistency hurts the larger case that democracy promotion has real roots in principle.

DIVERGENT PATHS

It is not yet clear what it will take for the United States to move forward in putting together an effective response to Russian electoral meddling, but dispensing with the argument that Washington has no moral standing for objecting to such actions is certainly one necessary step. The arguments over “whataboutism” merit some careful reflection and assessment given that the facts are not simple and not all the facts are available. The United States does have a past record of electoral meddling, particularly during the Cold War. Yet the trends of U.S. and Russian behavior are divergent, not convergent—with Russia on the negative side of the divide. And although the domain of U.S. democracy promotion is hardly free of flaws and serious past mistakes, it is not the dark twin of the illicit, covert election meddling that Russia seems intent on making one of its defining signatures abroad.

### At: Structures Inevitable

#### Structures are not inevitable, but rather alterable through responsible political decision-making

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In this article, I have argued that in order for IR to remain politically relevant and critical, we must rethink and reflect on the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions of the discipline. I then explored how onto-epistemologies, ethics, and political agency are interlinked. Ontologies of entanglement tend to embrace complex conceptualizations of causality and the morphogenetic properties of what exist. In a quantum world, ontological cuts happen in practices. This worldview invites a reconsideration of the way we justify and address political decisions and ethical action beyond the universalism supported by atomistic ontologies and the stifling limits imposed by substantialist-structuralism. As Nick Onuf has argued, “In a straightened world, as in a world in turmoil, talk of universal principles rings hollow… In such a world, positional ethics is the best we can hope for” (Onuf forthcoming, quoted with permission).

A quantum reconceptualization of our being in the world and our relation to matter calls for a profound sense of modesty, as well as for the central role of responsibility for taking political decisions. In an entangled world that is not governed by theoretically detectable, linear, and immutable laws of history, but instead by intra-agential processes, the conditions of possibility for political agency are rooted in the morphogenetic properties of practices. Taking responsibility for critically questioning what exists without the hubris of assuming our ability to ordain outcomes displays an affinity with Foucault’s methodological and political project. In this vein, ethical guidelines may not be grounded on abstractions stemming from the solitary ruminations of an individual’s mind. Prudence, responsibility, and practices of cultivation of the self offer pathways to overcome the limitations of the Kantian categorical imperative by which universal prescriptions are the main way of validating ethical choices. As Patomäki has shown, universalism may elicit exclusionary and violent practices. Moreover, as Connolly has argued, the nostalgia for a slowly moving world regulated by linear relations of causality and characterized by certainty and stability may be the root of fundamentalism.

Furthermore, if we accept Barad’s position that we are “of the world” and not above the world, theorizing looks more like a practice endowed with performative political effects than a quest for the discovery of the “true nature” of what exists. Therefore, intellectual undertakings are a form of political agency and come with great responsibility. Such responsibility requires the need for exercising prudence in making truth statements about what is universally good or naturally inevitable. Assumptions about linearity of causal relations, universal laws of history, or ontological properties of entities yield two problematic effects. On the one hand, they may stifle political imagination; on the other hand, they could encourage actions based upon abstract prescriptions rather than upon careful diagnosis of the forces that obtain in the situation at hand. In an entangled world, there are no externalities. Arguments that divert responsibility by basing political choices upon abstract principles or aspirations and, as a result, that treat what happens on the ground as “unintended consequences” or “collateral damage,” are ethically thin and politically dangerous.

In fact, unintended consequences may well be the result of irresponsible political decision-making that does not include a competent assessment of the practical configurations that constitute the context of action and the means necessary to achieve stated goals. Such attitudes, Amoureux and Steele (2014) have suggested, have led to disastrous initiatives, such as the Bush administration’s invasion of Iraq. Likewise, Kennedy (2006) has shown that the bland rhetoric of jus in bello that provides standardized criteria regarding the number of acceptable civilian casualties (conveniently called collateral damage) produces the effect of diverting responsibility from those who conduct war while assuaging their consciences concerning the injuries and deaths their choices are inflicting. Kennedy (2004) has also shown that as a result of the preference for universal normativity, the human rights profession (which he calls “the invisible college”) is more concerned with protecting abstract norms than with acting politically so as to devise viable solutions to specific problems.

Universal norms and bureaucratic routines play a major role in prescribing and justifying UN peacekeeping interventions. As Jean Marie Guehénno argued more than a decade ago, strategies of international intervention based upon assumptions of causal linearity and invariance may amount to hubris. Norms and rules can also offer grounds for appeasement. The massacres that occurred in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s provide examples of how, by uncritically following institutionalized rules, United Nations peacekeepers permitted atrocities. UN employees are not cold-blooded monsters or extremely callous individuals. They follow norms and rules, key examples of which include the principle of “impartiality,” Security Council mandates, and “rules of engagement.” By doing so, however, they have often fallen short of considering the possible consequences of decisions in specific situations. The United Nations’ failure to take action to prevent the Rwanda and Srebrenica genocide testifies to the fact that following universal norms (i.e., the imperative to preserve impartiality) and bureaucratic reasoning (i.e., the rules of engagement prescribing not to intervene to disarm any party of the conflict) set the stage for avoiding a careful assessment of what was at stake on the eve of the massacres. These ways of reasoning also appeased consciences for not making decisions accountable to the people in danger (Zanotti 2014).

Significantly, the lack of prudence that derives from broad overgeneralizations and reliance on abstractions, rather than careful consideration of what the case demands, threatens more self-defeating outcomes in peacekeeping and international politics. This is why a careful reflection of the ways our political choices are validated ontologically and epistemologically is of paramount practical importance. Seven decades ago, Carr (1946) advocated the need for conceptualizing political agency and ethics in a way that addresses both the limits of the idealist illusion regarding the possibility to transform reality through acts of will as well as the realist persuasion about the inescapable subordination of actors to external conditions. Both of these positions, Carr pointed out, lead to self-defeating outcomes and stifle political imagination because they focus on general abstractions, failing to take into consideration what conditions and political opportunity actually obtain in specific historical configurations.

Here I have proposed that an ontology of entanglement fosters an ethic of engagement and activism along the lines suggested by Foucault and opens up possibilities for political action. In this ontological horizon, what qualifies as meaningful agency is not stifled by the structuralist commitment to the stabilizing effects of structures (like in Waltz’s) or by the inescapable features of an oppressive and alienating social order that dispossess subjects of their humanity and reduces them to “bare life” (as in Agamben). Instead, micropolitical interventions, parrēsia, and the cultivation of a particular kind of character, while not revolutionizing the status quo, may be relevant to triggering social change. Importantly, ontologies of entanglement also raise the bar for adjudicating the ethical validity of political choices. Radical assumption of responsibility drastically limits what is acceptable as “unintended consequences.” This is important for the way international organizations make decisions regarding international peacekeeping interventions and for the way politicians decide to wage war. Ethically and politically sound decision-making cannot be based mainly upon the apodictic recognition of universal rules of behavior, abstract aspirations, or overarching theories of the functioning of society. They must also include careful analysis of how clusters of causes may generate effects in the specific contexts at hand and take responsibility for the ontological cuts our initiatives operate and for the morphogenetic processes they may set off.